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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS, STATE OF UTAH 
JAMIS M. JOHNSON, : VERIFIED MEMORANDUM IN 
: SUPPORT OF THE MOTION 
Appellant : FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION 
vs. : 
JAYSON ORVIS, : Ct of Appeals no. 20041122 
Appellee : 
Appellant, Jamis M. Johnson, appearing pro se, respectfully submits this Verified 
Memorandum Of Law In Support Of The Motion For Summary Disposition. 
INTRODUCTION 
The grounds for reversing summary judgment below are as follows: 
1. The district court committed reversible manifest error by erroneously applying 
the doctrine of judicial estoppel to dismiss Appellant's cause of action where the 
elements necessary for applying the doctrine were not met or satisfied. 
2. The district court improperly weighed the contested facts and Appellant's 
credibility when it concluded that it was satisfied that Appellant was "avoiding creditors" 
in an unrelated prior case and, therefore, he could not maintain a partnership action 
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against Appellee in this case, and the court entered a declaratory judgment against 
Appellant declaring that no partnership existed between Appellant and Appellee. 
As shown herein, this Court should grant this motion for summary disposition 
and reverse the grant of summary judgment below as a matter of law for manifest error 
on the foregoing grounds and as further argued herein below. 
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FACTS 
The facts relied upon herein are supported by the sworn verification of Appellant 
Johnson. The facts demonstrating the partnership between Appellant Johnson and 
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Appellee Orvis will be presented first to present a proper background of the matter as 
was presented to the district court. Because of the district court's improper application 
of the doctrine of judicial estoppel based on a purported inconsistent statement by 
Appellant in a prior unrelated proceeding between the SBA and Appellant, said facts 
will be included here as well to illustrate the clear manifest error by the district court. 
For clarity, the parties will be intermittently referred to hereinafter by their proper names 
rather than their appellate designations. 
1. Brief Outline of Factual and Procedural History 
1. Appellee Orvis (Plaintiff below) and Appellant Johnson (and wife DaNell) 
have a partnership extending back to 1994 and dividing profit share on a group of credit 
repair businesses. 
2. The partnership is documented and evidenced by written agreements, course 
of performance and financial records. 
3. The partnership and businesses grew to be extremely profitable now involving 
millions of dollars. 
4. Appellant asserts that Appellee Orvis first began embezzling and 
misappropriating partnership profit share as early as 1997. Discovery to date, 
particularly deposition testimony of Appellee employees, confirm this. (See the 
deposition testimony of Will Vigil excerpted herein on pages 14 and 15, infra, and in 
Exhibit 1; See the deposition testimony of Tommy Triplett excerpted herein on pages 15 
through 17, infra, and in Exhibit 2; and see the deposition testimony of Jade Griffen, 
excerpted herein on pages 14 and 15, infra, and in Exhibit 3.) 
5. In July 2001, Appellant made demand on Appellee for an accounting and an 
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audit. (See Demand For Audit and Accounting, Exhibit 4.) 
6. In August 2001, Appellee Orvis. using partnership funds, purchased an SBA 
judgment against Appellant to use offensively to mask the preceding fraud, to attempt 
to extinguish the partnership, and to seize profit share distribution; and upon acquiring 
the SBA judgment did withhold, seize, and convert profit share that had hitherto been 
distributed to the Johnsons. 
7. The SBA judgment was purchased with the counsel and participation of 
Victor Lawrence, attorney for DaNell Johnson and for Appellant, in the SBA case, and 
numerous other personal matters, and in business affairs of the partnership. (Triplett 
Deposition, Exhibit 2, See excerpts and discussion, pages 15 through 17 infra; See 
SBA deposition of DaNell Johnson, Exhibit 5, and discussion and excerpts thereof, 
page 19 and 20 infra.) 
8. These actions by Lawrence and Orvis are in breach of attorney fiduciary duty 
and partner fiduciary duty; the object of this conspiracy by Lawrence and Orvis was to 
take the profit share owed to the Johnsons, which at this date would exceed $1.5 Million 
(based on the last six months of actual profit share) and is closer to $5 Million based on 
amounts concealed and converted by Mr. Orvis; Mr. Orvis and Mr. Lawrence profited 
by these acts by converting Appellant profit share and dividing it between themselves. 
9. In August 2001, after Appellant's demand for accounting, and in concert with 
his purchase of the SBA judgment, Appellant Orvis brought this suit in Third District 
Court against Appellant seeking a declaratory judgment that Appellant had no 
partnership with Appellee or alternatively such interest was limited to 25% of two 
specific businesses. 
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10. Appellant counterclaimed for an accounting and for profits; DaNell Johnson 
was joined as a Third Party Plaintiff, and Victor Lawrence and others as Third Party 
Defendants. 
11. On March 29, 2004 Appellee Orvis moved for summary judgment. (Exhibit 
6 contains both the Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff Jayson Orvis' Motion for 
Summary Judgment, and the Affidavit of Jayson Orvis.) Citing only an 1857 
Tennessee case as support, Appellee asserted that Appellant was judicially estopped 
from asserting a partnership interest with Appellee Orvis; this estoppel was based of 
an Orvis' interpretation of a response by Appellant in a deposition taken by the SBA in 
an unrelated prior case between the SBA and Appellant. Appellee Orvis asserted that 
Johnson responded to the SBA that he did not have partnerships. (It is the judgment in 
this SBA case that was purchased by Appellee.) (Exhibit 7 is the November 1999 SBA 
Deposition of Jamis Johnson.) 
12. Appellant opposed the summary judgment motion. (Exhibit 8 is the 
Memorandum of Jamis Johnson in Opposition to Jayson Orvis' Motion for Summary 
Judgment.) Appellant asserted that i.) the quote was misconstrued, but was irrelevant 
regardless under the doctrine of judicial estoppel, and ii.) the doctrine of judicial 
estoppel, to be operative here, requires that the prior (SBA) action and this present 
action be between the same parties; the prior action involve the same issues as this 
action; the prior action be "successfully maintained"; and that Appellee must have 
detrimentally relied on the statement in the SBA deposition. Appellant argued that 
Appellee met none of the requirements for the doctrine of judicial estoppel to be 
applicable in this case. 
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13. The court heard oral argument on August 9, 2004. (Exhibit 9 is the 
transcript of Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment.) 
14. In its minute entry of October 20,2004, the Court granted summary 
judgment to Appellee, stating "...there was no question of mistake, Johnson testified 
as he did [in the prior unrelated SBA deposition] so as to avoid collection efforts from 
the Small Business Administration." [Emphasis added]; the court found that Appellant 
Johnson should be judicially estopped in this case from asserting a partnership based 
on the contested SBA deposition statement; and the court granted summary judgment 
to Appellee Orvis. (Exhibit 10 is the district court's minute entry dated October 20, 
2004.) 
15. Appellee drafted a Judgment and a Findings of Facts and Conclusions of 
Law which were executed by the district court on October 20, 2004. That findings of 
fact were entered is evidence alone of improper weighing of facts as opposed to issues 
of law which is the only consideration for granting summary judgment. (Exhibit 11 
contains both the Judgment, and the Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law.) 
2. Evidence of the partnership between Mr. Johnson and Mr. Orvis. 
16. Extensive and substantial evidence exists documenting the partnership 
between Mr. Orvis and Mr. Johnson. The evidence includes not only written 
partnership agreements, and profit share distribution checks, but letters, recorded oral 
statements of the parties and witness testimony. The evidence is so extensive that 
only portions were presented in district court in support of the opposition to the motion 
for summary judgment. Discovery was not complete when summary judgment was 
entered. Here, only a portion of the existing evidence submitted below will be 
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referenced but sufficient evidence to demonstrate a partnership under Utah statutes 
and case law. The evidence of the partnership is presented here by type: first 
documentary evidence then deposition testimony of third parties and of Mr. and Mrs. 
Johnson. 
A. Written Documentation of the Qrvis-Johnson Partnership. 
17. There are numerous documents providing clear evidence of the Orvis-
Johnson partnership and that that Orvis and Johnson operated a partnership or joint 
venture to engage in activities broadly described as the "credit repair" business. 
i.) The Partnership Agreement 
18 Perhaps most compelling of these documents is an "Agreement", a copy of 
which Mr. Orvis produced in discovery. (Attached as Exhibit 12 is the Agreement). 
Though undated, the Agreement was signed by both Mr. Orvis and Mr. Johnson in May 
of 1999 along with other documents. (Hereinafter this said Agreement is referred to as 
the "1999 Orvis-Johnson Partnership Agreement".) It memorializes and sets forth the 
terms of a pre-existing and continuing arrangement between the Orvis and the 
Johnsons to share profits from businesses providing "credit repair services." This is, of 
course, the very definition of a partnership. Utah Code Ann. §§ 48-1-3(1)(a) ("a 
partnership is an association of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners a 
business for profit"), 48-1-4(4) f[t]he receipt by a person of a share of the profits of a 
business is prima facie evidence that he is a partner in the business."...) 
19. In its recital paragraphs, the 1999 Orvis-Johnson Partnership Agreement 
recounts the history of the business relationship between Mr. Orvis and Mr. Johnson. 
It states "Orvis and Johnson have developed over the last several years enterprises 
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that provide credit repair services to a nationwide clientele." 1999 Orvis-Johnson 
Partnership Agreement, at 1 (emphasis added). 
20. The 1999 Orvis-Johnson Partnership Agreement then details the credit 
repair services of these "enterprises." and explains their growth: "Such credit repair 
services include, but are not limited to a range of activities, including telemarketing, 
internet marketing, consulting, law representation, and the enterprises have grown 
over the years and have acquired a variety of tangible and intangible assets including, 
without limitation, for example equipment, computers, software, furniture, knowledge, 
methods, techniques in marketing, lead sources, internet operations." Id. (emphasis 
added). 
21. The 1999 Orvis-Johnson Partnership Agreement also states that "the 
parties acknowledge that they have governed and operated these enterprises under an 
outline agreement and under a course of performance that they desire to continue." 
Id. (emphasis added). 
22. The1999 Orvis-Johnson Partnership Agreement also explains, to some 
extent, what has occasioned its execution. It states "the parties desire to provide for 
the unimpaired continuation and growth of the business to the mutual benefit of the 
parties," and that "an agreement was put in place reciting that all assets of this 
enterprise are placed in the name of Jayson Orvis so as to protect these assets and 
provide for the continued growth and mutual profitability." Id. 
23. Against the backdrop of these recitals - which are acknowledged and 
agreed to by both Orvis and Johnson - the parties then expressly agree (1) that 
"[governance and compensation/allocation of profits shall continue in the percentages 
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as heretofore provided under the operating arrangements and as the enterprise 
continues to grow"; (2) that "all monies shall be paid to Jayson Orvis or his business 
entity... and Jayson Orvis shall provide Johnson's share or allocation to any party 
directed by Johnson"; and (3) that "the intent being that these enterprises shall 
continue to grow, expand, multiply as directed by the parties under their outline 
agreement and course of performance to their mutual economic benefit." Id. 
(emphasis added). 
ii.) The 1994 Memorandum 
24. The 1999 Partnership Agreement alone, is blatant, unequivocal evidence of 
the Orvis-Johnson partnership; it is executed by the parties and specifically identifies 
and defines the ongoing partnership. But it is hardly the only document evidencing the 
partnership. For instance, as early as 1994, there is a memorandum dated September 
1,1994 from Jamis Johnson, Jayson Orvis, and others, and addressed to these same 
individuals, which memorializes the formation of an entity called "The Genesis Project." 
Mr. Orvis produced a copy of this memorandum. (Exhibit 13 is the Genesis Project 
Agreement.) The Memorandum reflects that, in consideration for their respective 
contributions (which are specified in the Memorandum), the parties expressly agree (1) 
to establish "The Genesis Project," "whose purpose is to create and manage profitable 
entities for the five partners," id. (emphasis added), and (2) to "[d]ivide equally the 
equity and profits of The Genesis Project." Id. (emphasis added). This memorandum 
is further evidentiary support" for the partnership, with, as Johnsons claim, it inception 
back as far as 1994. 
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Hi.) Assignment of trade name January 20001 is evidence of Orvis-
Johnson partnership 
25. On January 12, 2001, Mr. Johnson executed an Assignment to Mr. Orvis 
assigning the trade name "Lexington Law Firms" to Mr. Orvis to hold for the mutual 
benefit of both. (Exhibit 14 is the Assignment of trade name.) 
26. Mr. Orvis obtained this Assignment from Mr. Johnson, references it in his 
Complaint and produced it in discovery. He recorded it and it is on file with the 
Department of Commerce. 
27. This Assignment is clear evidence of the ongoing Orvis-Johnson 
partnership. It sates: 
WHEREAS, the said trade name [Lexington Law Firms] is an asset actually 
owned jointly by Jamis M. Johnson andJavson Orvis. and 
WHEREAS, Jamis M. Johnson and Javson own intellectual property and 
tangible and intangible assets for the business of credit repair and per 
prior agreement, this trade name is to be assigned by Jamis M. Johnson 
to Javson Orvis. and 
WHEREAS, Jayson Orvis has established a limited liability company 
called Attorneys For People, LLC, of which he is the only member in 
which he was to hold some of these hint assets and through which he 
administrates fsicl some of the credit repair business, and 
WHEREAS, Jamis M. Johnson desires to assign the trade name to Jayson 
Orvis/Attorneys For People and it shall form and is part of these assets 
jointly owned by Johnson and Orvis and administrated bv Orvis: 
NOW, THEREFORE, based on the foregoing recitals and upon the prior 
agreement of the parties ... [Johnson assigns trade name to Orvis] 
[Emphasis added] 
28. Thus, only a few months before Mr. Orvis secretly purchased the SBA 
judgment and filed this lawsuit claiming Mr. Johnson had no partnership, Mr. Orvis and 
Mr. Johnson are passing a legal document between them clearly describing the 
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ongoing partnership. 
iv.) Documents Evidencing Payments of "Profit Share" to Johnsons 
29. The partnership, from the start of 1998, had an unbroken chain of profit 
share checks distributing profits between the partners on an agreed upon formula. 
The payments distributed to Johnson, by agreement from 1996, were consistently 
distributed to Mrs. DaNell Johnson, wife of Appellant, (or to her business entities) who 
per prior agreement held the beneficial interest and received the distribution. Such 
profit share distribution is demonstrated by these checks from late 1997 until August of 
2001 when Appellee Orvis simultaneously purchased the SBA judgment (referenced 
herein) and filed this suit for a declaratory judgment that there was no partnership and 
withheld all further profit share distribution. Mr. Orvis, in discovery, produced a partial 
but nonetheless extensive list of the profit share distribution to Johnsons. That list is 
set out in Mr. Orvis' response to discovery. In Supplemental Responses to Mr. 
Johnson's First Set of Interrogatories, Mr. Orvis admits that he (or the Orvis entities) 
made substantial payments to Johnson on a regular basis until August of 2001. See 
Plaintiff, Counter Defendant and Third-party Defendant Jayson Orvis' Supplemental 
Responses to Defendant, Counterclaimant and Third-party Plaintiff Jamis Johnson's 
First Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents, at 8-9 
(Interrogatory No. 11) (Attached as Exhibit 15; see also Complaint, fl 24). Other 
documents evidence the shared profits from the credit repair business. There is, for 
example, a memo authored and signed by Mr. Orvis, addressed to Mr. Johnson, and 
dated March 2,1998, which refers to the parties' "profit shares." (A copy of this memo 
is attached hereto as Exhibit 10 thereto.) 
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30. In his interrogatory answers, Mr. Orvis, while admitting the substantial 
distributions, characterizes this long history of payments as "voluntary], and in Orvis' 
full discretion as to both amount and frequency," id. This answer, that the profit share 
distributions were essentially a gift to Mr. Johnson, obviously lacks basic credibility. 
The payments are substantial (some as much as $34,000), regularly made on a 
specific monthly basis, and per the agreed on formula, and the payments continue 
without interruption from 1998 through August of 2001, when Mr. Johnson demanded 
an accounting and audit of the partnership, and Mr. Orvis filed his declaratory 
judgment Complaint. This continual history of payments referred to by both parties as 
profit share is concrete course of performance and blunt evidence of the Orvis-
Johnson partnership. 
v.) Correspondence Between Orvis and Johnson Concerning Their Business 
Relationship. 
31. In addition to these documents, there is a long history of correspondence 
exchanged between Mr. Johnson and Mr. Orvis between 1999 and 2001 right up to a 
few days before Mr. Orvis filed this lawsuit, concerning their profit share and ongoing 
partnership. This correspondence provides further evidence of the Orvis-Johnson 
partnership. 
32. By the end of 1998, Mr. Johnson was facing enormous professional 
problems. He was facing disbarment. See In the Matter of the Discipline of Jamis M. 
Johnson, 48 P.3d 881 (2002) (upholding the same district court's summary judgment 
order disbarring Johnson). 1 
1. Judge Timothy Hanson, Third District Judge, was both the trial judge in this matter and in the bar 
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33. And, through failed business ventures several money judgments had been 
entered against him, including a substantial judgment in favor of the Small Business 
Administration. Further, the State of Tennessee had brought suit against Mr. Johnson 
in his capacity as the "dba" of Lexington Law Firm, one of the entities managed by the 
Orvis-Johnson partnership. 
34. Mr. Orvis insisted that he manage the partnership assets for the 
partnership. (Seethe 1999 Orvis-Johnson Partnership Agreement, Exhibit 12.) 
Nevertheless, throughout this period, both Mr. Orvis and Mr. Johnson worked for the 
benefit of the partnership; profit share was distributed, the SBA was provided discovery 
by Mr. Orvis and Mr. Lawrence; Mr. Johnson negotiated a consent order with 
Tennessee; Mr. Orvis and Mr. Johnson dealt with the bar matter and installed Victor 
Lawrence as the directing attorney for Lexington Law Firm with Mr. Johnson resigning 
that post; and throughout this time, profit share was distributed. Their written 
exchanges reflect the continued existence of a partnership through this period: The 
following (copies of which are collected in Exhibit 16) are some excerpts of these 
exchanges: 
a. January 22.199 fsicl [actual date: 1999] Letter from Orvis to Johnson - In 
this letter, Mr. Orvis tells Mr. Johnson that "I really don't want to spend more of my time 
on your contingency plan. I would like you to work that out and let me know what your 
plan is when you feel ready." He then sets forth five criteria it must meet to be 
acceptable to him, one of which is that "those of us with profit share and salary 
disciplinary matter against Mr. Johnson. 
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commitments will continue to receive our same compensation and will continue to 
receive it in proportion to growth and revenue." (emphasis added). In the letter, Mr. 
Orvis also states that he is glad Mr. Johnson "turned away from the idea of a straight 
buyout, as I was becoming increasingly uncomfortable with the figures being 
discussed." 
b. November 1.1999 Letter from Johnson to Orvis - (produced by Mr. Orvis) In 
this letter, Mr. Johnson "outlinefs] the substance of our conversations and 
understanding regarding the management and operations of our ventures and the way 
forward." He then states that he understands Mr. Orvis "will continue to manage these 
businesses for our joint benefit." To that end, Johnson agrees Orvis "may have 
'control' to manage these businesses and [he/Johnson] will not attempt to exercise 
managerial control over these endeavors." Johnson closes by saying "I sincerely hope 
that all this may result in business growth, exceptional mutual prosperity, and 
partnership tranquility between us." 
c. January 3. 2000 Letter from Johnson to Orvis (produced by Orvis). In this 
letter, Johnson says that he is "going to jump into the void," and try to exercise faith 
and trust in Orvis because "I am coming to believe that you deserve the trust." He 
then says "in the ongoing attempt to keep the spirit of whatever our contract is, try to 
get me to $45,000 per month from the growth." 
d. August 29. 2000 Memo from Johnson to Orvis (produced by Orvis) In this 
memo, Johnson raises "a few issues that have come up in the last month or so that we 
deed [sic] to get resolution on." He then sets forth his view regarding "Lexington's and 
affiliated companies' work on a move to a new location," payment of an extra fee to 
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Orvis and "Sam" for personally guaranteeing a company lease, and the fact that 
"[pjrofit share was down in July as you predicted.... I have great hopes for profit 
share at the end of this month but even greater hopes for the fourth quarter of the 
year." 
e. August 30. 2000 Memo from Orvis responding to Johnson: Orvis says he 
"feel[s] awkward discussing the particulars of firm management" but he is "pleased to 
continue paying your company as an adjunct consultant to my consulting services 
agency While the terms of the compensation I pay your company are foggy at 
best, I believe that you have been pleased with the amount of compensation afforded." 
Mr. Orvis closes with the following: 
"Might I make a suggestion? I would suggest that we just let our foggy, little 
business relationship continue down it's [sic] foggy, little course. You have no 
reason to believe that I will stop compensating your company for consulting 
services along the lines already established. Attempting to fortify your position 
can only heat up the debate. I am committed to making a bigger pie for as long 
as is feasible, and that has been nothing but good for both of us." 
f. August 13, 2001. Orvis telephone message to Johnson. In a message left on 
Mr. Johnson's telephone discussing profit share, just days prior to his bringing a suit for 
a declaratory judgment that there is no partnership or profit share, Mr. Orvis calls Mr. 
Johnson and discusses profit share being slow this month and volunteers to get more 
to Mr. Johnson. The transcription was taken by attorney Cheryl Mori-Atkinson and 
submitted under her affidavit to the district court. 
g. In addition to the foregoing, Mr. Johnson kept a running journal, produced to 
Mr. Orvis and a monthly accounting of Mr. Orvis' "accounting" for monthly profit share. 
These are not attached as Exhibits. 
16 
FINAL DEMAND FOR ACCOUNTING AND AUDIT 
35. The chain of correspondence continues through August 16, 2001. Then, on 
that date, Johnson writes to say "for various reasons of which you are aware, we have 
come to the point where we need a full accounting of all business operations since our 
inception." Memo from J. Johnson to J. Orvis, dated August 16, 2001. ("Demand For 
Audit and Accounting" of "Demand") (Exhibit 4 is the Demand For Audit and 
Accounting). Mr. Orvis' declaratory judgment Complaint was filed within two weeks of 
Mr. Johnson's Demand to Mr. Orvis. 
B. Testimony of Witnesses evidence the Orvis-Johnson partnership. 
36. The testimony of individuals also provides evidentiary support for Mr. 
Johnson's claim that a partnership existed between him and Mr. Orvis, and that it 
continued until the filing of the lawsuit. Several witnesses have testified that Mr. Orvis 
referred to Mr. Johnson as his "partner" or otherwise held Johnson out as a partner, 
both before and after the SBA deposition of November, 1999. (Witnesses have also 
testified that Mr. Orvis was actively hiding partnership funds and misappropriating 
partnership funds—a further proof of the partnership, also dealt with herein below.) 
37. For instance, under questioning from Orvis counsel, Wilfred M. Vigil, 
employee of Orvis and attorney Lawrence, testified, at his deposition, as follows: 
Q. Did you - during your employment with Lexington at any time before 
or after '99, or during, obviously did you have any conversations with 
Jayson Orvis with regard to his business relationship with Jamis Johnson? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What did he say? 
A. He said basically that Jamis was a partner in the firm, that he was 
getting certain amounts of money from the firm. 
Q. And when was it that he told you that? 
A. I'd say it would have to be back in -1 don't know the precise date. 
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We talked numerous times. I would say probably 2000, roughly. 
Q. Did that testimony - did that conversation, did that position ever 
change? Did he ever tell you anything about a change in that position? 
A. No. As a matter of fact, we did talk a lot about it when there was a 
confrontation between he and Jamis. 
Deposition of Wilfred M. Vigil, at 135 (Attached as Exhibit 1.) 
38. Witnesses have similarly testified that they understood Orvis and Johnson 
were sharing profits from the credit repair businesses. For instance, Jade Griffen 
testified as follows: 
Q. . . . Are you aware - do you know who took the bulk of the funds 
out of 
Lexington Law Firms and out of Johnson & Associates? 
A. Yes. 
Q. How do you know this? 
A. We would sit and go over money and what it looked like, and I knew 
that you [Jamis Johnson] were receiving monies, and I had an idea what 
the percentages were. 
Q. You used the term profit share. What's your understanding of profit 
share? 
A. A certain percentage of the profits were put away from employees 
and for certain benefits for them. There was a portion set apart for the 
principals, what we called the principals, Jamis Johnson, Jayson Orvis, 
and Griffin. 
Q. Okay. 
A. And if there was money after bills were paid each month, those 
amounts were split up and disbursed. 
Q. So its your understanding that profit share came out after bills? 
A. Right. 
Deposition of Jade W. Griffin (taken in Tennessee v. Lexington Law Firm, Civil No. 
3-96-0344, M.D. Tenn.), at 21-22 (Attached as Exhibit 3 with the pages for the cited 
statement.) Finally, witnesses have testified that Orvis began taking steps to exclude 
Mr. Johnson from the partnership, to hide its operations and finances from him, and to 
manipulate its finances to minimize Johnson's share. Jade Griffin, for instance, 
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testified: 
Q. Was there also a representation that Jayson would manipulate the 
incomes of the businesses to prevent Jamis Johnson from 
making any monies? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What was it that Jayson said? 
A. Basically that he would cut Jamis Johnson off if things got too ugly. 
Id. at 25; see also Deposition of Wilfred M. Vigil, Ex. 1, at 104-06 (Jayson Orvis directed 
Mr. Vigil to move clients away from certain credit repair entities in order to reduce 
payments to Johnson). See Exhibits 1 and 3. 
39. The deposition testimony of Orvis' personal assistant, Tommy Triplett, taken 
in this case provides additional evidence which illustrates the nature of Orvis' and 
Johnson's partnership and profit sharing agreement, and Mr. Orvis' misappropriation of 
partnership property. (Exhibit 2.) 
Q. Other than the fact Mr. Orvis and Mr. Johnson didn't seem to have a 
particularly close relation, did you ever get an explanation from Mr. Orvis about 
why Mr. Orvis was providing goodwill checks to Mr. Johnson? 
A. Yes, quite a few times. Basically how it breaks down is, and this is the 
extent to which I know it, there was several partners involved in the founding of 
the company. I think it was NADA or NACA or something like that. 
Q. NACA? 
A. North American Credit Association. And it began to trickle apart. Then 
the Lexington was formed after that, Johnson & Associates was formed, and this 
was primarily through Jayson and Jamis. 
(Triplett Deposition p. 20 line 24 - p. 21 line 13, Exhibit 2) 
Q Going back to this relationship between Mr. Orvis and Mr. Johnson. I 
take it Mr. Orvis had indicated to you that he was trying to keep Mr. Johnson at 
bay. At bay, did he tell you at bay with respect to what? 
A. With respect to his control over the company and control over profit 
shares and basically money. 
Q. Control over the company, which company do you have in mind? 
A. Johnson & Associates and Lexington Law Firm. 
Q To your knowledge, did Mr. Johnson claim ownership in those entities? 
A. I knew he felt he was entitled to money. I don't know if he ever claimed 
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ownership. I mean, the name Johnson & Associates, Johnson referring to Jamis 
Johnson, he founded in some way or another, so I know that he was an original 
partner. 
(Triplett Deposition at p. 22 line 21 - p. 23 line 10, Exhibit 2) 
That's the extent which I know. I know that the suit was against Jamis Johnson, 
that it was his •- his I guess you'd say butt on the line that was kind of under fire. 
And that's one of the things that he did mention when he was always cutting a 
check to Jamis Johnson. 
(Triplett Deposition, p. 38, lines 7-12, Exhibit 2) 
40. Mr. Triplett's testimony also provides specific evidence of Orvis' scheme to 
defraud Johnson by misrepresentations and other means. This sworn testimony of 
Orvis' personal assistant also demonstrates Orvis' intent to figure out a means to stop 
paying the share of partnership profits owed to Johnsons. 
Q. Were there any discussions to which you were present regarding •-
between Mr. Orvis and Mr. Lawrence regarding means to exert pressure on Mr. 
Johnson or prevent him from filing the lawsuit? 
A. Well, there was the monthly payment. I mean, Jayson told me, I don't 
know if he ever said this to Jamis, but he said to me that if Jamis ever, you know, 
got teeth and tried to bite he would just stop sending the checks, and he would 
use that money to hire the best attorney he could and fight him back. I don't know 
if he ever said that to Jamis. I would assume he would as a means to keep Jamis 
at bay, but I don't ever recall him ever saying that to him. 
(Triplett Deposition p. 44 line 23 - p. 45 line 10, Exhibit 2) 
41. When Mr. Orvis' misappropriation of partnership funds was suspected by his 
partner, Mr. Johnson, Orvis became more aggressive in his attacks on Johnson's 
partnership interests. Here, Mr. Triplett provides testimony regarding a consultation 
Orvis sought with attorney Victor Lawrence (attorney who had represented Johnson and 
his wife, among in before the SBA and elsewhere, and also represented Orvis and the 
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Orvis-Johnson partnership). Orvis seeks advice from the attorney Lawrence concerning 
the purchase and use of the judgment that arose from the SBA case. 
Q. Do you recall any discussions with Mr. Orvis regarding any judgments, 
legal judgments against Mr. Johnson? 
A. Oh, yeah. Yeah, that was in that conversation, too. 
Q. That conversation? 
A. The conversation that Victor had with Jayson Orvis. 
Q. That we discussed a little while ago? 
A. Yeah, that was — Jamis had some judgments against him, and Jayson 
had come to Victor and asked him if- what, you know, he's like, can I buy these 
against him. And Victor said to the effect that - this is all Jayson recounting this 
to me. At one time he said, well, you can, but you're pretty ruthless. And so I 
believe Jayson went and bought those as sort of another means to control Jamis. 
(Triplet! Deposition, p. 45 line 11 - p. 46 line 2, Exhibit 2) 
C. Mr. Johnson's testimony evidences the claims. 
42. Mr. Johnson has also provided testimony in this case, and it provides further 
evidentiary support for his claims. First, he testified that "I have a partnership 
agreement with Jayson Orvis that we share all the credit repair business that he does." 
Deposition of Jamis Johnson, June 11, 2002, at 20, Ex. 11; see also Deposition of 
Jamis Johnson, June 5, 2002, at 12-13, a copy of pages with the statement is attached 
hereto as Exhibit 17. ("Mr. Orvis and I had an ongoing partnership that did a lot of 
credit repair business and what could also be called credit repair law"). 
43. Second, he testified that as a result of his looming Utah State Bar problems 
and other issues including the Tennessee litigation, he, Mr. Orvis, and others, 
commences to develop "contingency plans" to protect the credit repair enterprises, and 
that these plans included, among other things, "takfjng] Victor [Lawrence], who was 
already [an employee lawyer] running portions of the credit law practice, and put him in 
21 
[as a new directing attorney of Lexington Law Firm]and Jayson and I would deal with 
our ownership of assets as well in contemporaneous agreements." [Emphasis added.] 
Id. at 22. See Exhibit 17. 
44. Third, he testified that in this time frame he and Orvis entered an agreement 
(see supra) pursuant to which "all of the assets, intellectual property that we own jointly 
would be held in Jayson's name for our mutual benefit and that the payment 
arrangements and profit shares would continue and that the businesses would expand 
and our profit share would expand." Id. at 86. Fourth, he testified that "[f]rom the 
outset of our partnership, I had explained that the beneficial interest of this endeavor 
would be owned by my wife or her entity and that the payments should go to my wife or 
her entity and that's what happened." Deposition of Jamis Johnson, June 11, 2002, at 
68-69. See Exhibit 17. 
45. Mr. Johnson's testimony clearly provides "evidentiary support" for the 
claims he asserted in Johnson's Answer to Complaint and Third Party Complaint. 
II. Mr. and Mrs. Johnson's Testimony in the prior unrelated SBA case 
46. The prior law suit between the SBA and Mr. Johnson arises from an entirely 
different matter unrelated to the partnership case before the district court. 
47. In the late 1980s Mr. Johnson guaranteed an SBA loan to a small 
manufacturing company in Vernal, Utah. The business failed and the SBA sued Mr. 
Johnson on a foreclosure deficiency and under his guarantee and after protracted 
litigation, a judgment was entered against Mr. Johnson. 
48. As referred to above, Mr. Johnson and Mr. Orvis were concerned about the 
impact of this judgment and others on their credit repair business. Mr. Orvis insisted 
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that he take control of all partnership assets and that Mr. Johnson take a more 
"passive" role. That led to their agreement to (1) title all of the partnership property "in 
the name of Jayson Orvis so as to protect these assets," and (2) agreeing that Orvis 
would continue to "provide Johnson's share or allocation to any party directed by 
Johnson" i.e. Continue to provide profit share to the beneficial interest of DaNell 
Johnson or entitles controlled by her as had transpired for several years. 
49. Following the entry of SBA judgment, the SBA commenced post judgment 
discovery to aid in its attempt to collect the judgment. The post judgment discovery 
included depositions of Mr. and Mrs. Johnson and interrogatories and document 
productions from the credit repair business. 
50. Mr. Orvis and company attorney Mr. Lawrence assisted Mr. Spendlove in 
complying with the interrogatories and document production and the company attorney 
Mr. Victor Lawrence (who was also the Johnsons' attorney in other matters) entered an 
appearance for Mrs. Johnson in the SBA matter, defended her position before the 
SBA, and also scheduled the depositions of Mr. Johnson and counseled him therein. 
Mr. Orvis, Mr. Spendlove who ran operations, Mr. Lawrence the attorney and Mr. and 
Mrs. Johnson all worked in concert with the SBA to present an accurate picture. 
a. SBA deposition of Mrs. Johnson (questioned by attorney Victor Lawrence) 
demonstrates profit share distributed by Orvis-Johnson partnership to beneficial 
interest of Mrs. Johnson. 
51. In April of 1999, the SBA subpoenaed DaNell Johnson for deposition on 
May 18,1999. 
52. At that deposition, DaNell Johnson was represented by attorney Victor 
Lawrence. (Mr. Lawrence had represented Mrs. Johnson on several other matters as 
well.) At this deposition, DaNell Johnson truthfully disclosed her business 
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relationships. 
53. Victor Lawrence himself questioned DaNell Johnson thusly: 
[Q= Questioning by Mr. Victor Lawrence.] 
A= Answer by DaNell Johnson 
Okay. When that business first started, it was just a handful of 
friends and associates" 
Right. 
Now that has somewhat blossomed, but you don't know really what 
the company does now, is that correct? 
Yes, because it has expanded quite a bit. 
In fact, aren't the funds that you received a profit share that you 
receive? 
That's what I understood it to be, yes. 
Are you being paid for anything else? Do you do any type of 
consulting for Johnson and Associates right now? 
(Nodded no.) 
You have to answer audibly. 
I'm sorry. 
Do you do any consulting for Johnson and Associates? 
No. 
Do you do any consulting for Lexington Law Firm? 
No. 
You may sit on the board and you may receive a compensation for 
that, but you are aware that you receive a compensation in some 
type of profit sharing arrangement, is that correct? 
That's right. 
54. Thus here, guided by attorney Victor Lawrence, Mrs. Johnson explains that 
profit share comes to her from the operations. 
(Exhibit 5 is the relevant pages of the SBA Deposition of DaNell Johnson.) 
b. Mr. Johnson's SBA Testimony 
55. It was under these circumstances when in November 1999 at Mr. 
Johnson's third SBA deposition wherein the purported inconsistent statement was 
made. 
56. Attached as Exhibit 7 is a true copy of the 1999 SBA Deposition of Jamis 
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57. In his deposition, Jamis Johnson accurately disclosed the information 
requested by the SBA. The following are excerpts and references of some of the 
deposition: 
Jamis' role at P.M. Johnson and Associates. LLC. (DaNell Johnson's LLC) 
(Jamis Johnson SBA Deposition, p. 14 lines 1-3, Exhibit 7.) 
Q. Are you a member ofD.M. Johnson & Associates, LLC? 
A. No. 
Ownership of Lexington dba: 
(Jamis Johnson SBA Deposition, p. 22 lines 14-25 and p. 23, Exhibit 7). 
Q. Do you still operate your law practice under the assume name of Lexington 
Law Firms? 
A. I never operated my practice under an assumed name of Lexington Law 
Firms. 
Q. Okay. The state records show that the d.b.a. is registered to you and has 
been ever since 1994 and will be until the year 2000. 
A. I think that's accurate. The state records show that. 
Q. So who do you claim uses the name? 
A. Oh, Lexington Law Firms? 
Q. Yes. 
A. I think we provided you with a bunch of that information before, and you 
should know that, and I'm surprised you don't. But I resigned with any 
involvement in Lexington Law Firms because of the pending bar problem. 
Bar Status affects Jamis' operational Lexington role 
(Jamis Johnson SBA Deposition p. 24 lines 1-10, Exhibit 7). 
A. _ / don't know if we've ever registered the fact that it was assigned [to OrvisJ. 
I was sued by the State of Tennessee, you know, personally because Lexington 
Law Firms was in my name, but since that time and with my bar problem I have 
completely relinquished any interest. They paid me a little bit, made my payment, 
and I resigned. Now, if it's listed as an assumed name by Jamis Johnson, they're 
going to have to go in and change that. But, you know, they're operating without 
me. 
Interests in any partnerships 
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(Jamis Johnson SBA Deposition p.30 lines 16-25 and p. 31 lines 1-24, Exhibit 7.) 
Q. Do you have any interest in any partnerships? 
A. No. I mean, you know, often I'll have a joint endeavor with somebody, but I 
don't have a partnership or set up a partnership or an LLC. You know, if I get a 
deal I say, Hey, do you want to do this deal together? We'll go up to summit 
county and buy a lot 
Q. So a joint venture? 
A. Yeah, you can call it that, but I don't have any outgoing partnerships. 
Q. Any interest in any limited liability companies? 
A. No. I had an interest in a limited liability company in California called 
Simmons Shores, LLC. The property got foreclosed out from underneath it. I 
made some money from raising loans for it, but I know that no longer exists. I had 
an interest in an outfit called Western Equities, LLC, but that is no longer 
functional. I have no interest in LLCs or corporations. 
Q. How about Summit Insured Equity Limited Partnership? 
A. I had - that was a - 1 had shares of stock in Summit that I got in exchange for 
legal work and sold them, I'm thinking, in either late 1997 or '98, early '98. 
Q. So you now longer have any interest in that limited partnership. 
A. No. 
Q. And you received no income. 
A. No. ft was a small amount of money. I got three grand from it. 
DaNell sits on the board at J&A: 
(Jamis Johnson SBA Deposition, p. 32 lines 12-15, Exhibit 7.) 
Q. Currently is she employed by anybody? 
A. Yeah. Well, she's not employed. She doesn't get a W-2. She sits on the 
board of Johnson & Associates. 
Q. Does she earn any money for that? 
A. Yeah, I think she does. I think she covered all of that with you. _ 
DaNell's Lexington compensation for board position and certain contributions: 
(Jamis Johnson SBA Deposition p. 42 lines 1-5 and lines 17-25, p.43 lines 1-3, Exhibit 
7.) 
Q. So if Johnson 8. Associates pays your wife money it's for her services as a 
trustee. 
A. Yeah. She sits on the board. She also - yeah, she also - she did some other 
things for them occasionally, but not much. 
26 
Q. So your wife goes into the office there and does work or-
A. She does some work, yeah. She does some minimal work. She's also on the 
board. She also donated, you know, as she told you in her deposition, early on a 
bunch of computers and furniture and, you know, a lot of facilities to get it 
started. It's got a combination of things there. I mean, I think you know this 
because we've given you the checks, or she's given you the checks or Johnson 
& Associates have given you the checks. All of those checks have been made 
available to you. 
DaNell still on board of J & A: 
(Jamis Johnson SBA Deposition, p. 80 lines 10-12, Exhibit 7.) 
Q. So your wife at this time is still on the board of Johnson & Associates. 
A. Yes. What was that you just turned off? 
DaNell Johnson's LLC's sources of income. Lexington makes regular payments 
to DaNell 
(Jamis Johnson SBA Deposition, p. 87 lines 3-15, Exhibit 7.) 
Q. So the LLC's main source of income right now is the DaNell's trusteeship in 
Johnson & Associates and some of these hard money deals. And anything else? 
A. Lex. You mentioned $465 payment from Lex. 
Q. Lexington Law Firm does credit repair, right? 
A. Uh-huh. DaNell gets payments from Lex. Then she also has - well, if a big 
deal comes along she gets some of that money. We sold some of that real estate. 
We bought some lots and sold them in the fall. I mean in the spring. 
58. When viewed in light of the entire deposition and the series of questions 
before and after the alleged disavowing of a partnership interest in the credit repair 
partnership, the more likely interpretation is that Mr. Johnson was responding to a 
question that in his mind was referring to real estate partnership or LLC. No where in 
the entire deposition did Mr. Johnson expressly or implicitly disavowed any interest in 
the credit repair business. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Manifest Error 
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I. THE DISTRICT COURT MANIFESTLY ERRED BY IMPROPERLY 
APPLYING THE DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL TO 
DISMISS APPELLANT'S CAUSE OF ACTION WHEN THE 
ELEMENTS OF THE DOCTRINE WERE NOT MET OR 
SATISFIED. 
A. Reliance is a critical and indispensable requirement for 
judicial estoppel; Mr. Orvis did not rely on any statement made 
by Mr. Johnson during his SBA deposition. 
B. The parties in the prior case and the instant case are not the 
same and so the doctrine of judicial estoppel is inapplicable. 
C. The subject matter of the prior case is different from the 
subject matter of the present case. 
D. The prior position must be "successfully maintained" for 
judicial estoppel to apply, and in the SBA case there was no 
position maintained; and Mr. Johnson could not have 
successfully maintained a position that he had no partnership 
interest in the credit repair business because he did not take 
that position during the SBA post judgment discovery. 
II. IT WAS REVERSIBLE MANIFEST ERROR FOR THE DISTRICT 
COURT TO WEIGH FACTUAL ISSUES AND MR. JOHNSON'S 
CREDIBILITY IN RULING ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
ARGUMENT 
Manifest Error 
Manifest error is clear in this case where the evidence of the partnership is so 
overwhelming and the district court decided to ignore all of it on the basis of a "no" 
response to a vague and ambiguous question from a post judgment deposition in a 
prior unrelated case. Manifest error exists where the lower court clearly misapplies the 
law to the facts of the case. Please see Mary J. Bailey (Adams) v. Spencer Adams, 
1990.UT.213, 798 P.2d 1142, 143 Utah Adv. Rep. 39 (Ut Appeal 09/19/90) [District 
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Court committed manifest error when it applied Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.5(2) (Supp. 
1990) to reduce child support without a motion to modify the support order or any 
evidence of change of circumstances.]. Similarly here, and as shown below, the district 
court committed manifest error. This it did in two ways: First, the district court 
committed manifest error when it granted summary judgment dismissing Appellant's 
partnership claim on the basis of the misapplication of the doctrine of judicial estoppel. 
Moreover, and second, in granting summary judgment against Appellant, the district 
court must have weighed Appellant's version of his SBA deposition testimony in the 
prior unrelated SBA case, and deemed Appellant's version incredible which clearly 
constitutes manifest error when ruling on a motion for summary judgment. Both 
instances of manifest error, the misapplication of the law of judicial estoppel and the 
improper weighing of Appellant's credibility and material facts interpreting the SBA 
deposition statement, will be discussed herein below. 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT MANIFESTLY ERRED BY IMPROPERLY 
APPLYING THE DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL TO 
DISMISS APPELLANT'S CAUSE OF ACTION WHEN THE 
ELEMENTS OF THE DOCTRINE WERE NOT MET OR 
SATISFIED. 
The doctrine of judicial estoppel is well settled in Utah and its application 
requires the district court to find several separate and independent elements: (1) The 
person seeking relief, Mr. Orvis, under the doctrine of judicial estoppel must have relied 
on the prior deposition statement by Mr. Johnson. Tracy Loan & Trust Co., v. 
Openshaw Inv. Co., 102 Utah 509, 515, 132 P.2d 388, 390 (Utah 1942). 2) The prior 
proceeding (the SBA proceeding) must be between "the same persons or their privies" 
as the parties in this case; (3) The prior action must involve "the same subject matter" 
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as this case; and (4) The prior position must have been "successfully maintained." 
Nebekerv. Utah State Tax Commission, 2001 UT 74, H 15, 34 P.3d 180.187; Salt Lake 
City v. Silver Fork Pipeline Corp., 913 P.2d 731, 734 (Utah 1996). 
The district court simply concluded the doctrine of judicial estoppel bars Mr. 
Johnson's partnership claim without analyzing the applicability of the four elements of 
the doctrine. As shown next, the district court should not have applied the doctrine of 
judicial estoppel on the disputed facts asserted by Mr. Orvis. 
A. Reliance is a critical and indispensable requirement for 
judicial estoppel; Mr. Orvis did not rely on any statement made 
by Mr. Johnson during his SBA deposition. 
As in any estoppel, the essential element of judicial estoppel is detrimental 
reliance. Mr. Orvis. as his offensive strategy, tries to claim that Mr. Johnson's 
ambiguous SBA statement about "no" partnerships is a misstatement, but unless Mr. 
Orvis actually relied on that statement made to the SBA, it cannot operate to estop Mr. 
Johnson from asserting his partnership claims and pursuing the misappropriation, 
against Mr. Orvis. Reliance by Mr. Orvis on any statement by Mr. Johnson is critical to 
the application of the doctrine of judicial estoppel, yet the district court ignored this 
element altogether. In Masters v. Worsley, 1989.UT.175, 777 P.2d 499,112 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 39 (Utah Appeal 1989), the court of appeals reiterated the Supreme Court's 
holding on this issue: 
In Tracy Loan & Trust Co. v Openshav/Inv. Co., 102 Utah 509,132 P.2d 
388, 390 (1942), the Utah Supreme Court said that a party invoking judicial 
estoppel must show that he or she has done something or omitted to do 
something in reliance on the other party's testimony in the earlier proceeding, 
and will be prejudiced if the facts are different from those upon which he or she 
relied. Id. However, "there is no estoppel where there was no reliance and the 
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parties had equal knowledge of the facts." Id. at 390-91. However, in Richards 
v. Hodson, 26 Utah 2d 113, 485 P.2d 1044, 1046 (1971), the court clarified that 
the doctrine was really akin to collateral estoppel and applied only to issues 
actually litigated, not those which merely could have been determined. 
[Emphasis added.] 
The glaring error with the district court's ruling is the blatant failure by Mr. Orvis 
to establish that "he . . . has done something or omitted to do something in reliance 
on...[Mr. Johnson's] testimony in the earlier proceeding." Mr. Orvis has not and cannot 
establish the essential element of reliance thus making the doctrine of judicial estoppel 
wholly inapplicable. For this reason alone, the district court has committed manifest 
error. 
First, Mr. Orvis has never, in any way, pled or claimed reliance on the Johnson 
SBA statement—not in his motion for summary judgment, nor in his affidavit, nor in any 
other pleading. 
Nor is it possible to infer reliance by Mr. Orvis because there are no facts, actual 
or alleged, anywhere in this case, from which reliance may be inferred. 
Further, Mr. Orvis' actual actions are the antithesis of reliance. 
Perhaps most telling (and most pernicious), when Mr. Johnson, concerned about 
misappropriation of partnership funds, demanded from Mr. Orvis an audit and an 
accounting, in July of 2001, (Exhibit 4), Mr. Orvis did the following: As discovery 
indicates, (Deposition testimony of Orvis employee, Mr. Triplett, Exhibit 2) Mr. Orvis 
consulted with Mr. Victor Lawrence (attorney for DaNell and Jamis Johnson in the SBA 
matter and in the partnership matters). Mr. Orvis and Mr. Lawrence determined to 
acquire the SBA judgment as a means to extinguish the partnership with Johnson and 
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mask the fraud that had preceded, and take and divide the Johnson profit share. Mr. 
Orvis, within days of the demand letter (using the instrumentality of a defunct Utah LLC, 
and using partnership monies), paid to the SBA the exact sum that Mr. Orvis and Mr.' 
Lawrence knew had been offered to the SBA by Mr. Johnson in prior negotiations. 
Thus, the SBA judgment was acquired to be used to deal with the existing Orvis-
Johnson partnership. This very act by both Mr. Orvis and Mr. Lawrence in buying the 
judgment to use against Mr. Johnson also voids the judgment. Please see Snow, 
Nuffer, Engstrom & Drake v. Tanasse, 980 P.2d 208,1999 UT 49, 369 Utah Adv. Rep. 
36 (Utah 1999). A few days thereafter, Mr. Orvis brought this Complaint, and withheld 
all further partnership distribution. 
While this act of buying the SBA judgment in itself constitutes breach of fiduciary 
duty by Mr. Orvis as partner, and Mr. Lawrence as lawyer, it clearly also demonstrates 
that Mr. Orvis did not detrimentally rely on Mr. Johnson SBA deposition statement in 
November 1999. Mr. Orvis paid to acquire the SBA judgment three years after the SBA 
statement. Indeed, Mr. Orvis did not have to be in the position he is in now by having 
purchased the SBA judgment. He came to the SBA judgment to use it for a fraudulent 
and aggressive purpose. And his purpose was to use the SBA judgment to attempt to 
extinguish the existing partnership that he knew existed. His very act of buying the SBA 
judgment is itself proof that he understood that he had a partnership with Johnson and 
was seeking an offensive weapon. This is the opposite of reliance. 
Indeed, once the SBA judgment was acquired, Mr. Johnson was summoned to 
the offices of Berman, Tomsic & Savage, where attorney Dan Berman informed Mr. 
Johnson that Mr. Orvis had purchased the SBA judgment and that Mr. Johnson must 
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abandon the partnership. Mr. Johnson wrote a confirmatory letter to Mr. Berman and 
that letter acknowledges that Mr. Orvis purchased the judgment and would pay Johnson 
between $16,000 and $18,000 per month for two years. (Exhibit 17, Letter to Dan 
Berman.) The letter is attached because it reveals the mind and intent of Mr. Orvis. 
The payment of $16,000 to $18,000 per month is for the purpose of settling the 
partnership claim and having Mr. Johnson thereafter abandon the partnership with Mr. 
Orvis. Thus, Mr. Orvis believes there is a partnership and his purpose in acquiring the 
SBA judgment is to use it to offset and extinguish the on-going partnership. Again, this 
is precisely the opposite of what would constitute detrimental reliance on a response in 
an SBA deposition three years earlier, by Mr. Orvis. 
Additionally, Mr. Orvis' actions toward the SBA prevent there from being any 
reliance. Mr. Orvis did not rely nor cannot claim reliance on the SBA statement 
because he helped Mr. Johnson outline the information to the SBA. The conclusion 
seems unavoidable that Mr. Orvis clearly understood what he was doing and was 
apprised of the SBA matter. Mr. Orvis and attorney Victor Lawrence were actually part 
of the team that prepared discovery to the SBA showing the flow of profit share checks 
and their distribution. Attorney Victor Lawrence (with the knowledge of Mr. Orvis and 
while working also for Mr. Orvis) actually represented and counseled DaNell Johnson in 
her deposition by the SBA where, at his directed questioning, she laid out to the SBA 
the profit share distribution—this only months before Mr. Johnson's SBA deposition. 
Mr. Lawrence counseled Mr. Johnson also in his depositions. Mr. Lawrence and Mr. 
Orvis and Mr. Johnson jointly conferred on the depositions and the discovery. Mr. Orvis 
and Mr. Lawrence knew so much about the SBA judgment that they actually knew the 
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amount Mr. Johnson was negotiating to settle this claim with the SBA and using that 
inside knowledge (gained from the attorney fiduciary relationship) they took advantage 
of it and paid the SBA exactly that amount to buy the judgment instead of settle it. Mr. 
Orvis and Mr. Lawrence cannot (without deliberate misrepresentation) state that they 
did not understand the nature of the partnership and the profit share distribution or that 
they did not assist in establishing and outlining to the SBA an accurate picture of the 
partnership. "There is no estoppel... where the parties had the same knowledge of the 
facts." Again, Mr. Orvis cannot claim to detrimentally rely on the SBA statement of Mr. 
Johnson. 
After November 1999, the date of the SBA deposition, Mr. Orvis did not change 
his position from being a partner with Mr. Johnson to a position that Mr. Johnson had 
no partnership with him. Instead Mr. Orvis did the opposite. Profit share distribution 
(distributed by Mr. Orvis) not only continued uninterrupted on a monthly basis but 
increased dramatically over the next two years up to as high as $35,000 per month just 
before Mr. Orvis filed this lawsuit; Mr. Orvis and Mr. Johnson continued to execute and 
exchange written documents regarding the partnership, and; their active course of 
performance after the SBA statement also evidences the ongoing partnership 
There is absolutely no evidence whatsoever that Mr. Orvis relied in any way on 
the SBA statement by Mr. Johnson. 
"There is no estoppel where there was no reliance" is the controlling principal 
here. Since the district court failed to place the burden on Mr. Orvis to show his 
reliance; and there is no evidence, nor can there be evidence of reliance, the grant of 
summary judgment was clear manifest error that calls for summary reversal of the 
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district court. Appellant respectfully urges the court for summary disposition reversing 
the grant of summary judgment below. 
B. The parties in the prior case and the instant case are not the 
same and so the doctrine of judicial estoppel is inapplicable. 
For judicial estoppel to apply, the parties in the prior case and in this case must 
be the same. The parties are not the same for three reasons: 
I.) The actual parties are not the same. 
ii.) Mr. Orvis, who claims to be a privy to the SBA because he purchased the SBA 
judgment, did so with monies misappropriated from the partnership, and he is not, 
therefore, the "privy" because the SBA judgment would actually be the property of the 
partnership, which would be the "privy"; 
iii.) The SBA judgment was purchased in violation of partner and lawyer fiduciary duties 
and is void in Mr. Orvis' hands. 
The parties in the prior case were Mr. Johnson and the United States 
Government (the SBA). The parties in this current matter are Mr. Johnson and Mr. 
Orvis and several others. The parties are clearly not the same. However, Mr. Orvis 
claimed, and the district court agreed, that Mr. Orvis was a privy with the SBA. The 
district court held that Mr. Orvis was in privity with the SBA since he purchased the SBA 
judgment against Mr. Johnson. The facts regarding the issue of being a privy are 
however, legitimately very much in dispute. Mr. Johnson asserts that Mr. Orvis was 
embezzling partnership money and purchased the SBA judgment using partnership 
funds wrongly taken from the partnership. If this is so, then the SBA judgment that he 
purchased would be the property not of Mr. Orvis but of the partnership. Accordingly, 
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this would make the partnership a "privy" of the SBA, not Mr. Orvis. Since this is a 
genuine factual issue raised below that had to be tried, this element of whether the 
parties are the same or privies precludes summary judgment. Further, Mr. Johnson, as 
partner, charges Mr. Orvis and Mr. Victor Lawrence with fraud, conspiracy to defraud, 
breach of both partner and attorney fiduciary duties, embezzlement, theft and criminal 
conversion by taking partnership assets and purchasing the SBA judgment for the 
malicious purpose of using it to deny Mr. Johnson his profit share and his partnership 
interest and also to mask their own ongoing fraud. There is significant testimony to this 
effect in the depositions of Tommy Triplett, (Orvis employee), Will Vigil (Lawrence and 
Orvis employee) and Jade Griffen, (Orvis employee). The substance of and references 
to these depositions were amply spread before the district court in the relevant 
pleadings. Such acts would void the SBA judgment in the hands of Mr. Orvis, and he 
would not be a privy. Also argued in the district court, is that Mr. Victor Lawrence and 
Mr. Orvis manage, work for, and profit by Lexington law firm, Mr. Lawrence's firm. Mr. 
Lawrence is also the attorney for the Johnsons in the SBA matter and in partnership 
matters. If is patently illegal for him, and for Mr. Orvis, in conspiracy with him, to 
acquire a judgment against a client. This act, if proven, not only voids the SBA 
judgment in the hands of Mr. Orvis and Mr. Lawrence, (Snow. Nuffer et al v. Tannasse. 
supra) but it is a criminal offense. 
These are all substantial and material issues of fact raised below but ignored by 
the district court in its grant of summary judgment to Mr. Orvis. And again, these issues 
would go directly to whether Mr. Orvis may claim to be a "privy" or not for purposes of 
judicial estoppel. Mr. Orvis' status as a "privy" is a material issue of fact prematurely 
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and erroneously ruled on by the district court. 
C The subject matter of the prior case is different from the 
subject matter of the present case. 
The prior case was a contract guarantee action and a foreclosure deficiency 
action brought by the SBA against Mr. Johnson. The SBA obtained a money judgment 
against Mr. Johnson. In the present action, Mr. Orvis seeks a declaratory judgment that 
would extinguish Mr. Johnson's partnership interest in their credit repair business, and 
Mr. Johnson is counterclaiming for an accounting, for conspiracy, and related claims. 
The subject matters of the prior action and this action are clearly different. 
This distinction between the subject matter of the prior SBA case and this case is made 
clearer by a 1971 Utah Supreme Court clarification of the doctrine of judicial estoppel 
by holding that "the doctrine [judicial estoppel] was really akin to collateral estoppel and 
applied only to issues actually litigated, not those which could have been determined.'' 
Richards v. Hodson, 26 Utah 2d 113, 485 P.2d 1044,1046 (1971). The only issue 
litigated in the prior SBA action was the foreclosure action and the guarantee contract. 
The specific partnership of the credit repair business in this case was not litigated in the 
prior SBA action, and no determination was there made as well. A vague and 
ambiguous "No" response to a general question followed by a statement showing Mr. 
Johnson thinking about real estate partnerships as he admitted to have had joint 
ventures is not a determination, let alone a litigated determination, that Mr. Johnson has 
no partnership interest in the credit repair partnership. 
There is no litigated determination regarding these responses; the only subject matters 
in the SBA case that have passed through litigated determination, so as to conform with 
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the standard set out in Richards above, are issues relating to the contract and real 
estate. And thus these would be the only issues arising from the SBA case that may be 
considered in analyzing the applicability of judicial estoppel and because these SBA 
issues are different from those issues pending in this case, judicial estoppel is not 
applicable. It is reversible manifest error for the district court to have granted summary 
judgment through the application of the doctrine of judicial estoppel when the issues 
here are different from the issues in the prior case. 
D. The prior position must be "successfully maintained" for 
judicial estoppel to apply, and in the SBA case there was no 
position maintained; and Mr. Johnson could not have 
successfully maintained a position that he had no partnership 
interest in the credit repair business because he did not take 
that position during the SBA post judgment discovery. 
The doctrine of judicial estoppel requires, as one of its tests of applicability, that 
the prior position be "successfully maintained". As cited above, this court, citing 
Richards v. Hodson with approval, stated: 
...in Richards v. Hodson, 26 Utah 2d 113, 485 P.2d 1044,1046 (1971), the court 
clarified that the doctrine [of judicial estoppel] was really akin to collateral estoppel and 
applied only to issues actually litigated, not those which merely could have been 
determined. 
There was no discernable action by the SBA or by Mr. Johnson, which was 
"maintained" or pursued, let alone concluded "successfully" involving the "position", i.e. 
that there was no Orvis-Johnson partnership. The district court manifestly erred in 
looking to the SBA statement of Mr. Johnson as the basis to grant summary judgment 
and to declare that no partnership existed between Mr. Orvis and Mr. Johnson. 
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Further, based simply on the information submitted to the SBA by the Johnsons, both in 
depositions, and through document production (provided in part by Mr. Orvis and Mr. 
Lawrence), it is highly improbable, even if Mr. Johnson had wanted to, that he could 
have successfully maintained a position that he had no interest in the credit repair 
businesses. This is because there is, in fact, a partnership interest in the credit repair 
businesses and the totality of the discovery to the SBA reflects this. There was a 
variety of evidence submitted to the SBA in discovery (collected and submitted in large 
part—profit share checks for example—by Mr. Orvis himself and Mr. Lawrence, for the 
partnership) and elicited from Mr. and Mrs. Johnson in multiple depositions. This 
evidence taken in context, accurately demonstrate the nature of their business 
relationship with Mr. Orvis. 
Mr. Orvis, who had access to all the SBA depositions and document production 
(because he bought the SBA judgment) submitted to the district court only a one word 
quote "no" from nearly 1,000 pages of discovery over four years, to support his claim 
that Mr. Johnson stated there was no partnership. Mr. Orvis had to ignore hundreds of 
pages of depositions and hundreds of produced documents, checks, agreements, etc., 
to try and persuade the district court. And the district court uncritically assumed Mr. 
Orvis' posture. 
Any reasonably complete review of the entire discovery responses to the SBA's 
post judgment discovery will clearly show that Mrs. Johnson, supported by their attorney 
Victor Lawrence and business associates Mr. Orvis and others, held, for many years, 
the beneficial interest and was receiving profit share distribution in the credit repair 
businesses. Additionally, Mr. Johnson was resigning from being the directing attorney 
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for Lexington and Johnson and Associates, and was to take a more passive role in the 
business with Mr. Orvis managing the day to day affairs of the businesses. The SBA 
had substantial documentary (including checks) and testimonial evidence of this 
position. While there was no legal determination for or against the assertion of this 
position, this was the position that was the thrust of the responses to the SBA discovery 
requests. Mr. Johnson was asked in various depositions about the credit repair 
businesses, Lexington and Johnson and Associates, as was Mrs. Johnson. Mr. 
Johnson's responses were accurate. In addition to those questions, Mr. Johnson was 
asked about other partnerships. His answer containing the "no" response clearly 
reflects that he understood the SBA to be inquiring, in this line of questioning, about 
real estate partnerships. And this answer was in conjunction with his other answers 
about Lexington and about Johnson and Associates which he responded to earlier in 
the deposition and would respond to later in the deposition. The SBA already knew 
what his position was from his and DaNell Johnson's prior depositions. 
Further, the position taken by the Johnsons vis a vis the SBA was not a recent 
concoction to defend against the SBA but was the manner the Johnsons have 
conducted their financial affairs for years. The Johnson's separated real property 
ownership and taxation in 1989. In 1994 the Johnsons operated an interest in a 
medical facility in Louisiana with Mrs. Johnson holding the beneficial interest, sitting on 
the board, etc. In 1996 Mr. Johnson and his wife DaNell Johnson entered into an 
agreement wherein DaNell would be the owner of all their properties including the 
beneficial interest in various business ventures including the partnership venture with 
Mr. Orvis. This information was given to the SBA in depositions in 1997,1998, and 
40 
1999 by Mr. Johnson and by Mrs. Johnson. What is more, this was explained to the 
district court in Mr. Johnson's opposition to Mr. On/is* motion for summary judgment. 
The entirety of Mr. Johnson's deposition testimony espouses this fact very clearly 
especially as to the credit repair business. Indeed, nowhere in Mr. Johnson or Mrs. 
Johnson's deposition was any testimony that they did not have any interest in the 
credit repair business. Nonetheless the district court found that Mr. Johnson took the 
position that he had no partnership interest in the credit repair business, and that is 
absolutely incorrect. If Mr. Johnson did not take the position that he had no interest in 
the credit repair business than he could not have successfully maintained that position. 
Moreover, the issue of what Mr. Johnson said, the meaning, the intent of both 
the examiner and deponent, the understanding by deponent of the question and a host 
of other incidental issues are fraught with multiple interpretations that would, under any 
circumstances, need to be examined by a trier of fact rather than ignoring them as the 
district court did on summary judgment. 
II. IT WAS REVERSIBLE MANIFEST ERROR FOR THE DISTRICT 
COURT TO WEIGH FACTUAL ISSUES AND MR. JOHNSON'S 
CREDIBILITY IN RULING ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
The district court stated in its minute entry that it was satisfied that Mr. Johnson 
was avoiding creditors.2 This statement clearly reveals the mental processes the court 
engaged in when deciding to grant the motion for summary judgment on the basis of 
2. The district Judge Hanson manifested pronounced Dias in open court against Appellant. At the first 
hearing in this case, the Judge indicated that he had read only the Movant's brief. (Mr. Lawrence, at this 
time); he had not then read the Appellant's brief, nor could clearly recall the complaint's causes of action, 
but had decided that Appellant was "lying" to the SBA and should be reported to the U.S. Attorney-
adopting the inflammatory view of the Lawrence brief. That brief was significantly in factual error as has 
since come to light. This judge, having previously handled the Utah Bar matter against Appellant seems 
to have maintained an undue bias in this case. Appellant asserts that this bias may be the reason the 
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judicial estoppel. To be satisfied that Mr. Johnson was avoiding creditors, the court 
must have adopted Appellee On/is' contested interpretation of deposition testimony. 
Mr. Orvis claimed that Mr. Johnson meant by a response therein that he does not have 
a partnership interest in the credit repair businesses. Mr. Johnson claims the opposite 
- that his response when taken in context and all the discovery responses up to and 
after the deposition clearly shows that he never disavowed his partnership interest in 
the credit repair businesses that he had for years with Mr. Orvis. [Mr. Johnson's 
version or position as to this factual issue must, as a matter of law, be accepted for 
purposes of ruling on the motion for summary judgment. Wheeler v. Mann, 763 P.2d 
758, 759 (Utah 1988)]. 
To be satisfied that Mr. Johnson was avoiding creditors, the district court was 
indeed accepting the version of the facts presented by Mr. Orvis and rejecting Mr. 
Johnson's version that he never disavowed his partnership interest in the credit repair 
businesses with Mr. Orvis. To be satisfied of one set of facts over another involves a 
weighing of the two sets of facts. This of course is not permissible, as a matter of law, 
on a motion for summary judgment. Winegar v. Froerer et. al,, 1991 .UT.110,813 
P.2d 104,161 Utah Adv. Rep. 22 (Utah 1991). Moreover, since Mr. Johnson's set of 
facts involves the issue of his credibility, the district court's rejection of his version of 
the facts, is a clear repudiation of his credibility as well. Weighing parties' credibility is 
also improper and it is another manifest error by the district court requiring this court to 
grant summary disposition reversing the lower court's grant of summary judgment. 
court here seemed to ignore well established standards for deciding a motion for summary judgment. 
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Maters v. Worsley, 1989.UT.17, 777 P.2d 499, 112 Utah Adv. Rep. 39 (Utah Appeal 
1989). 
CONCLUSION 
Certain matters are clear here. Mr. Orvis and Mr. Johnson have a partnership. 
Mr. Orvis purchased the SBA judgment against Mr. Johnson to use it as a defense 
against Mr. Johnson's partnership claims. Mr. Orvis, extracts the word "no" from a 52 
word quote, found in one of the SBA depositions he owns and uses this truncated 
quote as a means to argue to the district court that Mr. Johnson has made a 
misrepresentation to the SBA or has alternatively "disavowed" the Orvis-Johnson 
partnership. This argument forms the basis for Mr. Orvis' summary judgment motion. 
The district court erred in finding that Mr. Johnson was "avoiding creditors" and finding 
that Mr. Johnson is judicially estopped from any claim of partnership with Mr. Orvis. 
The district court committed manifest error with this ruling because the court 
misapplied the doctrine of judicial estoppel and he improperly weighed Mr. Johnsons' 
credibility and contested facts. It is clear that judicial estoppel has no applicability 
because not one of the four requirements are met. First, reliance is a critical element of 
judicial estoppel and Mr. Orvis did not rely on the SBA statement, nor did he plead any 
reliance and his actions in buying the SBA judgment are the opposite of reliance, and 
as this court has noted "where there is no reliance, there is no estoppel; Second, the 
parties in the SBA case and in this case are different. Mr. Orvis cannot claim to be a 
privy because he purchased the SBA judgment with misappropriated partnership 
assets and the real owner of the SBA judgment and the "privy" is the Orvis-Johnson 
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partnership. Further the judgment is void in the hands of Orvis for breach of partner 
fiduciary duty, and conspiracy with attorney Lawrence to breach attorney fiduciary duty; 
Third, the issues in the SBA case and the issues here are different and preclude the 
application of judicial estoppel, and only litigated issues may be considered and the 
litigated SBA issues are totally different from issues here; and Fourth, the prior position 
must be successfully maintained, and there is no discernable evidence that there was 
any effort at maintaining any position with regard to the SBA judgment. 
For the foregoing reasons, the district court committed manifest error and the 
decision of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of Appellee Mr. On/is 
should be summarily reversed. 
/ot*\ 
DATED this. 1 fl day of February, 2005 
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something that you weren't aware of? 
A. Absolutely. 
Q. They might have been reporting to Mr. Orvis 
or Mr. Griffith; is that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you know whether the lawyers were paid 
for their services? 
A. I don't know there was that compensation, 
but I did overhear certain instances of profit sharing. 
Q. You don't know how they were paid? 
A. No, I don't know. 
Q, You testified about a point in time when 
there was a shifting of some clients from Lexington Law 
Firm to Johnson & Associates. Do you recall that? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And tell me how you were aware of that. 
A. I was aware of that in that I was the 
fulfillment manager. I was directed to send the 
clients, the E-clients, the lower end paying clients 
from our firm, Lexington Law Firm, over to Johnson & 
Associates. 
Q. Who instructed you to do that? 
A. Jayson Orvis. 
Q. Did he tell you why he wanted you to do 
that? 
CitiCourt, LLC 
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A. No 
Q. Did you have an understanding of why that 
was being done? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And where did that understanding come from? 
A. From previous conversations with Mr. Orvis. 
Q. Tell me about that. First of all, what was 
your understanding? 
A. My understanding was that we were looking 
to -- my understanding was that there wasn't much focus 
on Lexington Law Firm building its profits, and my 
understanding was also that we were to send over the 
E-clients over to the Johnson & Associates department 
simply because the money was being divided up amongst 
different individuals. 
Q. From Johnson & Associates? 
A. Exactly. 
Q. And from L e x i n g t o n Law Fi rm? 
A. E x a c t l y . 
Q. Did that shifting of clients, in your 
understanding, have anything to do with Jamis Johnson? 
A. In my understanding? 
Q. Yeah. 
A. Yes. 
Q. What was that? 
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25 to 35 thousand were simply calculations that he 
pulled out of his rear, that had no bearing on any of 
the accounting practices or any of the -- you know, 
regardless of what Jamis -- or Johnson & Associates was 
doing. 
Q. So the checks were not even a rough function 
of profits or checks coming out of Johnson & 
Associates, to your understanding? 
A. Right. But they would reflect -- if Johnson 
& Associates did well that month, the checks would 
generally be a little larger. 
Q. Why was this a hot topic? 
A. It was something we talked about from time 
to time. There was some — there was animosity between 
Jamis and Jayson. So it was -- Jamis worked, you know, 
in a separate office, and I got the impression that 
Jayson didn't like to go visit him and that's why he 
always sent me to deliver the checks. So I was just 
the go-between for both of them. And throughout the 
course of my employment they exchanged a few -- they 
talked about a number of things, and I don't think they 
ever threatened each other, but they were tense 
conversations. 
Q. Other than the fact Mr. Orvis and 
Mr. Johnson didn't seem to have a particularly close 
CitiCourt, LLC 
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r e l a t i o n , d i d you e v e r g e t an e x p l a n a t i o n from 
Mr* O r v i s a b o u t why Mr. O r v i s was p r o v i d i n g goodwi l l 
checks t o Mr. J o h n s o n ? 
A. Y e s , q u i t e a few t i m e s . B a s i c a l l y how i t 
b r e a k s down i s , and t h i s i s t h e e x t e n t t o which I know 
i t , t h e r e was s e v e r a l p a r t n e r s i n v o l v e d i n t h e f o u n d i n g 
of t h e company . I t h i n k i t was NADA or NACA or 
someth ing l i k e t h a t . 
Q. NACA? 
A. North American Credit Association. And it 
began to trickle apart. Then the Lexington was formed 
after that, Johnson & Associates was formed, and this 
was primarily through Jayson and Jamis. The details 
I'm never -- I've never -- he's never told me and I've 
never been clear about. 
At some point in time Jamis got out of the 
deal, either a buyout or he left or something, I have 
no clue. But at any rate, he lost, you know, some sort 
of profit shares or didn't have any profit shares or 
any claim to any of the profits, so -- but Jayson 
always said that just out of his goodwill -- it really 
wasn't out of a goodwill but just to -- this is the way 
he would phrase it, just to keep him off my back and to 
keep him from suing me. Which he said even if he did 
it would be futile, but I just don't want to -- I'd 
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1 rather just pay him money and keep him at bay and we go 
2 on with our merry lives. 
3 Q. Did you form a view about what Mr. Orvis!s 
4 monthly gross income was? 
5 A. Yes. 
6 Q. What was your view? 
7 MR. ATKIN: Objection, lacks foundation. 
8 A. First month — during the interview when he 
9 hired me he told me that he made $96,000 that month. 
10 Later he said that for the last five or six months 
11 before my employment was when the checks started really 
12 getting big, around to the $90,000 mark. Throughout my 
13 employment they increased, one month $125,000. Towards 
14 the end it was about $153,000. 
15 J Q. How did you come to have this feeling? 
16 A. I deposited the checks, so I had a pretty 
17 good idea of what was coming in. And he told me half 
18 the time, so I was pretty in the loop. 
19 I Q. Going back to this relationship between 
20 Mr. Orvis and Mr. Johnson. I take it Mr. Orvis had 
21 indicated to you that he was trying to keep Mr. Johnson 
22 at bay. At bay, did he tell you at bay with respect to 
23 what? 
24 A. W i t h r e s p e c t t o h i s c o n t r o l o v e r t h e company 
25 1 and c o n t r o l o v e r p r o f i t s h a r e s a n d b a s i c a l l y money . 
C i t i C o u r t , LLC 
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1 J Q. Control over the company, which company do 
2 you have in mind? 
3 A, Johnson & Associates and Lexington Law Firm. 
4 Q. To your knowledge, did Mr. Johnson claim 
5 ownership in those entities? 
6 A. I knew he felt he was entitled to money. I 
7 don't know if he ever claimed ownership. I mean, the 
8 name Johnson & Associates, Johnson referring to Jamis 
9 Johnson, he founded in some way or another, so I know 
10 that he was an original partner. And to what extent 
11 he — and I have no idea how he lost it or got out of 
12 running and managing the company or being a part of the 
13 profit sharing. I have no idea how he I guess got out 
14 of control. 
15 Q. Aside from Mr,, Orvis's statements that 
16 Mr. Johnson was not a partner, do you have any other 
17 reason to believe Mr. Johnson was not a partner in 
18 these enterprises? 
19 A. No, not offhand. 
20 Q. Did Mr. Orvis, to your knowledge, have any 
21 partners in these credit repair enterprises? 
22 A. Yeah, he — I was settled as partner and I 
23 believe — oh, gol. Sam Spendlove and Spence — I 
24 cannot remember his name. 
25 I Q. Bingham? 
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1 Did you -- during your employment with 
2 Lexington at any time before or after '99, or during, 
3 obviously, did you have any conversations with Jayson 
4 Orvis with regard to his business relationship with 
5 Jamis Johnson? 
6 A. Yes. 
7 Q. What did he say? 
8 A- He said that basically that Jamis was a 
9 partner in the firm, that he was getting certain 
10 amounts of money from the firm. 
11 Q. And when was it that he told you that? 
12 A, I'd say it would have to be back in — I 
13 don't know the precise date. We talked numerous times. 
14 I would say probably 2000, roughly. 
15 Q. Did that testimony — did that conversation, 
16 did that position ever change? Did he ever tell you 
17 anything about a change in that position? 
18 A. No. As a matter of fact, we did talk a lot 
19 about it when there was the confrontation between he 
20 and Jamis. 
21 Q. And when was? 
22 A. That was around 2000. 
23 Q. And what did you talk about with regards to 
24 that? 
25 I A. The f a c t t h a t we were s u p p o s e d t o no t engage 
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A. The fact that the less profits we had at 
Lexington, you know, the less money we got paid, 
Mr. Johnson got paid. 
Q. How did you have that understanding? 
A. Because I was told that by Mr. Orvis in 
conversations. 
Q. And when did those conversations take place? 
A. They took place periodically around the time 
of the move, which was about the latter part of 2000. 
Q. And do you recall specifically what 
Mr. Orvis told you with regard to the intent to shift 
clients from Lexington to Johnson & Associates and the 
effect that it would have on Jamis Johnson's payment? 
MR. BOGART: Objection. 
A. Not directly. 
Q. You don't recall what he said? 
A, I don!t recall. 
Q. That was just the understanding you had had 
from the conversations? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Is it possible that you might have 
misunderstood what Mr. Orvis was intending with that 
shifting of clients? 
A. Yes. 
MR. ATKIN: Take a few minutes break. 
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that they're pretty vague in general. The regulations, 
telemarketing and Internet regulations on how to sign 
up clients, retain clients, and represent them were a 
little unclear and that they were able to clarify them. 
And he said it actually turned out to be in their 
favor. 
That's the extent which I know. I know that 
the suit was against Jamis Johnson, that it was his --
his I guess you'd say butt on the line that was kind of 
under fire. And that's one of the things that he did 
mention when he was always cutting a check to Jamis 
Johnson. It was one of the things he would mention, 
Jamis did put in — he did stick out his neck a little 
bit for the company and because of the lawsuit and 
that, you know, there was -- because there was the 
threat of worst case scenario, there was the threat of 
him being disbarred and things. So in that sense he 
said that was one of his motivations for giving him the 
monthly check of, you know, 30 thousand. 
Q. These conversations you had with Mr. Orvis 
regarding the Tennessee litigation, did Mr. Orvis ever 
tell you that the litigation concerned only Mr. Johnson 
and did not concern Johnson & Associates or Lexington 
Law Firm? 
25 I A. No. Well, he could have. I don't know. I 
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1 Q. Was that the only meeting you sat in on with 
2 between Mr. Orvis and Mr. Lawrence? 
3 A. I believe so. 
4 I Q. In that meeting was there any discussion of 
5 Mr. Johnson? 
6 A. Yes. 
7 Q. What was the discussion with respect to 
8 Mr. Johnson? 
9 MR. ATKIN: Objection, lacks foundation. 
10 A. Nothing that -- nothing specific I can 
11 recall. They were upset at him because of some of the 
12 things that were done, and there were a few like 
13 derogatory comments made but nothing -- nothing — 
14 nothing specific that I can think of. 
15 Q. Whether at this meeting or in some telephone 
16 conference or otherwise, do you recall any discussions 
17 to which you were present between Mr. Orvis and 
18 Mr. Lawrence regarding removal of Mr. Johnson from 
19 Johnson & Associates or Lexington Law Firms? 
20 A. It was my understanding that when I came to 
21 work for Jayson that Jamis Johnson was already removed 
22 from the companies. 
23 Q. Were there any discussions to which you were 
24 present regarding — between Mr. Orvis and Mr. Lawrence 
25 regarding means to exert pressure on Mr. Johnson or 
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prevent him from filing the lawsuit? 
A. Well, there was the monthly payment. I 
mean, Jayson told me, I don't know if he ever said this 
to Jamis, but he said to me that if Jamis ever, you 
know, got teeth and tried to bite he would just stop 
sending the checks, and he would use that money to hire 
the best attorney he could and fight him back. I don't 
know if he ever said that to Jamis. I would assume he 
would as a means to keep Jamis at bay, but I don't ever 
recall him ever saying that to him. 
Q. Do you recall any discussions with Mr. Orvis 
regarding any judgments, legal judgments against 
Mr. Johnson? 
A. Oh, yeah. Yeah, that was in that 
conversation, too. 
Q. That conversation? 
A. The conversation that Victor had with Jayson 
Orvis. 
Q. That we discussed a little while ago? 
A. Yeah, that was — Jamis had some judgments 
against him, and Jayson had come to Victor and asked 
him if -• what, you know, he's like, can I buy these 
against him. And Victor said to the effect that — 
this is all Jayson recounting this to me. At one time 
he said, well, you can, but you're pretty ruthless. 
CitiCourt, LLC 
And so I believe Jayson went and bought those as sort 
of another means to control Jamis. 
Q. Why do you believe Mr. Orvis bought the 
judgments? 
MR. ATKIN: Objection, lacks foundation. 
A. He was tired — what I understood was that 
he was tired of harassments and the constant 
accusations that he got from Jamis Johnson. 
Q. Maybe that question was phrased poorly. I'm 
not asking what Mr. Orvis's motivation was. I'm 
asking, you said you believe that Mr. Orvis actually 
bought the judgments. 
A. Oh, yes. 
Q. And what I want to know is, why do you have 
that belief? 
A. I never actually saw any paperwork regarding 
it, but I believe Jayson said it and I remember talking 
to Jayson — or Jamis on one occasion saying that 
Jayson had -- that Jamis had found out from one means 
or another that Jamis owned those -- Jayson owned those 
or had attempted to own them or something like that, 
and -- but I never saw any actual paperwork or anything 
regarding that. 
Q. So you didn't write the checks in connection 
with that? 
CitiCourt, LLC 
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1 you, as a partner, a ten percent Lexington person •-
2 A. Right. 
3 Q. - would forego some money so that the 
4 Johnson & Associates side of things could make it 
5 financially? 
6 A. Right. 
7 Q. Did you ever get reimbursed for those -
8 A. No. 
9 Q. •• checks? 
LO A. No. 
11 Q. No. Are you aware - do you know who took 
12 the bulk of the funds out of Lexington Law Firms and out 
13 of Johnson k Associates? 
14 A. Jayson Orvis, 
L5 Q. Jayson Orvis? Hhat about Jamis Johnson? 
16 Has he also getting funds from both organizations? 
17 A. Yes. 
L8 Q. How do you know this? 
.9 A. He would sit and go over money and what it 
,0 looked like, and I knew that you were receiving monies, 
1 and I had an idea what the percentages were. 
2 Q. You used the term profit share. Hhat's your 
3 understanding of profit share? 
4 A. A certain percentage of the profits were put 
5 away from employees and for certain benefits for them. 
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1 There was a portion set apart for the principals, what 
2 we called the principals, Jamis Johnson, Jayson Orvis 
3 and Griffin. 
4 Q. Okay. 
5 A. And if there was money after bills were paid 
6 each month, those amounts were split up and disbursed. 
7 Q. So it's your understanding that profit share 
8 came out after bills? 
9 A. Right. 
0 Q. Now, you left the organization, I think you 
1 said. 
2 Do you recall the date generally, the period 
3 of time? 
4 A. Probably would have been fall of '99. 
5 Q. Has the Tennessee case pending when you 
6 left, to your knowledge? 
7 A. Yes. 
B 0. Hhen you left, you wanted to be bought out, 
9 I think you said, your partnership bought out, and you 
0 sold it to a guy named Deon. 
1 Did anyone else offer to buy that from you? 
2 A. Yes. 
3 Q. Hho? 
4 A. Jamis Johnson and Jayson Orvis. 
5 Q. Jayson Orvis offered to buy it, Jamis 
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1 Johnson offered to buy it, and Deon Steckling offered to 
2 buy it? 
3 A, Yes. 
4 Q. Now, who is Deon Steckling? 
5 A. A friend of Jayson Orvis's, 
6 0. Hhat kind of friend? You mean an 
7 acquaintance? 
8 A. Yeah, at the time just an acquaintance. 
9 Q. Hell, what is his job? Is he a credit 
10 repair guy? 
11 A. No. At the time he was just a friend of 
12 Jayson Orvis's. 
13 Q, I've heard the term "Impact.1 Do you know 
14 what that is? 
15 A. Yes. 
16 Q. Some sort of training for positive thinking 
17 and such things? is that correct? 
18 A. Experiential training, sort of a gestalt 
19 training. 
20 Q. Has he involved in running the Impact I 
21 courses? 
22 A. Yes, He was one of the trainers at the 
23 Impact Institute. 
24 Q. Hho owned it? 
25 A. My understanding is a man named Hans Berger. | 
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1 Q. Who owns it now? 
2 A. Hans Berger. 
3 Q. Now, Jayson was heavily involved in Impact, 
4 was he not? 
1 5 A. Yes. 
6 Q. And he had you take the training as well, 
7 did he not? 
8 A. Yes. 
9 Q. And he was a friend of Deon's from this 
10 experiential --
11 A. Right. 
12 Q. •- this Impact training? 
13 A. Right. 
14 Q. Hhen you were offered to be purchased, to be 
15 bought out, Jamis Johnson wanted to buy you out, you 
16 declined to sell it to him, or what happened? 
17 A. I didn't care who bought it. I just wanted 
18 out. I needed the money -• 
19 Q. Okay. 
20 A. -- and he offered to buy it. Jayson Orvis 
21 offered to buy it, Jamis Johnson offered to buy it, but 
22 Jayson Orvis wouldn't allow - said he would block the 
23 sale if I sold it to Jamis Johnson, 
24 Q. Did you call Jamis Johnson and inform him of 
j 25 that? 
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A. . Yes. 
Q. And tell him that buying your interest would 
be a problem? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Has there also a representation that Jayson 
would manipulate the incomes of the businesses to 
prevent Jamis Johnson from making any monies? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What was it that Jayson said? 
A. Basically that he would cut Jamis Johnson 
off if things got too ugly. 
0. Did he say anything about manipulating ! 
finances? In other words, see that there would be no 
return to Johnson because he controlled the monies? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you convey that to Jamis Johnson? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did Jamis Johnson buy your interest? 
A. No. 
0. And it was purchased by Jayson's friend, 
Deon? 
A. Right. Jayson wanted a third party because 
he didn't want - he wanted there to be more balance in 
the decision making processes. 
Q, Okay. After this buyout and you left, did 
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you talk with Jayson much? 
A. Not really. 
Q. Now -
A. Prom time to time, 
Q. Prom time to time? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And currently have you renewed your 
acquaintanceship a little more in the last year or what? 
A, I speak with him fairly often. I don't 
i speak with him day-to-day like I used to. 
Q. Sure. Have you heard from Jayson Orvis 
! whether or not the Tennessee case was ever settled? 
I A. Yeah. He was told that it was. 
\ Q. What did he tell you about that? 
i A. That there had been a favorable settlement 
5 reached and that the PTC was satisfied with any changes 
? that had been made to the organization. 
3 Q. Now, Jamis Johnson and Jayson Orvis, do you 
9 know what the nature of their relationship became after 
0 you left? Did you ever have discussions with Jayson 
1 Orvis about it? 
2 A. Yes. 
1 Q. Do you know what happened, and let me ask 
!4 you this, first of all. 
!5 Do you know who Victor Lawrence is? 
PAGE 27 1 
27 
1 A. Yes. 
2 Q. Who is Victor Lawrence and when did you come 
3 to know him? 
4 A. Mr. Lawrence is an attorney here in town 
5 that Jayson Orvis brought in to serve as another point 
6 of contact for clients. 
7 Q. In Lexington, do you recall, was it uncommon 
8 from time to time for Johnson and Onis to bring in 
9 three or four attorneys to sort of fill positions? 
10 A. That was common. 
11 Q. 1 mean, do you recall Doug Stoel, for 
12 example? 
13 A. Doug Stowell, Jim Hickelson. 
14 Q. Linda Smith? 
15 A. Linda Smith. 
16 Q. Victor Lawrence? 
17 A. Victor Lawrence. 
18 Q. And a few others from time to time? 
19 A. Uh-huh (yes). 
20 Q. Was Victor Lawrence brought in in that time? 
21 A. ?es. 
22 Q. Do you have any knowledge - when you left, 
23 I guess I should say, was Johnson k Associates and 
24 Lexington Law Finns still functioning in this building? 
25 A. Yes. 
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1 Q. And essentially side by side, as it were? 
2 A. Yes. 
3 Q. Well, do you have any knowledge of what 
4 happened to the relationship between Orvis and Johnson, 
5 and, again, I would admonish you to keep in mind that 
6 you have to answer expansively and truthfully to the 
7 best of your knowledge. 
8 Do you have any knowledge of how their 
9 relationship evolved after you left? 
10 A. Yes. It was my understanding that Jayson 
11 Orvis was going to be working to remove Jamis Johnson's 
12 name from the organization, from any relationship to the 
13 organization, to protect the organization, because he 
14 felt that Jamis Johnson had some problems with the Bar 
15 and may not even be able to retain his law license and 
16 that he was a liability, that he would still honor his 
11 financial obligations to Jamis Johnson as long as Jamis 
18 Johnson didn't cause problems. 
19 Q. Let me ask you this: So was it your 
20 understanding that Johnson would become passive, or 
21 would he still be active? 
22 A. Yes, passive. 
23 Q. Was there some sort of agreement that was 
2* entered into between Jayson and Johnson? 
125 A. I believe so. 
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We need to deal with the following: 
1. I need the figures for profit share splits for June and July. I 
didn't get them for either month. 
2. This confirms that for the month of July the payment (for 
June's profit share) was reduced by $23,000 because of my 
guarantee of the Paul Schewenke note. 
3. You have stated to me that the bill for our Tennessee 
counsel has finally been paid up to date for the Tennessee 
litigation. 
4. Re: Office payment. I have learned that you have not been 
paying the office rent due. Johnson and Associates always 
paid this. I haven't paid it. There is a demand for it and I 
need it paid. Kim has the full amount. I will need it 
reimbursed to me. 
5. That raises the costs for the other rent. We've discussed it 
but it has not been resolved. I am going to move to new 
quarters. I will need the benefits that I was receiving 
before the operations moved. That includes phone, 
receptioning, office amenities (copying, fax, etc.). We have 
discussed this but never resolved it. Sam works out of the 
house now. I don't. I may also need temporary office 
space during the transition. I don't want to be at Johnson 
and Associates but I may lodge there for a month. I won't 
know for two weeks. 
6. There are regulatory problems where I am hanging out still 
and I need assurance of continued protection. 
Bar complaints. The bar has responded to my former 
counsel regarding potential bar complaints you have against 
me. They are asking if I am self reporting. I have told Sam 
that I want all trust account checks. He says they are in 
your control, not his. I need all of them. 
7. Accounting. For various reasons of which you are aware, 
we have come to the point where we need a full accounting 
for ail business operations since our inception. I am 
prepared to engage the CPA firm to do this and I have 
talked to one. The cost of this should be borne by the 
companies. If you won't pay for this then I will pay for this 
unless there are discrepancies in which case it will be paid 
for by the businesses. This review needs to be of all 
operations. I want to start this September 15. You have 
said you have put a controller in place so perhaps he is the 
first place to start. I suggest we meet with him. 
Incidentally I have learned that there is a debt settlement 
operation and I have never had any accounting for it. Steve 
Paiige has also raised concerns about large amounts of 
money coming in that are being diverted out of our 
partnership arrangement. For these and all other reasons 
we need an accounting. 
8. Regulatory problems. Regulatory problems still exist. 
a. Div. Of Consumer Affairs: You called me on Friday May 
25 to warn me about a former employee/attorney named 
Jan, no last name given. You indicated that there was a 
file a foot thick about me at the Div of Consumer Affairs 
at Utah and Jan had been contacted by them. You 
indicated that you had promised that I would not follow 
this up including contacting the Division or him because 
he was so upset about their inquiry and you would take 
care of this. I agreed to let you handle this for awhile but 
have heard nothing. This concerns me. 
b. State of Tennessee/FTC. This is hanging and unresolved. 
I cant wait to get it resolved any further. You indicated 
two weeks ago that you had finally gotten our Tennessee 
counsel's bill paid current. That was why I was told that 
profit share was lower. 
c. State Bar. This is unresolved. As you know you 
threatened to bring numerous bar complaints against me 
if we litigated including for the trust account problem that 
was already investigated by the bar for the trust account 
that was managed by you and Sam. The bar has 
responded to my former counsel but as yet not directly to 
me. I still don't have the checks from Sam or you. This 
needs to be investigated and settled. 
9. I just got notice that my families health insurance has 
lapsed again for oversight from Trina I guess. I have kids 
ail over the world and I immediately need that reinstated. I 
am having Kim call about that. 
There are some other pending problems that I only have some notice 
of. There is my IRS obligation for Johnson and Associates that I was 
told was resolved finally but I have no data on that. We need to 
discuss these and several other matters. Obviously the big matter is 
the accounting. 
As I have told you, I have been involved heavily in litigation and in 
this San Diego deal over the past several months as you run the 
operations but I am getting increasingly less info. I hope to have 
some relief shortly. However, we need to meet. There are obviously 
several other issues that I don't mention here, I would ask that we 
meet to catch up. If you want to bring your attorney along feel free. 
Piease call Kim and set an appointment when I can be available or I 
will call you. 
^—^ Jamis 
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION 
* * * I 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
Judgment Creditor, 
vs. 
JAMIS M. JOHNSON, 
Judgment Debtor, 
Civil No. 2:95CV-838W 
Deposition of: 
DANELL JOHNSON 
* * • 
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 18th day of May, 
1999, the deposition of DANELL JOHNSON, produced as a witness 
herein at the instance of the Plaintiff in the above-entitled 
action now pending in the above-named court, was taken before 
Larene Pearce, a Certified Court Reporter and Notary Public 
in and for the State of Utah, commencing at the hour of 10:45 
a.m. of said day at the offices of the Small Business 
Administration, 125 South State Street, Conference Room 2222, 
Salt Lake City, Utah. 
ORIGINAL 
Larene Pearce 
License No. 
22-104852-7801 
INDEPENDENT REPORTING 
& VIDEOGRAPHY 
1220 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 638-213* 
Fax (801)638-2334 
A P P E A R A N C E S 
For the Judgment Creditor: John S. Gygi 
Special Assistcint United States 
Attorney 
125 South State Street, Room 2237 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84138 
For the Witness: Victor Lawrence* 
220 South 200 East, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Also Present: Jamis M. Johnson 
• * * 
I N D E X 
WITNESS 
DANELL JOHNSON 
EXAMINATION PAGE 
By Mr. Gygi 
By Mr. Lawrence 
By Mr. Gygi 
3 
25 
36 
No. 
No. 
NO. 
NO. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
Johnson and Associates Profit and Loss 13 
Johnson and Associates 1996 U. S. 
Corporation Income Tax Return 15 
DaNell Johnson 1997 U. s. Individual 
Income Tax Return 15 
DaNell Johnson 1996 U. S. Individual 
Income Tax Return 15 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
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MR. LAWRENCE: And we can get the papers to find out 
who is on that now. 
MR. GYGI: Okay. 
Q (By Mr. Lawrence) But you know at one time you were 
on the board? 
A Oh, yeah. 
Q But right now you think you still are on the board? 
A I thought Jamis said something about the board 
dissolving just in the conversation here. 
MR. LAWRENCE: We'll go ahead and provide the current 
status. 
Q (By Mr. Lawrence) But right now you think you're on 
the board? 
A Oh, yeah. 
Q In regard to the payments that you received from 
Johnson and Associates and whatnot, initially didn't you 
contribute — I think you stated you contributed some carpet and 
some furniture, right, when the business was first starting? 
MR. JOHNSON: Computers. 
Q (By Mr. Lawrence) Is that right? 
A Yes. 
Q Did you contribute any computers as well? 
A Oh, yes. 
Q Okay. When that business first started, it was just 
a handful of friends and associates? 
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A Right. 
Q Now that has somewhat blossomed, but you don't know 
really what the company does now, is that correct? 
A Yes, because it has expanded quite a bit. 
Q In fact, aren't the funds that you received a profit 
share that you receive? 
A That's what I understood it to be, yes. 
Q Are you being paid for anything else? Do you do any 
type of consulting for Johnson and Associates right now? 
A (Nodded no.) 
Q You have to answer audibly. 
A I'm sorry. 
Q Do you do any consu l t ing for Johnson and Associates? 
A No. 
Q Do you do any consulting for Lexington Law firms? 
A No. 
Q You may sit on the board and you may receive a 
compensation for that, but you are aware that you receive a 
compensation in some type of profit sharing arrangement, is that 
correct? 
A That's right. 
Q And if Johnson and Associates has something to that 
effect, you can go ahead or I can get that for you and turn that 
over to Mr. Gygi? 
A Okay. 
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BERMAN. TOMSIC & SAVAGE 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1250 
Salt Lake City. Utah 84144 
Telephone: (801) 328-2200 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Third Party 
Defendant, Jayson Orvis 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JAYSON ORVIS. 
Plaintiff. 
vs. 
JAMIS JOHNSON, 
Defendant. 
JAMIS JOHNSON. 
Third-Party Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JAYSON ORVIS, SAM SPENDLOVE. 
DEON STECKLING. VICTOR 
LAWRENCE, and JOHN DOES 1-15. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
PLAINTIFF JAYSON ORVIS'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Case No. 010907449 
Honorable Timothy R. Hanson 
Third-Party Defendants. 
STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS 
1. Jayson Orvis is the Plaintiff in this Declaratory Judgment action against the 
Defendant Jamis Johnson. Plaintiff seeks, in this action, a judgment declaring that the 
Defendant has no right, title or interest relative to any business or venture in which 
Plaintiff has any ownership interest relating to the credit repair business; any real or 
personal property or other assets relative to such businesses or ventures; or any 
proceeds or profits relative to such businesses or ventures. 
2. Mr. Johnson was sued by the Small Business Administration and judgment 
was entered against him in that case on September 29, 1997. Exhibit 4 to Affidavit of 
Jayson Orvis. 
3. In post-judgment supplemental proceedings for collection purposes, Mr. 
Johnson was deposed by the Small Business Administration. In that deposition. Mr. 
Johnson categorically testified that he had no interest in or relationship with any 
partnership or limited liability company, including Lexington Law Firm: 
Lexington Law Firm, Victor Lawrence and another attorney 
have taken over all of that. I've indemnified them, they have 
indemnified me. I've resigned from any relationship.... 
Lexington Law Firm[] was in my name, but since that time and 
with my bar problem, I have completely relinquished any 
interest. They paid me a little, made my payment, and I 
resigned. Now, it's listed as an assumed name by Jamis 
Johnson, they're going to have to go in and change that. But, 
you know, they're operating now without me. 
2 
Deposition of Jamis Johnson, November 17,1999, Exhibit 5 to Affidavit of Jayson 
Orvis, at 23:6-24:10. 
4. Defendant Johnson also testified before the SBA that he did not have any 
interest in any partnership or limited liability company: "Q. Do you have any interest in 
any partnership? A. No." "Q. Any interest in any limited liability companies? A. No." 
Deposition of Jamis Johnson, November 17,1999, Exhibit 6 to Affidavit of Jayson 
Orvis, at 30:16-31:4. 
ARGUMENT 
The Court should enter judgment in favor of the Plaintiff Mr. Orvis and against 
the Defendant Mr. Johnson, declaring that Mr. Johnson has no claim to or interest in 
any credit repair business entity or enterprise of the Plaintiff. The Court should enter 
that Declaratory Judgment on the single ground of judicial estoppel. 
In testimony before the Small Business Administration, Mr. Johnson, under oath, 
completely disavowed any interest, partnership or otherwise, in the credit repair 
business of Mr. Orvis. Before this Court, he now claims an interest in such business.1 
Judicial estoppel will not allow Mr. Johnson to contradict his testimony before the Small 
Business Administration and, accordingly, his current claim to an interest in Mr. Orvis's 
business must fail. 
'To decide the case on grounds of judicial estoppel, it is not necessary to 
determine on what (apparently shifting) basis Mr. Johnson rests his claim to interest in 
Mr. Orvis's credit repair business. 
3 
The doctrine of judicial estoppel first made its appearance in 1857 in a case 
before the Tennessee Supreme Court. See Hamilton v. Zimmerman, 37 Tenn. (5 
Sneed) 39,1857 WL 2547 (1857).2 The facts there are instructive. Plaintiff Hamilton 
alleged that for several years he had been a secret partner of defendant Zimmerman in 
a drug store;3 Zimmerman claimed that Hamilton was only a store clerk. In deciding the 
case, the court pointed to pleadings from an earlier action wherein Hamilton had 
testified that allegations describing Hamilton as a store clerk were "substantially true.1' 
1857 WL at *4. The Tennessee Supreme Court held that Hamilton's answer was an 
implicit admission, under oath, that he was a clerk in the employ of Zimmerman, and 
that this answer estopped Hamilton from asserting in the case before the court that he 
and Zimmerman were partners: 
This is at least an implied admission of the truth of the 
statement of Zimmerman - that Hamilton was merely his clerk. 
And for all the purposes of this present bill, the admission 
must be taken as true, without enquiring whether, as a matter 
of fact, it be so or not. The law, as against the complainant 
presumes that it is true . . . . 
id. The court explained the policy behind the judicial estoppel doctrine: 
This doctrine is said to have its foundation in the obligation 
under which every man is placed to speak and act according 
}Mr. Orvis attaches a copy of this case for the Court's convenience. 
3As the court found, Hamilton was a secret partner because, "as against his 
creditors, it was a matter of absolute necessity to conceal his true relation to the 
business as partner . . . . ' • 1857 WL at *2. 
4 
to the truth of the case; and in the policy of the law to 
suppress the mischiefs from the destruction of all confidence 
in the dealings of men, if they were allowed to deny that which 
bv their solemn and deliberate acts thev have declared to be 
true. And this doctrine applies with peculiar force to 
admissions or statements made under the sanction of an 
oath, in the course of judicial proceedings. The chief security 
and safeguard for the purity and efficiency of the 
administration of justice is to be found in the proper reverence 
for the sanctity of an oath. 
JdL (emphases added). 
While the Supreme Court of Tennessee was the first court to apply the doctrine 
of judicial estoppel, it certainly has not been the last Utah courts have adopted the 
doctrine, and courts throughout the country regularly apply it to prevent litigants from 
doing precisely what Mr. Johnson attempts to do here, that is, to engage the judicial 
system in a farce and a fraud. These courts have used a variety of colorful metaphors 
to describe judicial estoppel, "characterizing it as a rule against "'playing "fast and loose 
with the courts,n" blowing hot and cold as the occasion demands,' or 'hav[ing] [one's] 
cake and eat[ing] it too."1 Reynolds v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue. 861 F.2d 469, 
472 (6th Cir. 1988) (internal cites omitted; alteration in original),4 But however 
described, the purpose of the doctrine is, as the Supreme Court of Utah has explained, 
"to uphold the sanctity of oaths, thereby safeguarding the integrity of the judicial 
4
 As the court in Reynolds observed: "Emerson's dictum that 'a foolish 
consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds* cuts no ice in this context." 861 F.2d at 472-
73. 
5 
process from conduct such as knowing misrepresentations or fraud on the court." Salt 
Lake City v. Silver Fork Pipeline Corp.. 913 P.2d 731, 734 (Utah 1995). 
The doctrine of judicial estoppel, unlike equitable estoppel, focuses solely Mon 
the relationship between the litigant and the judicial system, and seeks to preserve the 
integrity of the system:15 Delqrosso v. Spang & Co.. 903 F.2d 234, 241 (3d Cir. 1990); 
see also Lowerv v. Stovall. 92 F.3d 219, 223 n.3 (4* Cir. 1996) ("[Judicial estoppel is 
designed to protect the integrity of the courts rather than any interests of the litigants."); 
Oneida Motor Freight. Inc. v. United Jersey Bank. 848 F.2d 414, 419 (3d Cir. 1988) 
("Judicial estoppel looks to the connection between the litigant and the judicial system 
while equitable estoppel focuses on the relationship between the parties . . . .").6 
Indeed, the Supreme Court of Wyoming has held that a court may raise and 
apply the issue of judicial estoppel sua sponte and for the first time on appeal: 
We are not a bit concerned that the matter of judicial estoppel 
was not raised in the lower court or argued by either of the 
parties. This court has general superintending control over all 
the courts of the state and the Wyoming judicial system in 
general. It is our duty to protect its integrity and prohibit 
dealing lightly with its proceedings. We are at liberty to 
decide a case upon any point which in our opinion the ends of 
justice require, particularly on a point so fundamental that we 
must take cognizance of it. 
5it[E]quitable estoppel.. . focuses on the relationship between the parties M 
Delqrosso. 903 F.2d at 241. 
6For this reason, Mr. Orvis and his relationship to Mr. Johnson are entirely 
irrelevant to the inquiry here. 
6 
Allen v. Allen. 550 P.2d 1137, 1142 (Wyo. 1976). The facts of Men are also 
instructive. There, the defendant had testified in divorce proceedings against his wife 
that he owned a parcel of land in name only and therefore did not have an interest in it. 
Later, in a dispute over the ownership of the land between the putative owner (the 
defendant's father) and the defendant, the defendant argued that he did in fact own the 
land. The Supreme Court of Wyoming emphatically denied the defendant's claim: 
[l]t would be highly inequitable for the defendant to have a 
decree in his divorce case holding the property not to be his 
and at the same time to be held the owner of an interest in 
this proceeding. It is that very inconsistency that judicial 
estoppel will not tolerate. Defendant's statements in the 
previous action are the very highest order of evidence against 
him and are entitled to judicial sanctity. He cannot play 
hanky-panky with the courts of this state and thus interfere 
with the integrity of the judicial system. 
id, (emphasis added). 
The reasoning of Allen applies with full force here. Mr. Johnson has lied - either, 
under oath, before the United States government in the form of the Small Business 
Administration or, under oath, before this Court. Judicial estoppel exists to %'raise[) the 
cost of [such] lying." Chaveriat v. Williams Pipe Line Co.. 11 F.3d 1420, 1428 (7,hCir. 
1993). The cost to Mr. Johnson is that he must be held to his testimony before the 
Small Business Administration. To this end, this Court should declare, on grounds of 
judicial estoppel, that Mr. Johnson has no claim to or interest in any credit repair 
7 
business entity or enterprise of Mr. Orvis, and enter a judgment in favor of the Plaintiff 
on his Declaratory Judgment claim. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the Court should grant Plaintiffs Motion for Summary 
Judgment and enter judgment in favor of Plaintiff on his Declaratory Judgment claim. 
DATED: March 2004. 
BERMAttMOMSIC & SAVAGE 
- ^ 
Peggyi^Jonjlsic. Esq. 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1250 
Salt Lake City. Utah 84144 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Third-Party 
Defendant Jayson Orvis 
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Supreme Court of Tennessee,, 
M HAMILTON 
v. 
JOHN M.ZIMMERMAN. 
December Term. 1852 
West Headnotes 
Estoppel €=>3(3) 
156k3(3) Most Cited Cases 
Where the complainant in a bill against his alleged 
partner for a settlement of partnership accounis, 
declared himself a secret partner in the concern, and 
entitled to half the profits thereof, which the 
defendant denied, alleging that the complainant 
was, during the whole time, only a salaried clerk; 
and it appeared in proof, that in some collateral 
litigation in which both parties were defendants, 
that the defendant, in his answer, among other 
things, averred that the complainant was his 
clerk-and the complainant in his answer admitted 
that the facts staled in defendant's answer were 
substantially true; it is held in a case where the 
proof is conflicting and irreconcilable, and in the 
absence of any satisfactory explanation of said 
admission, that the complainant is thereby estopped 
from denying that he was a clerk as charged. 
Estoppel €=^5 
156k5 Most Cited Cases 
Estoppel €=>88(1) 
I56k88(i) Most Cited Cases 
Evidence O=>205(I) 
157k205(I) Most Cited Cases 
While admissions or declarations made in pais are 
often entitled to little or no consideration, because 
made inconsiderately or in ignorance of the facts, or 
not correctly understood or reported; yet. the 
doctrine of estoppel applies with peculiar force, to 
admissions or statements made under the sanctum 
of an oath, in the course of judicial proceedings. 
But in either case, if it satisfactorily appear that the 
party made such admissions inconsiderately or 
without full knowledge of the facts, it is proper that 
the court should relieve him from the consequences 
of his error. 
Estoppel C=>52(2) 
156k52(2) Most Cilcd Cases 
The doctrine of estoppel has its foundation in the 
obligation under which every man is placed, to 
speak and act, according to the truth of the case; 
and in the policy of the law to suppress the mischief 
which would arise from the destruction of all 
confidence in the intercourse and dealings of men, 
if they were allowed to deny that which, by their 
solemn and deliberate acts, they have declared to be 
true. 
Evidence 0=>596(l) 
157k596( I) Most Cited Cases 
Pretrial Procedure C=*552 
307Ak552 Most Cited Cases 
It is a rule of practice alike applicable in equity as at 
law, that the party who asserts a claim or right 
against another, must establish such claim or right, 
by competent and satisfactory proof; and the test of 
what is satisfactory proof, is the sufficiency of the 
evidence lo satisfy the mind of the probable truth of 
the fact alleged, upon which the right is grounded. 
If unable to do so. the court cannot do otherwise 
than dismiss his suit. 
Exemptions €=^15 
163k 15 Most Cited Cases 
Husband and Wife C=>4 
205k4 Most Cited Cases 
Child Support C=>24 
76Ek24 Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 285k3.1(2)) 
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The debtor is under a positive obligation in law as 
well as morals, to support and maintain his wife and 
infant children. This is bis first and most imperative 
duty. But while this is so, and while he will be 
countenanced by the law in its proper discharge, he 
cannot make it the pretext for covering up and 
protecting from the just claims of creditors, any 
surplus fund accruing from his labor or vocation, 
whatever it may be. 
FROM DAVIDSON. 
*1 The complainant filed this bill in the chancery 
court at Nashville, for a settlement of partnership 
accounts between himself and the defendant, with 
whom he claims to have been a secret partner in the 
business of druggist. The facts are fully given in the 
opinion. At the November term, 1857, Chancellor 
Frierson, rendered a decree for the complainant. 
The defendant appealed. 
E. H. Swing and W. F. Cooper, for the 
complainant; John Trimble and Foster, for the 
defendant. 
McKinney, J., delivered the opinion of the court. 
Tlifs was a bill for a partnership account. The 
complainant alleges that, for several years, he was a 
secret partner with the defendant in a drug store in 
the city of Nashville, carried on in the name of J. M. 
Zimmerman, under a verbal agreement between 
them, to share equally the profits of the business. 
The fact of partnership is expressly dented by the 
defendant. To establish his interest as a partner in 
the concern, the complainant relies on the oral 
admission of the defendant, made to various 
persons, at different periods during the continuance 
of the alleged partnership. And to show that such 
was not the fact, and that the complainant's only 
connection with the business was in the capacity of 
clerk, in the employ of defendant, resort is had to 
the same sort evidence, namely, the verbal 
declarations of the complainant, often repeated, to 
the effect that he was not a partner with defendant 
in the business, but simply a salaried clerk; and, in 
addition, the defendant relies upon the 
complainant's implied admission in a more solemn 
form, contained in his answer to a bill in chancery, 
to disprove the allegation of the present bill. It 
seems, from the allegations and proof in the cause, 
Copr. © West 2004 No ( 
that on the 18th of November, 1850, McNairy & 
Hamilton, druggists, of Nashville (the firm 
consisting of the complainant, M. Hamilton, and W. 
H, McNairy), being about to fail, sold and 
transferred their stock to the defendant, 
Zimmerman, who executed his several notes for the 
consideration agreed to be paid payable in future 
installments which notes were transferred by Mc 
Nairy & Hamilton to N. A. McNairy, as collateral 
security, to indemnify him on account of his 
liabilities for the firm of McNairy & Hamilton. 
The bill, in substance, charges that about the time 
of the sale by McNairy & Hamilton to Zimmerman, 
the complainant, reduced to poverty by the failure 
of said firm, and deprived of the means of support 
for his family, proposed to Zimmerman, who was 
comparatively a stranger in Nashville, that he, the 
complainant, who was familiar with ihe business, 
and had an extensive acquaintance in the 
community, would, as a secret partner, join with the 
former in the purchase of the said stock of drugs 
and medicines from McNairy & Hamilton, and in 
canying on said business in Nashville, upon the 
terms that they should equally share the profits of 
the business. To this proposition, as the bill alleges, 
Zimmerman readily assented. The bill further states, 
in substance, that, being insolvent, and looking to 
his interest in the profits of this new business as the 
only means of furnishing a support for his 
increasing family,, "it was absolutely necessary that 
his (complainant's) connection with Zimmerman in 
the purchase should be kept secret, otherwise the 
whole object had in view might at any moment be 
defeated. Accordingly the fact was not made known 
to the public," and complainant "went into the new 
business, ostensibly, as clerk, and so held himself 
out to the world." etc. But that in reality he was a 
full and equal partner in the business, and so 
continued up to some time in 1856, when 
Zimmerman sold out the entire establishment, and 
denied that complainant had any interest as partner 
in the same, or any right to a share of the profits. 
The bill alleges that the complainant withdrew from 
the concern upwards of $4,000. and the defendant 
nearly $8,000; and that after this deduction, and an 
adjustment of all ihe liabilities of the concern, there 
remains a balance of clear profits of from $10,000 
to $14,000 to be divided: and to one-half of which, 
complainant, by the agreement, is entitled. 
*2 The answer denies, in strong terms, the 
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existence of any agreement or understanding that 
Hamilton was to have any interest, or that he ever 
had any interest, as partner, in the purchase of the 
stock of drugs and medicines, or in the business 
carried on by the defendant, and positively asserts 
that he was merely employed and taken into the 
store as clerk, in the early part of the year 1852; and 
that he remained, and served in that capacity alone, 
until in 1856, when defendant sold out the 
establishment; and that the money stated to have 
been drawn from the concern by the complainant 
was received as compensation for his services as 
clerk, and not otherwise, 
This is an extraordinary case. The solemn 
asseverations of the parties in the bill and 
answer-both of which are sworn to-are positively 
contradicted and disproved by the previous repeated 
declarations of the parlies. It is satisfactorily proved 
that the defendant, on different occasions, during 
the continuance of the business, distinctly admitted 
the interest of complainant as a partner, and that, as 
such, he was entitled to a share of the profits. And, 
on the other hand, it is as fully established that the 
complainant denied more frequently, perhaps, that 
he had any interest whatever as partner; and 
asserted that he was merely a clerk, receiving a 
salary for his services. 
Perhaps no case of conflicting evidence, of more 
difficult solution than the present, can be imagined, 
if we look merely to the oral admissions and 
declarations of the parties. It is impossible to 
reconcile the statements of the parties with each 
other; and it is no less impossible to reconcile the 
statements of either, made prior to this suit, with his 
own allegations in the pleadings. The attempt to do 
so would be alike painftil and fruitless. If there were 
nothing more in the case, we should feel driven to 
the necessity of resorting to the principle, alike 
applicable in equity as at law, (hat the party 
asserting a claim or right against another must 
establish such claim or right by competent and 
satisfactory proof; and the test of what is 
satisfactory proof is the sufficiency of the evidence 
to satisfy the mind of the probable truth of the fact 
alleged, upon which the party grounds his right. If 
unable to do this, the judicial tribunal appealed to 
cannot do otherwise than dismiss his suit. But it has 
been argued for the complainant, with great 
ingenuity, that the supposed inconsistency of his 
previous declarations with the sworn statement of 
the bill is apparent rather than real; that such 
declarations are entitled to no force, and should not 
be permitted to prejudice his rights, because they 
are shown lo be compatible with the intention of the 
parties, and the end to be accomplished-which was 
to secure the means of support for himself and 
family; and that, to effect this end as against his 
creditors, it was a matter of absolute necessity to 
conceal his true relation to the business as partner, 
and to hold him out to the public in the relation of 
clerk merely. 
*3 This argument involves a conclusion as hard to 
be maintained, perhaps, in law, as in sound 
casuistry. 
We fully assent to the correctness of the position 
assumed by the counsel for the complainant, that 
since the abolishment of the arrest or imprisonment 
of the body of a debtor the creditor has no more 
power over the person than over the will of his 
debtor. He cannot be heard to insist that his debtor 
shall apply himself to labor, either of mind or body, 
so as thereby from his daily earnings to accumulate 
a fund for the benefit of creditors. In law- however 
it may be in morals-the debtor may resign himself 
to hopeless and endless want, or he may limit his 
exertions to just such an extent as may be adequate 
to furnish him the means of a scanty subsistence; 
and in all this he violates no legal right of his 
creditor. And. for the same reason, it would seem 
that he might in favor of his wife and children 
create a sort of lien, so to speak, upon the earnings 
of his daily labor, for their maintenance, in defiance 
of creditors. And this might be blameless in morals 
as well as in law, under some circumstances. 
The debtor is certainly under a moral obligation to 
use all reasonable exertions to satisfy the just claims 
of creditors; but he is under a positive obligation, in 
law as well as morals, to support and maintain his 
wife and infant children. This is his first and most 
imperative duty. But while this is so, and while he 
will be countenanced by the law in its proper 
discharge, he cannot make it the pretext for 
covering up and protecting from the just claims of 
creditors any surplus fund accruing from his labor 
or vocation, whatever it may be. He has an election 
to labor or not. as he may please, with which the 
law will not interfere so long as he keeps himself 
from without the scope and operation of such police 
regulations as, in the economy of every 
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well-ordered state, are deemed necessary. But 
beyond the necessary wants of his family there is a 
limit which the law will not allow him to transcend. 
He cannot treasure up a fund, no matter from what 
source derived, and claim that it shall be protected 
for the benefit of himself or family, against the 
demands of creditors. 
If the foregoing reasoning be correct, there existed 
no sufficient reason for concealment of the truth, or 
representation of an untruth, if nothing more were 
contemplated by the complainant's connection with 
the business than to obtain the means of an adequate 
support for his family; and if more than this was 
intended, and the concealment was a mere 
subterfuge, such intention must be regarded as a 
meditated fraud upon creditors. And from the 
complainant's own showing it is somewhat difficult 
to escape the latter conclusion; for, after $4,000, or 
upwards, had been received by him, which was 
about $1,000 a year, during the period he remained 
in the store, and double that sum had been 
withdrawn by the defendant, there still remained a 
neat balance of from S10,000 to $14,000 profits to 
be equally divided, upon the assumption of the bill. 
*4 In this view, the argument denying the 
complainant a status in a court of equity is 
plausible, to say no more of it. Wc do not, however, 
rest the decision of the case upon this ground alone, 
but mainly upon a different one. It has been already 
slated that the notes executed by Zimmerman to 
McNairy & Hamilton were transferred for the 
indemnity of N. A. McNairy. And the complainant 
in his bill alleges that on the 13th of March, 1852, 
he and his former partner, to whom said notes were 
made, together with the personal representative of 
N. A. McNairy, filed a bill against Zimmerman to 
enforce the specific execution of the contract 
between the parties, and to have his stock of drugs, 
medicines, etc., attached, for the purpose of 
discharging said notes, upon the express allegations 
that Zimmerman had failed to meet the payment of 
some of said notes, and that he had declared freely 
his design to leave the state, and had offered to sell 
out his entire establishment with a view of doing so, 
and other charges of like import. 
Zimmerman, in his answer to that bill, after an 
express denial of all the charges against him, made 
the following statement; "Resp't, by way of showing 
the great injustice done him by the charges in the 
bill, states that, at the lime this bill was filed, one of 
the complainants in the biir (meaning Hamilton) 
"was then in the house of resp't as clerk, and had 
full knowledge of the whole business of resp't, and 
knew perfectly well that the debts resp't owed the 
firm of McNairy & Hamilton were perfectly good," 
etc. At the same time. Zimmerman filed a cross-bill, 
to obtain a credit for certain claims alleged to be 
due from McNairy & Hamilton to him. 
And in his answer to said cross-bill. Hamilton, the 
present complainant, states, "that he has read 
carefully the answer of Zimmerman, and also his 
bill, and believes that the allegations in said answer 
and bill are substantially true." 
This is at least an implied admission of the truth of 
the statement of Zimmerman-that Hamilton was 
merely his clerk. And for all the purposes of the 
present bill, the admission must be taken as tme, 
without enquiring whether, as a matter of fact, it be 
so or not. The law, as against the complainant, 
presumes that it is true: and this presumption 
proceeds upon the doctrine of estoppel, which, from 
motives of public policy or expediency, will not, in 
some instances, suffer a man to contradict or 
gainsay what, under particular circumstances, he 
may have previously said or done. This doctrine is 
said to have its foundation in the obligation tinder 
which every man is placed to speak and act 
according to the truth of the case; and in the policy 
of the law to suppress the mischiefs from the 
destruction of all confidence in the intercourse and 
dealings of men, if they were allowed to deny that 
which by their solemn and deliberate acts they have 
declared to be true. And this doctrine applies with 
peculiar force to admissions or statements made 
under the sanction of an oath, in the course of 
judicial proceedings. The chief security and 
safeguard for the purity and efficiency of the 
administration of justice is to be found in the proper 
reverence for the sanctity of an oath. 
*5 Admissions oir declarations made in pais are 
often entitled to little or no consideration, because 
made inconsiderately or in ignorance of the facts, or 
not correctly understood or reported. And even 
when made with more deliberation, and under oath, 
it may be made to appear that they were made 
inconsiderately or by mistake: and if this be so, the 
party ought certainly to be relieved from the 
consequences of his error. 
Copr. © West 2004 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
37 Tenn. 39 rage j 
5 Sneed (TN) 39 
(Cite as: 1857 VVL 2547 (Tenn.)) 
In the present instance no explanation is given of 
the admission, either in the bill or in the proof. And 
it is vain to attempt 10 evade its force by saying that 
the statement was an immaterial maner in the 
former suit, and therefore not likely to have 
challenged the attention of Hamilton, or to have 
been one of the "allegations" the truth of which he 
intended to admit. As a matter of law, the statement 
may have been of no importance in that cause; but 
as a matter of fact, from the obvious import of the 
statement, it was material to Hamilton, if the truth 
were otherwise. 
There are other inferences arising from the fact of 
filing the former bill, and from the allegations 
made, and the relief sought thereby, which, 
unexplained as they are, cannot fail to prejudice the 
complainant's right to bring the present bill. But we 
leave the case, resting its determination mainly 
upon the legal principle that ihe complainant is 
precluded by his admission, without undertaking to 
adjudge how the truth of the matter really is. 
The entire costs of the cause will be equally 
divided between the parties. 
Decree reversed, and bill dismissed. 
37 Tenn. 39, 5 Snccd (TN) 39. 1857 WL 2547 
(Tenn.) 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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BERMAN, TOMSIC & SAVAGE 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1250 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Telephone: (801)328-2200 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Third Party 
Defendant, Jayson Orvis 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JAYSON ORVIS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JAMIS JOHNSON, 
Defendant. 
JAMIS JOHNSON, 
Third-Party Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JAYSON ORVIS, SAM SPENDLOVE, 
DEON STECKLING, VICTOR 
LAWRENCE, and JOHN DOES 1-15, 
AFFIDAVIT OF JAYSON ORVIS 
Case No. 010907449 
Honorable Timothy R. Hanson 
Third-Party Defendants. 
Jayson Orvis, being first duly sworn, states as follows: 
1. I am the plaintiff in this Declaratory Judgment action against the 
defendant Jamis Johnson. I am seeking, in this action, a judgment declaring that the 
defendant has no right, title or interest relative to any business or venture in which I 
have any ownership interest relating to the credit repair business; any real or personal 
property or other assets relative to such businesses or ventures; or any proceeds or 
profits relative to such businesses or ventures. 
2. I have been involved in businesses relating to credit repair since at least 
1993. As a result of my involvement with credit repair businesses, I have up until the 
present designed and licensed software, trademarks, trade names and processes used 
in credit repair businesses through various entities which I have created and in which I 
own an "interest. 
3. In addition to owning and licensing intellectual property and processes 
used in the credit repair business, I also provide expert consulting and services to 
companies and law firms that are engaged in the credit repair business. 
4. I first became acquainted with the defendant Jamis Johnson in 
approximately 1994, as a result of my association with a now-defunct credit repair 
marketing entity. In approximately January of 1995, I assisted Mr. Johnson in setting 
up the business processes, software and marketing for a credit repair law firm owned 
solely at the time by Mr. Johnson, who was at the time an attorney. This law firm 
2 
adopted the name Lexington Law Firm. In early 1996, I assisted Mr. Johnson in 
establishing J&A, which was formed to act as the "fulfillment" department, that is, the 
department where the actual credit repair work was done for Lexington. I developed 
and owned intellectual property and processes that I licensed to Lexington and J&A 
and that were utilized by the defendant to provide credit repair services to his clients. 
Defendant Johnson had no involvement in the development, improvement or 
ownership of any of the intellectual property or processes. Defendant Johnson's role 
and interest in the credit repair business was limited to his ownership of the law firm 
and J&A, and his position as directing lawyer responsible for supervising the actual 
legal work being done by employee non-attorneys. 
5. In April of 1997, defendant Johnson and I formalized our agreement with 
regard to the defendant's utilization of the intellectual property and processes that I had 
developed and owned. That agreement simply reflected in writing the status of our 
respective ownership rights and business relationship prior to that time and after that 
time. In that agreement, the defendant also relinquished any possible claim to the 
trade name, Lexington Law Firm, and assigned such to me. A copy of this agreement 
is attached as Exhibit 1. 
6. Sometime after April of 1997 and before May of 1999, I entered into a 
written agreement with the defendant memorializing our working relationship and 
verbal agreements and clarifying that the defendant would continue to be compensated 
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in a manner consistent with previous compensation as long as he served as and 
performed the duties of the directing attorney of Lexington/J&A. At the same time, I 
was actively providing my credit repair consulting services, properties, marketing and 
software to other credit repair firms and companies, to the full knowledge of Mr. 
Johnson, and without any compensation flowing to him as a result of these activities, 
outside of Lexington. Our understanding at the time we executed this agreement was 
that the defendant was and would be compensated for performing his duties as 
directing attorney for Lexington and J&A alone and that Mr. Johnson did not have an 
interest in any business endeavor of mine other than that of the law firm owned and 
supervised by Mr. Johnson. That agreement is attached as Exhibit 2. 
7. Sometime in late 1998 or early 1999, the Utah State Bar filed a 
disciplinary action against the defendant for conduct predating and unrelated to his 
involvement with Lexington or J&A. That action eventually led to the defendant being 
disbarred as a lawyer in Utah. 
8. As a result of defendant Johnson's troubles with the Utah State Bar, 
defendant Johnson could no longer perform his duties and obligations as the directing 
attorney. He therefore transferred all his credit repair clients to attorney Victor 
Lawrence who assumed and continues to perform credit repair-type legal services 
utilizing my processes, software, marketing and consulting services. A copy of this 
agreement is attached as Exhibit 3. 
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9. The defendant had no right, title, interest or involvement with Lexington or 
J&A or relative to any of my businesses or ventures relating to credit repair after he 
was disbarred, resigned his position as directing attorney and transferred the Lexington 
credit repair law clients to Mr. Lawrence on May 21, 1999. After that date, Mr. 
Johnson had no managerial, financial, or other involvement with Lexington or J&A. 
10. When the defendant was disbarred and transferred his credit repair clients 
to Victor Lawrence, I had become aware that, in addition to problems with the Utah 
State Bar, the defendant was having problems with a number of creditors. The 
defendant, contrary to our agreement, began to make demands and claims relative to 
my businesses. I made it clear to the defendant that all obligations had been fulfilled to 
the defendant and that our business relationship had been terminated by his actions. 
However, because we were friends at that time and to avoid any further problems, I 
told the defendant that, at my discretion and as long as he did not serve as a nuisance, 
I would pay him an amount on a monthly basis based on my own subjective decision. I 
made it clear to the defendant, however, that I had no obligation or duty and he had no 
right relative to any further payments or compensation. 
11. Defendant Johnson was sued by the Small Business Administration 
("SBA"), and judgment was entered against him in that case on September 29,1997. 
This judgment is attached as Exhibit 4. 
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12. In post-judgment supplemental proceedings for collection purposes, 
defendant Johnson was deposed by the SBA. In that deposition, the defendant 
categorically testified that he had no interest in or relationship with any partnership or 
limited liability company, including Lexington Law Firm: 
A: Lexington Law Firm, Victor Lawrence and another attorney 
have taken over all of that. I've indemnified them, they have 
indemnified me. I've resigned from any relationship. . . . 
Lexington Law Firm was in my name, but since that time and 
with my bar problem, I have completely relinquished any 
interest. They paid me a little, made my payment, and I 
resigned. Now, it's listed as an assumed name by Jamis 
Johnson, they're going to have to go in and change that. 
But, you know, they're operating now without me. 
Exhibit 5, Deposition of Jamis Johnson, November 17, 1999 at 23:6-24:10. 
Q: Do you have any interest in any partnership? 
A: No. 
Q: Any interest in any limited liability companies? 
A: No. 
Exhibit 6, Deposition of Jamis Johnson, November 17, 1999 at 30:16-31:4. 
13. I was never deposed by the SBA nor have I had any interaction with it. 
14. I have never agreed, reached any understanding, or made any 
commitment which was intended to or in fact defrauded any creditor of the defendant, 
including the SBA. I have never agreed, reached any understanding or made any 
commitment that was intended to conceal or transfer or concealed or transferred any 
6 
asset of the defendant from any creditor of dfefendant, including the SBA, nor would 
havo ever had a reason to do so. 
DATfcD: March . 3 / . 2004. 
Jayson Orvis 
SUBSCRIBED and sworn to before me this ^/dav of March. 2004. 
>. Notary PubiSc"™ O^ULJ^-^ 
COLLEEN PETEHSONr^.
 ni o,,hiin 
5osouihMam,suiio 1250 rotary Publ ic j „ 
Sopiembor 26,2004 • S**>*^ r J 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on March 31, 2004, I caused a true and correct copy 
of AFFIDAVIT OF JAYSON ORVIS to be mailed, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Jamis M. Johnson 
Johnson & Associates 
352 South Denver Street 
#304 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Blake S. Atkin 
Atkin & Hawkins 
136 South Main Street, #610 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorney for Third Party Defendants 
&oU^4d?t OULfi-L<^ 
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Exhibit 7 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF UTAH 
-0O0-
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
Case No. 2:95-cv-838W 
Deposition of: 
JAMIS M. JOHNSON 
JAMIS M. JOHNSON, 
Defendant. 
-0O0-
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 17th day of 
November, 1999, the deposition of JAMIS M. JOHNSON, 
produced as a witness herein at the instance of the 
Plaintiff, in the above-entitled action now pending 
in the above-named court, was taken before Jerry 
Martin, Registered Professional Reporter and Notary 
Public in and for the State of Utah, commencing at 
the hour of 11:00 a.m. of said day at the Federal 
Building, 125 South State Street, Room 2231, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
ORIGINAL 
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1
 Q. Are you a member of D.M. Johnson & 
2 Associates, LLC? 
3 A. No. 
4
 Q- Now, your wife previously provided tax 
5 returns for D.M. Johnson, LLC, and it shows you as a 
6 50 percent owner. 
7 A. I think what it showed -- I don't think 
8 it showed me as a SO percent owner* 
9 Q* That's what the schedule K-1 shows. 
10 A. What happens is they -- you would have to 
11 ask my tax preparer -- they take an LLC, and if 
12 you've had income they allocate that income, and you 
13 pay taxes personally on whatever flows through, and 
14 I'm not listed as a member of D.M. Johnson, LLC. 
15 There are two other members. I have done some work 
16 that I have billed D.M. Johnson for. But it's just a 
17 standard LLC. It's -~ 
18 Q. I understand how an LLC works, and I 
19 understand tax returns for LLCs. For 1996 and 1997 
20 the LLC shows they gave you Schedule K-1. They gave 
21 you K-1 returns as a 50 percent owner, allocating 
22 income and losses. Is that inaccurate? 
23 A. No. They allocated the income and 
24 losses, but I'm not an owner. 
25 Q. But you're getting 50 percent of the 
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1
 Q* When is your tax preparer supposed to 
2 have your 1998 returns done? 
3 A, Well, he should have them done now. In 
4 October we discussed that he was missing a couple of 
5 items. I actually got those items, and I think 
6 really within the next 30 days I should have them 
7 done. You know, it will be for '98. 
8 Q. Have you given him all the information he 
9 needs to prepare them? 
10 A. Yeah. Yeah, there were a couple of 
11 items. He needed some from Danell and some from me. 
12 I think we've got them. We're trying to get them 
13 together. 
14 Q. Do you still operate your law practice 
15 under the assumed name of Lexington Law Firms? 
16 A. I never operated my law practice under an 
17 assumed name of Lexington Law Firms. 
18 Q. Okay. The state records show that the 
19 d.b.a. is registered to you and has been ever since 
20 1994 and will be until the year 2000. 
21 A. I think that's accurate. The state 
22 records do show that. 
23 I Q. So who do you claim uses the name? 
24 | A. Oh, Lexington Law Firms? 
25 I Q. Yes. 
22 
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1 A. I think we provided you a bunch of that 
2 information before, and you should know that, and I'm 
3 surprised you don't. But I resigned with any 
4 involvement in Lexington Law Firms because of the 
5 pending bar problem. 
6 Q. Aren't we talking Johnson & Associates, 
7 not Lexington Law Firms? 
8 A. No. I resigned from anything. I have 
9 practiced law under Jamis M. Johnson and Jamis M. 
10 Johnson & Associates. Johnson & Associates is a 
11 not-for-profit corporation, and you've been told 
12 this. Nobody has shares of stock. I resigned from 
13 that. Lexington Law Firm, Victor Lawrence and 
14 another attorneys have taken over all of that. I've 
15 indemnified them, they have indemnified me. I've 
16 resigned from any relationship. Lexington Law Firm 
17 was just an operating entity that was doing credit 
18 repair. 
19 Q. Now, Lexington Law Firms is not an 
20 entity. It's an assumed name registered to you. 
21 A. Actually, I think what happened -- and 
22 I'll have to recall this -- but I assigned -- a 
23 I couple of years ago there was a corporation being set 
24 I up, but that was assigned -- the name was assigned 
25 | to -- it was going to be assigned into a corporation. 
23 
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1 I don't know if we've ever registered the fact that 
2 it was assigned. I was sued by the State of 
3 Tennessee, you know, personally because Lexington Law 
4 Firms was in my name, but since that time and with my 
5 bar problem I have completely relinquished any 
6 interest. They paid me a little bit, made my 
7 payment, and I resigned. Now, if it's listed as an 
8 assumed name by Jamis Johnson, they're going have to 
9 go in and change that. But, you know, they're 
10 operating now without me. 
11 Q. So you don't use that name in any way. 
12 A. I have actually never actively used it. 
13 I registered it. 
14 Q. Haven't you written checks with the name 
15 on it? 
16 A. There was a - - t h e r e were checks w r i t t e n 
17 t h a t had my s i g n a t u r e , c o m p u t e r - g e n e r a t e d s i g n a t u r e , 
18 and I was on t h e a c c o u n t . A c t u a l l y , I d o n ' t t h i n k 
19 I ' v e ever s i g n e d one of t h o s e c h e c k s . I t was a 
20 f a i r l y b i g o r g a n i z a t i o n . I t was j u s t a m a r k e t i n g 
21 e n t i t y . 
22 Q. Do you want me to show you all checks 
23 that you've handwritten out, checks that say 
24 Lexington Law Firm? 
25 A. Yeah, why don't you. My recollection is 
2 4 
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1 Q. But there's no cash value in either 
2 policy? 
3 A. No, there is no cash value on any 
4 insurance policy. 
5 Q. Doesn't the universal life policy have 
6 cash value by_its nature? 
7 A. You know, it may. That's owned by my 
8 wife, but I would be glad to have you look at it. If 
9 it does have some accrual, it might be a thousand 
10 bucks. That's a good question. I could find that 
11 out. I don't know if anybody would care. But again 
12 it's the property of -- it's not property the SBA 
13 could grab. As I recall, it's about $150,000, you 
14 know, that policy. The other one is a million bucks. 
15 The term is a million bucks. 
16 Q. Do you have any interest in any 
17 I partnerships? 
18 A. No. I mean, you know, often I'll have a 
19 joint endeavor with somebody, but I don't have a 
20 partnership or set up a partnership or an LLC. You 
21 know, if I get a deal I say, Hey, do you want to do 
22 this deal together? We'll go up to summit county and 
2 3 J buy a lot. 
24 | Q. So a joint venture. 
25 I A. Yeah, you can call it that, but I don't 
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1 have any outgoing partnerships, 
2 Q. Any interest in any limited liability 
3 companies? 
4 A. No. I had an interest in an limited 
5 liability company in California called Simmons 
6 Shores, LLC. The property got foreclosed out from 
7 underneath it. I made some money from raising loans 
8 for it, but I know that no longer exists. 
9 I had an interest in an outfit called 
10 Western Equities, LLC, but that is no longer 
11 functional. I have no interest in LLCs or 
12 corporations . 
13 Q. How about Summit Insured Equity Limited 
14 Partnership? 
15 A. I had -- that was a -- I had shares of 
16 stock in Summit that I got in exchange for legal work 
17 and sold them, I'm thinking, in either late 1997 or 
18 '98, early '98. 
19 Q. So you no longer have any interest in 
20 that limited partnership. 
21 A. No. 
22 Q. And you received no income. 
23 A. No. It was a small amount of money. I 
24 got three grand from it. 
25 Q. Do you own any real estate? 
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1 A. No. I would have to be crazy to own real 
2 estate with the SBA trying to get all my real estate. 
3 I've been working on this SBA loan when it was first 
4 taken out, I think, in '85, and we, as you know, had 
5 a lot of litigation. I don't have any real estate. 
6 Q. What's your wife's occupation? 
7 A. She's a mom and she does a little bit of 
8 paralegal work, and she had some real estate business 
9 for a while. She was working with a hospital, kind 
10 of a billing situation. She wants to go back to 
11 school. 
12 Q. Currently is she employed by anybody? 
13 A. Yeah. Well, she's not employed. She 
14 doesn't get a W-2. She sits on the board of 
15 j Johnson & Associates. 
16 Q. Does she earn any money for that? 
17 A. Yeah, I think she does. I think she 
18 covered all that with you. I can't recall. Yeah, 
19 she was on the board of Johnson & Associates. I 
20 think she's -- well, she's no longer on the board of 
21 the Caldwell Memorial Hospital, That ended. She 
22 j wants to go back new and she wants to get a job and 
23 I come to work for the SBA, I think. 
24 | Q. Good. 
25 | A. You get paid so well. 
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Q. So if Johnson & Associate pays your wife 
money it's for her services as a trustee. 
A. Yeah. She sits on the board. She 
Also -- yeah, she also -- she did some other things 
for them occasionally, but not much. 
Also, you know, I think our income will 
be substantially less. I think mine will be higher 
and hers will be lower. Caldwell is gone. It's no 
longer around, so, you know 
Q. I've noticed that Lexington Law Firms 
would pay her checks of $465. What would that be? 
A. That's like services. 
Q. What kind of services? 
A. Well, let's see. The same kind of 
services that the 20 other people up there provide 
generally, whatever. I know initially --
Q. So your wife goes into the office there 
and does work or --
A. She does some work, yeah. She does some 
minimal work. She's also on the board. She also 
donated, you know, as she told you in her deposition, 
early on a bunch of computers and furniture and, you 
know, a lot of facilities to get it started. It's 
got a combination of things there. I mean, I think 
you know this because we've given you the checks, or 
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she's given you the checks or Johnson & Associate 
have given you the checks. All of those checks have 
been made available to you. 
Question. Never mind. Hey, what do you 
think the SBA would like to take to settle this? Is 
it up to $400,000 yet, this loan? It's over three. 
Q. I don't know. You keep saying you'll 
make an offer and you dcn't. 
A. It's because I'm only now starting to 
recover. We talked about my suing Kent Davis. Kent 
Davis is around. You recall that whole argument. 
Kent Davis was the source of this problem. I mean, 
you have heard me say that, you know, we've got this 
SBA loan. I demanded an accounting. He actually got 
a TRO and prevented me from going to the business. I 
sued them, got the IRS on them, and then the business 
collapsed. He went bankrupt. I negotiated with the 
SBA to try and sell the property. We actually had a 
deal of $60,000, a settlement from me. It didn't 
happen. 
They sold the property to the same guy 
for $60,000. They went after me for the deficiency. 
I litigated that and I lost. Judge Winter gave me 
about a 20-page opinion. And so by the time we're 
all done you want $300,300 from me, but Kent Davis, 
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1 charge, but they're just giving it to us. That whole 
2 basement is just basically half deserted now, so 
3 they're not having to pay rent. 
4
 Q. So Wasatch Credit is not there? 
5 A. Wasatch Credit is no longer there. 
6 Q. And you're just paying the 175 bucks a 
7 month? 
8 A. I'm just showing up and paying it. I try 
9 to keep my overhead pretty low. 
10 Q. So your wife at this time is still on the 
11 board of Johnson & Associates. 
12 A. Yes. What was that you just turned off? 
13 Q. That was just this leather chair here. 
14 A. I thought maybe you turned something off. 
15 1 thought you had an infrared polygraph beam you were 
16 beaming at me or something, some new government 
1 7 scheme. 
18 What do you think the SBA would take if I 
19 came in and gave them some money? 
20 Q . I don't know. 
21 A. You don't you have enough information to 
22 extrapolate my financial condition. Would you sell 
23 me the judgment if I -- would you sell it to me if I 
24 wanted to buy it? 
25 Q. Well, what good would that do you? 
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1 I income from L o u i s i a n a . 
2 A. N o . 
3 Q. So t h e LLC's main s o u r c e of income r i g h t 
4 now i s D a n e l l ' s t r u s t e e s h i p i n Johnson & A s s o c i a t e s 
5 and some of t h e s e hard money d e a l s . And a n y t h i n g 
6 e l s e ? 
7 A. Lex. You mentioned $465 payment from 
8 L e x . 
9 Q. L e x i n g t o n Law Firm does c r e d i t r e p a i r , 
10 r i g h t ? 
11 A. Uh-huh. Danell gets payments from Lex. 
12 Then she also has — well, if a big deal comes along 
13 she gets some of that money. We sold some of that 
14 real estate. We bought some lots and sold them in 
15 the fall. I mean in the spring. 
16 Q. The spring of 1999? 
17 A. Yeah, the tax sale when we went up to 
18 Summit County. I mentioned that to you. And, you 
19 know, the payments on the house coming from Knudsen 
20 would probably be treated as income to her to the 
21 extent it pays out on that first mortgage $3,700 a 
22 month. That's about -- that comes out to be $45,000 
23 a year or something, 1 mean on the receipt of the 
24 payments of that house. 
25 Q. So is your wife in the lawsuit trying to 
87 
1 INDEPENDENT REPORTING & VIDEOGRAPHY . ( 8 0 1 ) 5 3 8 - 2 3 3 3 
Exhibit 8 
oe Cartwright #7697 
ittomey For Defendant 
Veils Fargo Center 
99 South Main Street, Suite 1700 
lalt Lake City, UT 84111 
el: 801-363-5255 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE 
COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WSON ORVIS ) 
Plaintiff. -
vs. I 
\MIS JOHNSON j 
Defendant. I 
\MIS JOHNSON and DaNell JOHNSON, 
Third-Party Plaintiffs. ; 
VS. ; 
VYSON ORVIS 
Third-Party Plaintiffs. 
MEMORANDUM OF JAMIS 
JOHNSON IN OPPOSITION TO 
JAYSON ORVIS" MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
I Civil No. 010907449 
I Honorable Timothy R. Hanson 
I (Oral Argument Requested) 
Defendant, Jamis M. Johnson, by counsel, Joe Cartwright, hereby submits Jamis 
Johnson's Memorandum in Opposition To Jayson Orvis' Motion For Summary 
Judgment, as follows: 
FACTS 
Please note that the below paragraphs are supported by the Affidavit of Jamis 
Johnson filed concurrently herewith, and each paragraph below matches the 
corresponding paragraph of the said Affidavit Reference will not be made in each 
paragraph to the affidavit. 
1. This case involves millions of dollars. 
2. It is estimated that Jayson Orvis is today personally taking $500,000 to 
$800,000 monthly from the credit repair ventures, one third of which belongs to 
the Johnsons. (Ex. 1, Vigil Deposition p. 70 line 6-15) (Lexington web page: 
lexingtonlaw.com) (Ex. 2, Deposition of Tommy Triplett p. 20,1. 9, where Orvis 
takes in $153,000 in one month several years ago.) 
3. Lexington Law Firms has 75,000 to 150,000 clients each paying $35 monthly 
and Orvis takes the lion's portion of this money. (Ex. 1, Vigil Deposition supra.) 
4. This case is an effort by Orvis to end the partnership of Orvis and the 
Johnsons and involves claims by the Johnsons of embezzlement, fraud and 
concealment by Orvis of profit share; establishment of secret companies to 
siphon profits from Johnsons, use of sham companies to hide from the U.S. 
Government the Orvis purchase of an SBA judgment; it involves the active 
complicity of a Utah attorney. The actual damages to Johnsons exceed several 
million dollars. 
5. In or about 1994, Jamis Johnson, Jayson Orvis, and three others, John 
Hollingshead, Merrill Chandler, and Steve Paige, founded a consumer services 
enterprise to engage in the business of "credit repair1'. 
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6. DaNell Johnson, wife of Jamis Johnson, would hold the beneficial interest in 
this business venture, and she would receive monies derived therefrom, and 
would separately incur and pay the tax liability thereof. Jamis Johnson would 
work with the venture representing their interest and interfacing with Orvis and 
the other partners. 
7. This arrangement between DaNell and Jamis Johnson is evidenced by, 
among other things, Powers of Attorney dated in 1995 and 1996. (Ex. 3 Powers 
of Attorney) and is long-standing with similar arrangements between them 
extending back to as early as 1987. It is reflected in prior business ventures 
involving the Johnsons such as in the Caldwell Memorial Hospital business. (Ex. 
4 Deposition of Jamis Johnson, March 98 page 20 line 3 and on.) 
8. DaNell Johnson was to, and did, receive the profit share from this venture and 
Jamis Johnson would do much of the work (Ex. 3, Powers of Attorney), interface 
with the business, and would also incur significant personal liability. 
9. The credit repair venture used many different business entities, two of which 
were Johnson and Associates, a Utah non profit corporation (sometimes referred 
to asuJ&A) and Lexington Law Firms (sometime referred to as'Lexingtorf). 
10. Three of the founding partners would depart from the partnership for various 
reasons at different times. They were Chandler, Paige, and Hollingshead. 
Hollingshead left the partnership in approximately September of 1997. 
11. Hollingshead's departure left Orvis and the Johnsons remaining in the 
partnership and conducting the credit repair business. 
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12. DaNell sat on the Board of J&A along with Orvis, Victor Lawrence, Sam 
Spendlove, etc. (Ex. 5. Resolutions By Unanimous Consent of The Board of 
Trustee of Johnson and Associates.) 
13. Orvis ran the marketing of J&A and Lexington and an entity called eClient 
and provided the day-to-day management. Orvis controlled all money and 
performed all accounting and financial controls, and interacted primarily with 
Jamis Johnson for the Johnsons (per the Power s of Attorney, and the practice 
and arrangement of the Johnsons), 
14. Jamis Johnson was the signatory on all checks for Lexington and J&A. His 
computerized signature appeared on thousands of checks. The trade name 
Lexington Law Firms was held in his name. 
15. By September of 1997, Jamis Johnson had incurred significant personal 
liability for the ventures, thus shielding DaNell Johnson and Orvis: The State of 
Tennessee had sued him under a federal regulation; (State of Tennessee vs. 
Jamis Johnson, U.S. District Court, Middle District of Tennessee, Civil No: 3-96-
0344) The Utah Division of Consumer Affairs,, and The Utah State Bar were 
pursuing an administrative action relative to the credit repair business; and 
Johnson & Associates had incurred back tax liability placed in the name of Jamis 
Johnson though he was not on the Board of Trustees (Orvis and DaNell Johnson 
were on the Board). 
16. Indeed, Orvis would acknowledge that he felt compelled to keep paying profit 
share because of the ongoing liability of Jamis Johnson. (Ex. 2, Triplett 
deposition, page 38 line 10-12 ) 
17. Jamis Johnson and Orvis would engage as many as four attorneys to help 
with Lexington and with J&A. Jamis Johnson was originally designated as 
'directing attorne/for J&A and Lexington. 
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18. One of these attorneys hired in approximately early 1997 was Victor 
Lawrence. Victor Lawrence received a modest salary and free office, telephone, 
reception, etc. 
19. Victor Lawrence also represented DaNell Johnson in significant individual 
business matters for example, in litigation with Bruce Giffen, as a creditor in the 
Utah Agrisource Bankruptcy, against First Security Bank to recover on an 
agriculture lien on cattle; and also Victor Lawrence represented separately Jamis 
Johnson in his Utah Bar matters and several other matters including briefly with 
the SBA. 
20. DaNell Johnson profit share checks were sporadic in the credit repair 
ventures at first. 
21. By late 1997 to early 1998, the credit repair ventures started to consistently 
generate revenue for profit share. Orvis provided verbal monthly accountings of 
revenue for eClient, Lexington and J&A which Jamis Johnson either kept in a 
journal or were recorded on Invoiced. 
22. Profit share was divided between Orvis and DaNell Johnson at a ratio where 
Orvis received twice what DaNell Johnson received. In other words, Orvis 2/3"*-
DaNell Johnson1/3 of profit share. (Ex. 6. Outline Agreement, unsigned, dated 9-
23-97.) These ratios were based on Jayson's day to day management of the 
business affairs and marketing, and on the Johnsons' less active role after the 
ventures were established. 
23. After Hollingsheacfs departure, and as the Johnsons and Orvis continued to 
operate the credit repair businesses, tensions arose between the parties. 
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24. Johnsons would later learn that Orvis. during this time, was secretly taking 
partnership funds and setting up separate parallel companies to conceal profits 
and divert profits and not truthfully disclosing profit share revenues by greatly 
under representing revenues to Johnsons. (Ex. 2, Deposition of Tommy Triplett 
p. 22,1. 23-p. 26,1. 22-p. 28.1. 25-p 39,1. 8) (See also Vigil Deposition Ex. 1 
supra, page 49 line 5, page 53 line 10). 
25. In September 15, 1997, the SBA obtained a judgment against Jamis 
Johnson. (Ex. 7. Order For Entry of Judgment, U.S. v. Jamis Johnson.) 
26. In March of 1998, the SBA deposed Jamis Johnson in post-judgment 
proceedings. There Jamis Johnson explained the arrangement between DaNell 
Johnson and himself where they worked together and she was allocated the 
profit share, as evidenced, for example, by the Caldwell Memorial Hospital 
business. 
27. In early May of 1999 at the request of Orvis and after discussion, the parties 
entered into various agreements: 
28. First, Orvis and Jamis Johnson executed an agreement wherein Orvis would 
hold all of the assets of the credit repair ventures of the Johnsons and Orvis, for 
the economic benefit of Orvis and the Johnsons. This is referred to as the Orvis-
Johnson Profit Share Agreement. (Ex. 8, Orvis-Johnson Profit Share Agreement.) 
29. This Orvis-Johnson Profit Share Agreement states in relevant part as follows: 
WHEREAS, Orvis and Johnson have developed over the last 
several years, enterprises that provide credit repair services to 
a nationwide clientele. Such credit repair services include, but 
are not limited to a range of activities, including telemarketing, 
internet marketing, consulting, law representation, and the 
enterprises have grown over the years, and have a variety of 
tangible and intangible assets including, without limitation, for 
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example, equipment, computers, software, furniture, 
knowledge, methods, techniques in marketing, lead sources, 
internet operations; and 
WHEREAS, the parties desire to provide for the unimpaired 
continuation and growth of the business to the mutual benefit 
of the parties; and 
WHEREAS, the parties acknowledge that an agreement was 
put in place reciting that all assets of this enterprise are placed 
in the name ofJayson Orvis so as to protect these assets and 
provide for continued growth and mutual profitability; and 
WHEREAS, the parties acknowledge that they have governed 
and operated these enterprises under an outline agreement 
and under a course of performance that they desire to 
continue; 
1. Governance and compensation/allocation of 
profits shall continue in the percentages as 
heretofore provided under the operating 
arrangements and as the enterprise continues to 
grow, however, all monies shall be paid to Jayson 
Orvis or his business entity as may be 
established and Jayson Orvis shall provide 
Johnson's share or allocation to any party 
directed by Johnson. The intent herein being that 
these enterprises shall continue to grow, expand. 
multiply as directed bv the parties under their 
outline agreement and course of performance to 
their mutual economic benefit (Emphasis added). 
30. References therein to the "course of performance" and the percentages" are 
references to ratios of profit share paid to DaNell Johnson or her entities. The 
outline agreement refers to Ex. 6, the unsigned document that sets out the ratios 
of Johnson and Orvis, etc. 
31. In the second of these agreements, Johnson resigned as directing attorney 
for Lexington and J&A, and Victor Lawrence stepped into that position. (Ex. 9, 
Victor Lawrence Agreement) This agreement required Lawrence to continue to 
use the credit repair marketing of Orvis (and Orvis had entered into the above 
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Orvis-Johnson Profit Share Agreement holding all for the joint profit of Orvis and 
the Johnsons.) 
32. In resigning as directing attorney, Jamis Johnson did not relinquish the 
partnership interest and profit share that he and DaNell Johnson held. The 
Orvis-Johnson Partnership Agreement (evidencing the ongoing partnership of the 
Johnsons and the prior course of performance) and the Victor Lawrence 
Agreement (where Jamis Johnson resigned as directing attorney) were executed 
simultaneously. Thus even though Johnson resigned as directing attorney, the 
partnership with Orvis was intended to continue and indeed did continue until 
Orvis filed this lawsuit. 
33. Profit share accounting and profit share checks divided between Orvis and 
Johnsons continued unabated after this time, regardless of the resignation of 
Jamis Johnson as directing attorney. 
34. In April of 1999, the SBA subpoenaed DaNell Johnson for deposition on May 
18, 1999. 
35. At that deposition, DaNell Johnson was represented by Victor Lawrence. At 
this deposition, DaNell Johnson truthfully disclosed her business relationships. 
36. Victor Lawrence himself questioned DaNell Johnson thusly: 
[Q= Questioning by Mr. Victor Lawrence.] 
A= Answer by Danell Johnson 
Q Okay. When that business first started, it 
was just a handful of friends and 
associates" 
A Right 
Q Now that has somewhat blossomed, but 
you don't know really what the company 
does now, is that correct? 
A Yes, because it has expanded quite a bit 
8 
Q In fact, aren 't the funds that you received a 
profit share that you receive? 
A That's what I understood it to be, yes. 
Q Are you being paid for anything else? Do 
you do any type of consulting for Johnson 
and Associates right now? 
A (Nodded no.) 
Q You have to answer audibly. 
A I'm sorry. 
Q Do you do any consulting for Johnson and 
Associates? 
A No 
Q Do you do any consulting for Lexington 
Law Firm? 
A No. 
Q You may sit on the board and you may 
receive a compensation for that, but you 
are aware that you receive a compensation 
in some type of profit sharing arrangement, 
is that correct? 
A That's right. 
(Ex. 10, Deposition of DaNellJohnson.) 
37. Later, in this litigation against the Johnsons to deprive them of their profit 
share interest, Victor Lawrence would argue that the Johnson's had no profit 
share interest and specifically ignored DaNell Johnson's profit share interest, in 
direct repudiation of the sworn testimony that she gave to the SBA under his 
representation and counsel. 
38. November 17,1999, the SBA deposed Jamis Johnson. (Ex. 11, Jamis 
Johnson Deposition. November, 1999) 
39. In his deposition, Jamis Johnson accurately disclosed the information 
requested by the SBA. The following are excerpts and references of some of the 
deposition: 
Jamis' role at D.M. Johnson and Associates, LLC, (DaNell Johnson's 
y
 P14 lines 1-3 
0 «"t- it 
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Q. Are you a member of D.M. Johnson & Associates, LLC? 
A. No. 
and further. 
Ownership of Lexington dba 
P22 14-25 and P23 
Q. Do you still operate your law practice under the assume name of 
Lexington Law Firms? 
A. I never operated my practice under an assumed name of 
Lexington Law Firms. 
Q. Okay. The state records show that the d.b.a. is registered to you and 
has been ever since 1994 and will be until the year 2000. 
A. I think thafs accurate. The state records show that. 
Q. So who do you claim uses the name? 
A. Oh, Lexington Law Firms? 
Q. Yes. 
A. I think we provided you with a bunch of that information before, 
and you should know that, and Fm surprised you dont But I resigned with 
any involvement in Lexington Law Firms because of the pending bar 
problem. 
Bar Status affects Jamis' operational Lexington role 
P24 lines 1 - 1 0 
A. .J don't know if we've ever registered the fact that it was assigned [to 
Orvis], I was sued by the State of Tennessee, you know, personally 
because Lexington Law Firms was in my name, but since that time and 
with my bar problem I have completely relinquished any interest. They 
paid me a little bit, made my payment, and I resigned. Now, if its listed as 
an assumed name by Jamis Johnson, they're going to have to go in and 
change that. But, you know, they're operating without me. 
Interests in any partnerships -
P30 lines 16-25 and P31 lines 1-24 
Q. Do you have any interest in any partnerships? 
A. No. I mean, you know, often Til have a joint endeavor with 
somebody, but I don't have a partnership or set up a partnership or an LLC. 
You know, if I get a deal I say, Hey, do you want to do this deal together? 
We'll go up to summit county and buy a lot. 
Q. So a joint venture? 
A. Yeah, you can call it that, but I dont have any outgoing partnerships. 
Q. Any interest in any limited liability companies? 
A. No. I had an interest in an limited liability company in California 
called Simmons Shores, LLC. The property got foreclosed out from 
underneath it. I made some money from raising loans for it, but I know 
that no longer exists. 
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I had an interest in an outfit called Western Equities, LLC, but that is no 
longer functional. I have no interest in LLCs or corporations. 
Q. How about Summit Insured Equity Limited Partnership? 
A. I had-that was a-l had shares of stock in Summit that I got in 
exchange for legal work and sold them, fm thinking, in either late 1997 
or "98, early'98. 
Q. So you now longer have any interest in that limited partnership. 
A. No. 
Q. And you received no income. 
A. No. It was a small amount of money. I got three grand from it. 
DaNell sits on the board at J&A 
P32 lines 12-15 
Q. Currently is she employed by anybody? 
A. Yeah. Well, she's not employed. She doesn't get a W-2. She 
sits on the board of Johnson & Associates. 
Q. Does she earn any money for that? 
A. Yeah, I think she does. I think she covered all of that with you.... 
DaNell's Lexington compensation for board position and certain 
contributions 
Page 42 lines 1-5 and lines 17-25(page 43 lines 1-3) 
Q. So if Johnson & Associates pays your wife money itfs for her services 
as a trustee. 
A. Yeah. She sits on the board. She also-yeah, she also-she did some 
other things for them occasionally, but not much. 
* * * 
Q. So your wife goes into the office there and does work or-
A. She does some work, yeah. She does some minimal work. 
She's also on the board. She also donated, you know, as she told you in 
her deposition, early on a bunch of computers and furniture and, you know, 
a lot of facilities to get it started. Its got a combination of things there. I 
mean, I think you know this because we've given you the checks, or she's 
given you the checks or Johnson & Associates have given you the checks. 
All of those checks have been made available to you. 
DaNell still on board of J & A 
Page 80 lines 10*12 
Q. So your wife at this time is still on the board of Johnson & Associates. 
A. Yes. What was that you just turned off? 
DaNell Johnson's LLC's sources of income. Lexington makes 
regular payments to DaNell 
Page 87 lines 3-15 
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Q. So the LLCs main source of income right now is the DaNelfs 
trusteeship in Johnson & Associates and some of these hard money deals. 
And anything else? 
A. Lex. You mentioned $465 payment from Lex. 
Q. Lexington Law Firm does credit repair, right? 
A. Uh-huh. DaNell gets payments from Lex. Then she also has-well, if a 
big deal comes along she gets some of that money. We sold some of that 
real estate. We bought some lots and sold them in the fall. I mean in the 
spring. 
Jamis' holdings/assets 
Questions about Jamis' personal accounts and holdings (checking, 
etc.) 
Page 24 lines 1-25 
DaNell's sources of income, which are separate from Jamis* 
Pages 33, 37, 38-39,40 
DaNell and Jamis pay separate taxes 
Page 70 lines 1-3 
40. After several years of work, Johnson obtained a favorable settlement of the 
federal action against Lexington in Tennessee. (Ex. 12, Consent Agreement, 
State of Tenn. vs. Jamis Johnson.) On August 28. 2000. Johnson wrote Jayson 
Orvis to advise him that the Tennessee case had been settled and of the steps to 
take to make sure there was compliance with the Tennessee Federal District 
Court Consent Agreement. (Ex. 13 Letter: Johnson to Orvis re. TN compliance 8-
28-00;) 
41. Orvis responds by letter of August 30,2000 that includes the following 
statement: 
Might I make as suggestion? I would suggest that we just let our 
foggy little business relationship continue down its foggy little 
course...I am committed to making a bigger pie for as long as it is 
feasible and that has been nothing but good for both of us. 
(Ex. 13, Letter of Orvis, 8-30-01) Orvis clearly references a business relationship 
with Johnson. 
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42. The trade name. Lexington Law Firms has remained in the name of Jamis 
Johnson throughout this time. 
42. On January 12, 2001, Johnson assigns the Trade Name to Orvis. (Ex. 14, 
Assignment of trade name) 
43. The Assignment specifically sets out the existing and ongoing partnership. It 
says: 
WHEREAS, the said trade name {Lexington Law Firms] is an asset 
actually owned jointly bv Jamis M. Johnson and Javson Orvis. and 
WHEREAS, Jamis M. Johnson and Javson own intellectual property 
and tangible and intangible assets for the business of credit repair 
and per prior agreement, this trade name is to be assigned bv Jamis 
M. Johnson to Javson Orvis. and 
WHEREAS, Jayson Orvis has established a limited liability company 
called Attorneys For People, LLc, of which he is the only member in 
which he was to hold some of these joint assets and through which 
he administrates Fsicl some of the credit repair business, and 
WHEREAS, Jamis M. Johnson desires to assign the trade name to 
Jayson Orvis/Attorneys For People and it shall form and is part of 
these assets Jointly owned bv Johnson and Orvis and administrated 
bv Orvis: 
NOW, THEREFORE, based on the foregoing recitals and upon the 
prior agreement of the parties ... [Johnson assigns trade name to 
Orvis] [Emphasis added] 
46. This Assignment is retrieved from Johnson's office by Tommy Triplett who 
signed a receipt for it, and it is accepted by Orvis who acknowledges that he 
accepts the Assignment in the complaint he filed. 
47. The Assignment by its very terms and recitals evidences the ongoing 
partnership. It is unambiguous. And clearly the assignment is per the Orvis-
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Johnson Partnership Agreement of May 1999, and the trade name is still a joint 
asset. 
48. In an astounding display of hubris, after the Assignment, which clearly 
reaffirms the existence of a partnership with the Johnsons, Orvis had his 
assistant, Tommy Triplett, deliver a mock agreement that is intended to mock 
Johnsons and to reveal to Johnsons that Orvis thinks he has successfully taken 
away the Johnsons' partnership interest. 
49. That mock document states in various parts: 
ASSIGNMENT made this day by Jayson Orvis (hereinafter referred to 
as "Lord") and Jamis M. Johnson (hereinafter referred to as 
"Peasant") 
WHEREAS, Lord holds complete and sole ownership of everything 
Peasant wants, including all credit repair methodologies, strategies, 
operations, computers, [ and Peasant's] 
careen..Firstborn, ...hookers...friends...wife... 
WHEREAS, Jamis M. Johnson ("Peasant") owns absolutely nothing 
and can do doodley squat about it... 
WHEREAS, Lord delights in torturing Peasant and making him 
wonder every month ...[regarding profit share]... 
[signature line] Jayson Orvis, Master of the Universe 
(Ex.15 Mock Assignment) 
50. Johnson senses that Orvis is not truthfully accounting, and is setting up 
parallel and secret companies to divert profit share. This will; turn out to be 
correct. (Ex. 2, Triplett Deposition. See references in para. 24 of this Affidavit, 
supra. See also the deposition of Will Vigil attached as Ex. 1) 
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51. On August 16. 2002 Johnson sends Orvis a demand for an accounting. (Ex. 
16, Demand for Accounting from Johnsn). Such will reveal that Orvis has not 
been honestly accounting for profit share. 
52. On August 11, 2001 Orvis will purchase the SBA judgment against Johnson. 
(Ex. 17, Assignment of SBA judgment to Orvis by All Starr Financial, LLC.) 
53. He will not reveal his identity to the SBA but rather will engage a suspended 
Utah LLC, All Star Financial, LLC to negotiate with the US Government to buy 
the SBA judgment. All Star is operated by the brother-in-law of Dion Steckling, a 
party to this lawsuit. 
54. All Star Financial, will not disclose to the SBA that it is a Lexington affiliate 
that is seeking to acquire the judgment and upon information and belief, the 
money to acquire the judgment flowed through All Star from Orvis. All Star will 
get the judgment on August 10, 2001 and within 24 hours, it will be re-assigned 
to Orvis. (Ex. 17.). 
55. On August 30, Johnson will be summoned to the office of Dan Berman who, 
with Orvis present, informs Johnson that 
i. Orvis had purchased the SBA judgment against Johnson; 
ii. Orvis had sued Johnson to end the partnership, 
iii. Orvis has acquired the judgments to use to end the partnership 
and will satisfy the judgments if Johnson will accept a settlement 
and end the Partnership; and 
iv. It will cost Johnson probably $300,000 to litigate this so 
settlement is advisable. 
56. Johnson writes a confirmatory letter to Berman outlining the above. (Ex. 18. 
August 30, 2001 Letter of Jamis Johnson to Dan Berman.) 
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57. Johnson later learns that Victor Lawrence, former counsel to DaNell with the 
SBA, participated in counseling and aiding Orvis in acquiring the judgment. 
(Tripiett Deposition page 45 lines 11-25). Victor Lawrence will further attempt to 
buy another action involving Johnson and former partner Hollingshead. 
58. On information and belief, Victor Lawrence has received a significant 
increase in personal revenue once the Johnson profit share was stopped upon 
the filing of the Orvis lawsuit. Orvis controls Lexington Law Firm through his 
marketing agreement with Victor Lawrence. (Ex. 19, Orvis-Lawrence Marketing 
Agreement.) 
59. The SBA judgment was purchased at precisely the discount that Johnson 
was discussing with the SBA and had discussed with Victor Lawrence. And, the 
fact that the SBA judgment could be obtained at a discount, was never revealed 
by Victor Lawrence to his client, DaNell Johnson or his former client, Jamis 
Johnson. 
60. Currently, In this month, May of 2004, Orvis has, as the assignee of the SBA 
judgment, subpoena both Jamis Johnson and DaNell Johnson, in an exercise in 
post judgment discovery. This action is in federal court and the Johnson will 
seek to void the judgment in the hands of Orvis because of the duplicity 
discussed herein. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. THE TESTIMONY OF JAMIS JOHNSON TO THE SBA IS CONSISTENT 
WITH THE FACTS AND IS NOT A MISREPRESENTATION; ORVIS 
MISCONSTRUES THE JOHNSON QUOTES ON WHICH HE RELIES; AND 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS UNSUPPORTABLE BASED ON THESE QUOTES; 
A. JAMIS JOHNSON DID NOT DISAVOW AN INTEREST IN ORVIS 
CREDIT REPAIR BUSINESSES BY HIS RESIGNATION AS 
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DIRECTING ATTORNEY OF LEXINGTON AND J&A, NOR BY 
DISCLOSING THAT IN HIS SBA DEPOSITION. 
B. JAMIS JOHNSON DID NOT DISCLAIM CREDIT REPAIR 
PARTNERSHIP INTEREST; NOR DID HE MERELY ANSWER "NO" 
TO THE SBA QUESTION AT ISSUE. 
2. IF THERE IS AMBIGUITY IN SUCH SBA TESTIMONY, THE 
INTERPRETATION OF SUCH TESTIMONY IS A MATERIAL ISSUE OF FACT 
PRECLUDING SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
3. THE DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL IS INAPPLICABLE AND 
CANNOT SUPPORT SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
ARGUMENT 
1. THE TESTIMONY OF JAMIS JOHNSON TO THE SBA IS CONSISTENT 
WITH THE FACTS AND IS NOT A MISREPRESENTATION; ORVIS 
MISCONSTRUES THE JOHNSON QUOTES ON WHICH HE RELIES; AND 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS UNSUPPORTABLE BASED ON THESE QUOTES; 
In support of his motion for summary judgment, Orvis submits only two 
quotes by Jamis Johnson from the November 1999 SBA deposition: (i). One 
quote is to the effect that Jamis Johnson withdrew and resigned as directing 
attorney for Lexington Law Firms and J&A.; and (ii) the other quote is supposedly 
that Jamis Johnson answered "nd" when asked about any partnerships. 
These quotes are misconstrued by Plaintiff and do not mean what he 
claims they mean. They are not dispositive of this action. 
A. JAMIS JOHNSON DID NOT DISCLAIM CREDIT REPAIR 
PARTNERSHIP INTEREST; NOR DID HE MERELY ANSWER "NO" TO 
THE SBA QUESTION AT ISSUE. 
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On/is quotes a section of Jamis Johnson's SBA deposition wherein Johnson 
accurately discloses to the SBA that he resigned from Lexington and Johnson & 
Associates as directing attorney. 
Orvis then states that Johnson '.'.completely disavowed any interest, 
partnership or otherwise, in the credit repair business ofJayson Orvis? 
(emphasis added). It does not follow from Johnson's statements concerning 
resignation as directing attorney that all interests in the credit repair partnership 
had been disavowed. 
Orvis does marketing for, and operates credit repair businesses. He does 
this for law firms as well as non-law firms. Orvis does not claim to be a partner in 
the law firms for which he does marketing. (See the marketing agreement 
between Orvis and Victor Lawrence. Ex. 19) 
Likewise, DaNell and Jamis Johnson do not claim to have a profit share 
interest in Victor Lawrence's law practice or Lexington Law Firms of J&A (which is 
a non-profit organization and so no one could have a partnership therein). Their 
claim is directly against Orvis for a profit share of the credit repair entities that 
they helped develop jointly. 
Indeed Orvis' initial lawsuit starting this action against Johnson was to 
declare that Johnson had no partnership with himt (not with Victor Lawrence or 
Lexington and J&A), and Orvis sought by his lawsuit to both cut off the profit 
share that was monthly divided by Orvis with the Johnsons up to that time, and to 
avoid the accounting demanded by the Johnsons for misappropriated profit share. 
At the time Jamis Johnson resigned as directing attorney in May of 1999, 
he entered into an agreement with Victor Lawrence providing for continued 
representation of the clients, and continued use of the Orvis credit repair 
businesses in which Johnsons had an interest. 
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Simultaneously with Johnson's resignation as directing attorney in May of 
1999. Orvis and Johnson reaffirmed their ongoing partnership arrangement 
between Orvis and DaNell and Jamis Johnson. That Orvis-Johnson Partnership 
Agreement states unequivocally that the partnership between Orvis and the 
Johnsons continues unabated. Please se paragraph 29 above. That document 
states clearly the partnership. 
Here, Orvis squarely acknowledges the ongoing partnership arrangement 
with the Johnsons that had existed prior to this agreement and continued after. 
Orvis had accounted for profit share to Jamis Johnson and divided profit share 
with DaNell Johnson as agreed and as directed by Jamis Johnson before, during 
and after the May 1999 resignation of Jamis Johnson from Lexington and J&A, 
and the execution of this Orvis-Johnson partnership agreement. 
The claim that Jamis Johnson "disavowed1 any interest in the credit repair 
businesses of Orvis is false and will not support summary judgment. 
C. B. JAMIS JOHNSON DID NOT DISCLAIM CREDIT REPAIR 
PARTNERSHIP INTEREST; NOR DID HE MERELY ANSWER "NO" 
TO THE SBA QUESTION AT ISSUE. 
Orvis alleges that Jamis Johnson answers "No." when asked if he had'any 
partnerships". To support this motion, Orvis extracts only one word/No", out of a 
52 word quote. 
The complete and uncut version is: 
Q. Do you have any interest in any partnerships? 
A. No. I mean, you know, often I'll have a joint endeavor with 
somebody, but I don't have a partnership or set up a partnership or 
an LLC, You know, if I get a deal I say, Hey, do you want to do this 
deal together? We'll go to Summitt County and buy a lot. 
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In this deposition, both before and after this response, Johnson would 
discuss Lexington and J&A and the beneficial interest of DaNell Johnson and the 
flow of monies. It is clear from the deposition that Jamis Johnson, when asked 
here about "any partnership^' by the SBA was not thinking that the SBA was 
asking about the Lexington and J&A credit repair businesses since those had 
already been discussed in the deposition previously by Johnson and would be 
discussed again later in the deposition. 
The un-cut quote of that answer to the question abouf'any partnership 
interests reveals that Johnson was thinking about other joint endeavors and real 
estate in particular, and whether he actually "set uff or prepared partnership 
documents. ('... / don't set up a partnership or an LLC" and You know, if I get 
a deal I say, Hey, do you want to do this deal together? We'll go to Summitt 
County and buy a lot") 
Further, in context, this question to Johnson about any interest in 
partnerships comes in a series of general questions about stocks, trusts, cash 
value in life insurance, partnerships, limited partnerships, etc. 
The Orvis memo relies on the single word "Nd'to support Plaintiffs motion. 
This clearly distorts the context of Johnson's answer. 
Further, any full reading of the Jamis Johnson deposition to the SBA 
demonstrates that Jamis Johnson's statements are reasonable and accurate 
responses. In the full SBA deposition, Johnson covers his and DaNell Johnson's 
relationship to Lexington Law Firms, and to Johnson and Associates. He 
explains that DaNell receives the flow of funds related to Lexington and J&A, not 
himself. He also explains their long standing business arrangement where she 
holds the beneficial interest in other businesses. (See paragraph 39 above for a 
synopsis of the foregoing.) 
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The SBA deposition testimony of Jamis Johnson is congruent with the 
actual situation and does not disavow an Orvis partnership. 
2. IF THERE IS AMBIGUITY IN SUCH SBA TESTIMONY, THE 
INTERPRETATION OF SUCH TESTIMONY IS A MATERIAL ISSUE OF FACT 
PRECLUDING SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
Because Jamis Johnson's SBA testimony is truthful and unambiguous, and 
does not support the interpretation of Orvis, the Orvis summary judgment motion 
cannot be sustained. Moreover, it is sufficient here, to defeat summary judgment, 
to demonstrate that Johnson's SBA testimony, on which Orvis' motion relies, is 
susceptible to a credible difference of interpretation. 
Again, this ambiguity raises a material issue of fact which precludes 
summary judgment. 
3. THE DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL IS INAPPLICABLE AND 
CANNOT SUPPORT SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
Orvis claims that Jamis Johnson contradicts his position in this lawsuit 
when he made statements to the SBA in a deposition to the SBA. Thus, claims 
Orvis, Johnson is'judicially estopped'from maintaining his counterclaim against 
Orvis here for a share of the staggeringly huge profits from these partnership 
businesses, and so, Orvis argues, Jamis Johnson's counterclaim here must be 
summarily dismissed. 
Even if Orvis' contested interpretation of Johnson's deposition is correct, 
such SBA deposition testimony simply cannot estop Mr. Johnson from claiming a 
partnership in this case. 
Under Utah law, three elements must be shown before a court may 
judicially estop a litigant from denying a position taken in a prior judicial 
proceeding: (1) the prior proceeding must be between "the same persons or their 
privies"; (2) it must involve the same subject mattef; and (3) the prior position 
must have been "successfully maintained." Nebeker v. Utah State Tax 
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Commission. 2001 UT 74, H 15, 34 P.3d 180,187; Salt Lake City v. Silver Fork 
Pipeline Corp.. 913 P,2d 731. 734 (Utah 1996): Tracy Loan & Trust Co.. v. 
Qpenshaw Inv. Co.. 132 P.2d 388, 390 (Utah 1942). 
None of these elements is present here. 
First, the SBA litigation was clearly between different parties than the 
Orvis-Johnsons litigation. 
Second, the SBA case concerned a different subject matter. The SBA 
case dealt with foreclosure on real property and a guarantee. 
Third, there is no indication that Johnson "successfully maintained'any 
position. The SBA case was already closed resulting, in a judgment. The 
deposition was merely incident to general post-judgment discovery. No hearing 
or procedure was looming and no position was to be advocated, argued, litigated, 
adjudicated or"maintained'. 
Of far graver concern, and in direct opposition to the Orvis claim about the 
Jamis Johnson quotes, is that Orvis and Victor Lawrence actually helped Jamis 
and DaNell Johnson set out their position to the SBA-tie same position that Orvis 
now, and Lawrence earlier, repudiate. Victor Lawrence actually represented 
DaNell Johnson to the SBA in a separate earlier deposition only months before 
the Jamis Johnson deposition at issue here. There DaNell, under Lawrence's 
counsel, explained the nature of her beneficial interest regarding Lex, J&A, Jamis 
Johnson and Orvis. (Lawrence has never disclosed to the court that he actually 
represented DaNell Johnson in the very SBA case he, earlier, and Orvis, now 
use. 
Lawrence never disclosed to the Court that he in reality had actual 
knowledge of the specific profit share arrangement with the Johnsons). 
Orvis helped to provide to the SBA sundry J&A and Lexington documents 
that support DaNelfs testimony and the position of Jamis Johnson. 
The current Orvis arguments are incredible in light of his and Lawrence's 
aiding of the SBA's understanding of the DaNell Johnson-Jamis Johnson 
relationship. If any person should be estopped form an assertion, it is Orvis here 
(and Victor Lawrence in a prior summary judgment) where they fail to disclose to 
22 
the Court that they actually helped shape and verify the Johnson's1 partnership 
position vis-S*-vis Orvis, that Orvis now seeks to avoid by this motion. 
The quotes cited by Orvis in the Jamis Johnson SBA deposition, do not 
support, under any standard, summary judgment, based on the doctrine of 
judicial estoppel. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the motion of Orvis for summary judgment 
should be denied. Johnson did not misrepresent anything to the SBA; he did not 
disavow an interest in the profit share of the credit repair enterprises; and the 
doctrine of judicial estoppel is inapplicable. 
Dated this 27th day of May. 2004 
CARTWRIGHT LAW FIRM 
Joe Cartwright 
Attorney for Defendant, Jamis Johnson 
23 
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1 SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH - AUGUST 9, 2004 
2 i JUDGE TIMOTHY R. HANSON PRESIDING 
3 I P R O C E E D I N G S 
4 J THE COURT: Good afternoon. 
"5 MS. TOMSIC: Good afternoon, Your Honor. 
6 j THE COURT: Jayson Orvis v. Jamis Johnson, 010907449. 
7 Appearances please. 
8 ' MS. TOMSIC: Peggy Tomsic representing the plaintiff, 
9 Jayson Orvis. Today Your Honor, I have with me Heather Keoyo 
10 who has just joined our firm but has not as yet been admitted 
11 I to the bar, who's helping me. Mr. Orvis, the plaintiff and his 
12 wife, Pam Orvis, are also present in the courtroom. 
13 THE COURT: Thank you. 
14 MR. CARTWRIGHT: Joe Cartwright here representing Mr. 
15 Johnson, Your Honor. 
16 THE COURT: Thank you. This is on for Plaintiff's 
17 I Motion for Summary Judgment. I've reviewed the pleadings that 
18 you've filed counsel, so if you'd like to proceed Ms. Tomsic, 
19 you may. 
20 MS. TOMSIC: Your Honor, as you know this action is a 
21 declaratory judgment action that was brought by the plaintiff, 
I 
22 Jayson Orvis, seeking a declaration from this Court that the 
23 defendant, Jamis Johnson holds no interest, title, or right to 
24 j the credit repair businesses of Mr. Orvis and seeking the costs 
25 involved in that case. Mr. Johnson has filed a counterclaim 
1 - asserting various claims against Mr. Orvis and other third 
i 
2 i parties, two or whom you've already granted summary judgment 
3 ' on, all of which, regardless of the label are predicated on the
 j 
4 | assumption that Mr. Johnson has a partnership with Mr. Orvis 
5 I relative to these credit repair businesses. 
6 , Previously Your Honor, just in terms of history, two 
I i 
7 I of the defendants, Mr. Lawrence and a Mr. Spendlove moved the ! 
I ! 
8 I court for summary judgment and the Court had granted that \ 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
Motion for Summary Judgment basically on two grounds, one of 
which was judicial estoppel. Mr. Orvis has moved this Court 
for summary judgment on one ground, Your Honor, and that is 
judicial estoppel, that is that as a matter of law, Mr. 
Johnson, Jamis Johnson, the defendant and counterclaim 
14 plaintiff and third party plaintiff in this action, cannot 
15 j assert that he has a partnership interest or any right or title 
16 | to the credit repair businesses of Mr. Orvis or the proceeds or 
17 profits from those businesses. 
18 i Your Honor, as you know, judicial estoppel is a 
19 | doctrine that was created in the late 1800s and has been 
20 | adopted by those courts who have considered it including the 
i 
21 J Supreme Court of the United States and obviously was applied by , 
22 j this Court in granting the summary judgments for Mr. Lawrence i 
i 
23 and Mr. Spendlove. Judicial estoppel is a doctrine that the 
24 . courts have created which is an equitable doctrine; that it is 
25 a doctrine that is applied by a court as in matter of law where 
1 you have a party coming into court and asserting a position or 
2 making a claim that is inconsistent with a position or claim 
3 that they have asserted in a prior case. And in this case, 
4 I Your Honor, we have a situation where Mr. Johnson was sued by 
i 
5 the Small Business Administration, SBA, back in 1997 and they 
6 I got a judgment against him for money owed. The SBA 
7 subsequently engaged in supp hearings to determine whether Mr. 
8 j Johnson had any assets including any interest in any 
9 partnerships, any limited liability companies, any businesses 
10 on which the SBA could execute to collect on its judgment. 
11 In the course of those supp hearings, the SBA in 
12 1999, took the deposition of Mr. Johnson. Mr. Johnson was 
13 sworn to tell the truth in that deposition as all deponents are 
14 and given an opportunity to correct the deposition prior to the 
15 time it becomes final. In this case, while Mr. Johnson 
16 testified to tell the truth and purported to tell the truth, he 
17 never corrected that deposition and never made any changes and 
18 | in fact has never made any assertions before this Court that in 
19 anyway that his testimony before the SBA was somehow mistaken 
20 j or wrong, and in fact, has stood by that testimony. 
21 We have submitted the testimony that Mr. Johnson gave 
22 | in the SBA proceeding and that testimony, Your Honor, flatly 
23 I contradicts Mr. Johnson's position in this case both by way of 
a defense and in its counterclaim and third party claims that 
24 
25 he has a partnership issue in these credit repair businesses, 
And Your Honor, what I'd like to do is I'd just like 
to read from the pages that I have attached to Mr. Orvis' 
affidavit. They are attached as Exhibits 5 and 6, if I could, 
and I'm beginning on page 23 on line 3 and again, this is the j 
supp hearing that is being conducted by the SBA to determine 
whether Mr. Johnson holds any interest in anything that they 
can execute on and this is Mr. Johnson's testimony beginning at 
line 3 on page 23 and he states, testifies under oath, "But I 
have resigned with any involvement in Lexington Law Firms 
because of the pending bar problem." Question, "Aren't we 
talking about Johnson and Associates, not Lexington Law Firms?" 
Answer, "No. I resigned from anything. I have practiced law 
i 
under Jamis M. Johnson and Jamis M. Johnson and Associates. j 
Johnson and Associates is a not-for-profit corporation and ; 
you've been told this. Ncbody has shares of stock. I resigned' 
from that. Lexington Law Firm, Victor Lawrence and another 
i 
i 
attorney have taken over all of that. I've indemnified them. 
They have indemnified me. I've resigned from any relationship. ' 
Lexington Law Firm was just an operating entity that was doing 
credit repair." Question, "Now Lexington Law Firm is not an 
entity, it's an assumed name registered to you?" Question by 
Mr. Hugey. Answer, "Actually, I think what happened, and I'li j 
have to recall this but I assigned, a couple of years ago there ' 
was a corporation being set up but that was assigned, the name 
was assigned to - it was going to be assigned into a 
I 
I 
corporation. I don't know if we've ever registered the fact
 ( 
that it was assigned." And then he goes on to talk about a : 
suit by the state of Tennessee and this is the next page, page
 ( 
i 
24. Beginning on line 4 he says, "But since that time" that's 
i 
I 
the time of the Tennessee suit and his problems with the bar, ! 
NXand with my bar problem, I have completely relinquished any j 
i 
interest. They paid me a little bit, made my payment and I | 
resigned. Now if it's listed as an assumed name by Jamis j 
I 
Johnson, they're going to have to go in and change that but, | 
you know, they're operating now without me." So he testified 
to that in terms of Lexington Law Firm which was the credit , 
repair business that was being run by Mr. Johnson and then by j 
Mr. Lawrence and it was a credit repair business that was I 
utilizing intellectual property and equipment of Mr. Orvis, 
part of the intellectual property and equipment that's at issue j 
here but Mr. Johnson didn't stop his testimony there, Your j 
Honor. The attorney for the SBA really wanted to find out 
i 
geez, okay, we're talking about Lexington Law Firm and we're 
I 
talking about Johnson Associates, you're saying you've resigned' 
any interest, you don't have anything at all, well, I'm going 
to be real categorical about this and beginning on page 30 at 
line 16 the lawyer says, question, uDo you have any interest in ! 
any partnerships?" On line 18 Mr. Johnson testifies under i 
oath, NNNo." Now he does go on to say in that he says, "I mean, ; 
you know, often I'll have a joint venture with somebody but I | 
don't have a partnership or set up a partnership or an LLC. 
You know, if I get a deal I say, hey, do you want to do this 
deal together? We'll go up to Summit County and buy a lot." 
i 
Question, "So a joint venture." "Yeah, you could call it that , 
but I don't have any outgoing partnerships." I believe that's 
a typo. I believe it's ongoing, Your Honor, partnerships. \ 
Question, "Any interests in any limited liability companies?" 
Answer, "No." And then he goes on on line 11 on page 31 and 
says, "I have no interest in LLCs or corporations." 
Clearly Your Honor, the supp hearing was to determine 
what if any interests he held in anything. The questions were 
specifically put to him under oath as to whether he had any ' 
interest in Lexington Law firm, Johnson and Associates, any , 
partnership, any LLC, any corporation and he categorically said 
no. I 
i 
In this proceeding Your Honor, Mr. Johnson has done 
i 
an entire about face and his answer, all you have to do is look I 
at his answer to the declaratory judgment in this action and i 
i 
his counterclaim and thiro party claim and he says "I, Jamis
 ( 
Johnson, am a partner with Jayson Orvis. I have a partnership ! 
I 
interest in these credit repair business." That is the 
foundation of his defense. That is the foundation of every , 
I 
single claim he has made against Mr. Orvis, the plaintiff in 
this case and every third party defendant including the two 
third party defendants who were let out of this case on summary ' 
judgment. 
Your Honor, so I would say as a matter of law, under 
the doctrine of judicial estoppel, Mr. Johnson is estopped from 
claiming he owns a partnership and Mr. Orvis, as a matter of 
law, is entitled to a declaratory judgment that Mr. Johnson 
does not have an ownership interest. 
And I want to address a couple of issues that were 
raised by Mr. Johnson in his opposition because I think that 
they're ones that I'd like to address in my opening and then if 
there are further issues, I'd like to deal with that in my 
rebuttal. 
Mr. Johnson takes the position that the doctrine of 
judicial estoppel does not apply here even though this Court 
applied it relative to Mr. Lawrence and Mr. Spendlove because 
he says that under Utah law, you have to have been a party or 
privy with a party in this prior action and it had to involve 
the same subject matter and he cites to a Utah Supreme Court 
case that quotes from a 1S42 decision, the Tracy Loan case by 
the Utah Supreme Court and says that's the state of the law. 
Well, Your Honor, the problem with that position is 
that the Utah Supreme Court subsequent to that Tracy decision 
stated that in fact to the extent there was that type of broad 
language in the Tracy case, that it had been revisited and 
reconstructed in a later decision by the Supreme Court, the 
Hodge decision which he said has clarified what that is and in 
the Hodge decision, Your Honor, they were talking about 
collateral estoppel and on collateral estoppel there had been 
prior case law just like there had been on judicial estoppel, j 
that you had to be same parties in the same suit or privy on 
the same subject matter and the Court made it clear that that 
is not correct* What you have to demonstrate is that in fact i 
i 
you have someone in a prior proceeding who takes a position and . 
if they're doing it under oath before a tribunal or in a case, 
and that position is contrary to a position they're not 
asserting before a court, that you do not have to be the same 
i 
parties, that what you have to show is they are contrary 
i 
I 
positions and in this case, the defendant got a benefit out of 
it. Well, clearly in this case Your Honor, Mr. Johnson got a 
benefit out of it because the'SBA didn't collect on anything » 
because be claimed he didn't own anything including this 
partnership interest. 
i 
And so Your Honor, I would say there is not a Supreme
 ; 
Court case after the Supreme Court basically overruled the 
Tracy decision on the grounds of having to have identities of 
parties and subject matter. Where this Court, being the 
Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, or even a district court has j 
held that in order to utilize judicial estoppel, you have to be • 
the same parties in the same action. And that's important, 
Your Honor, because as you stated in your opinion explaining 
why you had granted summary judgment to Mr. Lawrence and Mr. 
Spendlove, the purpose for judicial estoppel is to make sure 
that the courts are not being utilized to commit fraud and that 
they are not allowing people to lie in one tribunal and use it 
to their benefit in another tribunal and, Your Honor, I would i 
i 
say that the issue that this Court decided relative to Mr. 
Lawrence and Mr, Spendlove on the issue of judicial estoppel is . 
identical as that raised by Mr. Orvis. 
The courts are dear that when you're talking about 
judicial estoppel versus equitable estoppel, the relationship j 
you're looking at is the relationship between a party of the j 
tribunal. The question is, are you misusing the justice ! 
i 
system? And that's the relationship you're looking at and on | 
the summary judgment motion against Mr. Johnson by Mr. 
Spendlove and Mr. Lawrence, this Court stated and I'm quoting 
Your Honor from page 4 of your opinion in that case that was 
entered, I believe, more than a year ago in February 2003, you 
stated, "Mr. Johnson is also estopped from asserting any claims 
I in this action which are based on the partnership he denied 
under oath when questioned by the SBA." "Estoppel is a bar or 
impediment which precludes allegations denial of a certain fact 
or state of facts in consequence of a previous allegation or 
I denial or conduct or admission. It operates to put a party 
I entitled to its benefits in the same position as if the thing 
I represented were true." And you're quoting Black's Law 
I Dictionary. And then you go on to say, judicial estoppel 
1 ' "prevents a party from seeking judicial relief by offering 
i 
2 
3 
statements inconsistent with its own sworn statements in a 
prior judicial proceeding." 
i 
4 I You then go on to state on page 5, "Mr. Johnson seeks 
5 
6 
judicial relief in this matter by offering statements that are 
i 
inconsistent with his own sworn statements in the proceedings I 
7 I brought against him by the SBA. In a sworn deposition, Mr. 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
Johnson told the SBA that he had no interest in and had no ; 
right to receive payments from Lexington Law Firm. He went on 
to aver that he had no partnership interest nor interest in a ; 
i 
limited liability company. Because each of the claims asserted \ 
against Lawrence and Spendlove are expressly negated in Mr. 
Johnson's prior testimony where he was attempting to avoid I 
i 
payment to the SBA, the claims must be dismissed." And again, i 
those claims, Your Honor, were all predicated on an assumption | 
16 j that Mr. Johnson owned a partnership interest or had a j 
17 I partnership with Mr. Orvis. 1 
18 
19 
20 
i 
So I would say Your Honor, one, you have visited this 
issue with regard to other defendants. You clearly have laid I 
i 
out what judicial estoppel is and what the purpose behind it is ' 
21 and why it would apply in this situation. ' 
22 ' Your Honor, the arguments that the Defendant Johnson ' 
23 asserts here are exactly the arguments that he asserted in . 
24 | opposition to Mr. Spendlove and Mr. Lawrence's motion and which] 
25 j were rejected by the court in finding summary judgment based at 
I I 
10 . 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
1 I least in part on the judicial estoppel doctrine. 
2 I Finally Your Honor, the argument that Mr. Johnson 
3 raises again which he raised in the last hearing on the other 
4 I summary judgment motion, is that, well, geez, you know, my wife 
5 J and I both have this interest in the partnership and it's 
6 really her interest in the partnership. Well, Your Honor, we 
7 attach as Exhibit A to our reply an order from this court that 
8 I was signed and was basically reflected your ruling at the oral 
9 I argument in connection with the last Motion for Summary 
10 Judgment, that his wife, Danelle Johnson is not a proper party J 
11 before this Court and you ordered that any reference to her in ' 
12 I any pleadings, be stricken and the reason this had arisen is 
13 because the Memorandum in Opposition, just as the Memorandum in 
14 ! Opposition to our motion was styled, Jamis and Danelle 
Johnson's opposition and your point was, she's not a proper 
party in this case. She's not a party. She cannot be 
asserting claims and that is not before the court. Well, that 
was back in February 2003, Your Honor, and here we are again 
with the same point. 
And I might point out, Your Honor, even if she were a 
party to this action, it would make no difference and that is | 
because to the extent she's claiming any interest and I believe | 
that Jamis has described it as a "beneficial interest" it all 
derives and is part and parcel of his claim that he is a 
partner and has a partnership interest with Mr. Orvis in credit 
11 
1 i repair and that he has given the benefit of that, that is in 
2 profit sharing to his wife. So even if she were before this 
3 court which she's not, it would make no difference because j 
4 • judicial estoppel, estops Mr. Johnson from making that claim 
t « 
5 ' and he can't give a benefit to his wife that he's estopped from' 
i 
6 j claiming. • 
i 
7 Finally Your Honor, I would just say, this is an 
8 | issue that is firmly established in the law. The record is 
9 ! uncontroverted in this record that Mr. Johnson made those 10 statements under oath before the SBA. They are inconsistent 
11 | with the position he has taken here and as a matter of law, the 
12 
13 
14 
Court should grant our Motion for Summary Judgment, both on our 
declaratory judgments and on his counterclaim and third party 
claims predicated on him having an ownership interest. We 
15 j would ask that our motion be granted. 
I 
16 j THE COURT: Thank you. 
17 
18 
19 
Mr. Cartwright? 
MR. CARTWRIGHT: Good afternoon, Your Honor. I'm 
somewhat new to this case and I want to first address a 
20 misunderstanding I had when I first got involved in the case 
21 because I think that may be a misunderstanding that is taking 
22 | place here in the way this motion is being presented. What had 
23 ' happened here as explained in Mr. Johnson's affidavit was there 
24 were initially five guys who created a partnership in doing 
25 i credit repair, the credit repair business, where they dispute 
12 
certain things on people's credit and challenge them. After a • 
period of time three of those partners dropped out and there j 
were just two guys left, Mr. Orvis and Mr. Johnson. They were
 { 
the two remaining partners. Now this credit repair partnership' 
that existed between the two of them - and here's where my 
i 
i 
misunderstanding was - was not called Lexington Law Firm. This
 ( 
partnership had many different organizations that it was j 
j 
managing, some LLCs, this law firm. It hired attorneys to ; 
I 
manage the law firm including Lexington Law Firm but the | 
partnership existed outside and separately of Lexington Law i 
Firm. So later on Mr. Johnson, there was a judgment obtained i 
against him by the SBA and after that judgment there was a [ 
I 
deposition and he was asked about his interest in Lexington Law j 
i 
Firm and at that time Mr. Johnson truthfully stated that he had 
disclaimed all interest in Lexington Law Firm. Now even though 
he didn't have that interest in Lexington Law Firm, there still 
remained this partnership between Mr. Johnson and Mr. Orvis and 
Mr. Orvis isn't an attorney but this was the marketing arm that 
was generating clients for Lexington Law Firm, contract between j 
the law firm and Mr. Orvis, where all this money was being j 
poured into the partnership and therefore, in accordance with j 
the partnership agreement between Mr. Johnson and Mr. Orvis, he ' 
i 
was receiving a cut of that. So I just want to clarify that j 
I 
issue right now. It isn't - Mr. Johnson still isn't claiming I j 
own Lexington Law Firm. He's saying I have a partnership with I 
i3 i 
1 ! Mr. Orvis. j 
I 
2 , THE COURT: That's swell but why did he tell the SBA 
' I 
3 i he didn't have any interest in any partnerships? 
4 i MR. CARTWRIGHT: Let me look at the broader context 
5 J of this statement. Mr. Johnson earlier in this deposition had 
6 talked about - and in his other deposition with the SBA and in 
I 
7 | his wife Danelle's deposition with the SBA, explained that 
8 there was a lot of money coming to Danelle Johnson. Danelle 
i 
9 ' was pretty much a figurehead. Jamis was the one with the 
10 involvement and was doing zhe work and so they had talked about 
11 I that in this deposition and in previous ones. Now we get to
 ( 
I 
12 I the specific question where they asked about partnerships and 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
that was done in the context of the laundry list of things do \ 
you own or not own. Do you own stocks? No. Bonds? No. It's i 
a big list and it gets down to partnerships. No. Now in Mr. 
t 
Johnson's mind set as explained in his affidavit, he thought , 
that had to do with real estate or other partnerships not 
18 ' having to do with this one that he'd already talked about i 
19 
i 
extensively with the SBA and that his wife had talked about 
i 
20
 | extensively with the SBA. 
21 - THE COURT: So being a lawyer, he, of course, said to 
22 the question, are you just talking about the Lexington Law Firm i 
I 
23 or what partnerships are you talking about? 
24 , MR. CARTWRIGHT: I don't think that he was being that ' 
I 
25 * tap dancing around the issue at that time. 
! | 
i 14 ' 
THE COURT: Of course he didn't because he said no. 
MR. CARTWRIGHT: He said no in the context of his I 
i 
mind that they'd already talked about these other issues and ' 
I 
that that question meant other than the partnership that ; 
Danelle's already talked about, that you've already talked i 
I 
about, that the SBA knew that money was coming to Danelle and 
so in his mind it wasn't even a tap dance. It was thinking in j 
the context of the entire deposition, other partnership 
interests other than the one with Mr. Orvis. So in his mind, I 
he answered that question truthfully. It wasn't referring to 
that and it wasn't any legal lawyer tap dancing around the 
issue asking about definition. He was just answering a 
question to the best of his knowledge with his understanding, 
as he explains in his affidavit, that the SBA was well aware of 
the relationship of the partnership and the money going to 
Danelle Johnson and Jamis' involvement in the partnership. 
Now that's what he's testified in his affidavit. It 
doesn't have to do with Lexington Law Firm. He doesn't assert 
an ownership in that. He asserts a continuing partnership 
relationship. He says no there but the reason he says no, his 
intent is that he's already talked about that and that was 
related to real estate holdings or other types of partnerships 
that he was involved in. 
Now, having said that, we shouldn't even get as far 
as his answers in this prior proceeding because the law I agree 
is clear that judicial estoppel does not apply in this case. I 
think counsel has clearly, is clearly mistaken as to what the 
law of judicial estoppel is in the state of Utah, She 
indicated that there was no more recent law in the United j 
States Supreme Court than this Hodge case in 1971 and that 
I 
ignores two separate cases that are far newer. One is in 2001 
i 
and one is in the year 2000 and following these cases, we don't ' 
even get to what's in this deposition. In Nebeker which we 
cited in our Memorandum in Opposition, the Utah Supreme Court 
i 
outlines what judicial estoppel is. "Under judicial estoppel a 
i 
person may not, to the prejudice of another person, deny any ! 
position taken in a prior judicial proceeding 'between the same j 
i 
persons or their privies involving the same subject matter and 
if such prior position was successfully maintained.'" So the 
I 
Utah Supreme Court is setting forth three requirements; number i 
I 
one, between the same persons or their privies; number two, , 
involving the same subject matter; and number three, if such 
i 
prior position was successfully maintained. Those elements are ! 
clearly not satisfied here. Number one, it isn't the same ! 
persons or privies. In that case it was the SBA. In this case j 
it's Mr. Orvis. Number two, involving the same subject matter. 
In the SBA case they were litigating issues over the contract ! 
liability under the SBA loan. After a judgment was entered, 
this isn't litigating a claim, he made a statement that can be I 
construed several different ways in a post judgment, I 
is i 
supplemental proceeding. And number three, I don't see how ; 
i 
this can be met under any reasoning, if such prior position was : 
i 
successfully maintained. There was no position taken in there | 
that was asserted or litigated or decided by anyone. He lost 
i 
that case. He made a statement in a post judgment deposition, j 
There wasn't any successfully maintaining this. Interestingly, , 
in the plaintiff's memorandum, they say that this element is j 
met successfully maintained because the SBA hasn't received a ! 
cent from Johnson on the judgment and that that constitutes J 
meeting this element. Well, the fact of the matter is, they , 
didn't tell the Court that Mr. Orvis bought that judgment from 
the SBA. The SBA got I believe $30,000. That's a lot more 
than not receiving a cent on this and it certainly doesn't 
satisfy if such a prior position was successfully maintained. 
Simply put, under judicial estoppel, it doesn't meet any of the 
requirements set forth by the Utah Supreme Court. 
The Utah Supreme Court, this is 2001 in Nebeker 
Trucking versus the Utah State Tax Commission and that's not 
the only case that talks about it. The Nebeker Court actually 
- it cites I believe to a 2000 case, Salt Lake City versus 
21 I Silver Fork Pipeline Corporation and in that they talk about 
1 ]
 • ! 
the requirements that you have to have for judicial estoppel to 
apply. In this, SFPC claimed that Salt Lake City was 
judicially estopped and the Utah Supreme Court again said, 
SFPCs contention is untenable for two reasons. First, SFPC 
17 
was not a party to Progress, that's another party, that 
detrimentally changed its position by reason of Salt Lake's 
inaccurate representation of Utah's water law in progress. 
Then they cite the law. Under judicial estoppel, a person may 
not, to the prejudice of another person, deny any position 
taken in a prior judicial proceeding, one - and these are my 
ones - between the same persons or their privies; that doesn't 
i 
! 
apply in this case; (2) involving the same subject matter; SBA . 
i 
subject matter and this one is different; and (3) if such prior ' 
position was successfully maintained. The exact same elements 
and they're citing an earlier case involving the same parties ' 
and they also cite Tracy Loan and Trust Company versus 
Openshaw. Again, there's two Supreme Court cases, 2000 and ' 
i 
2001 which directly say here's the elements to judicial \ 
estoppel and in this case they say because these elements 
weren't met, judicial estoppel does not apply. i 
Now, this 2000 case also cites to AMJUR, talking 
about what the judicial estoppel is. Now AMJUR, if you go to ' 
section 70, it lists the requirements. Number one, the i 
I 
inconsistent position first asserted must have been 
successfully maintained; two, a judgment must have been ' 
rendered; three, the positions must be clearly inconsistent; ! 
four, the parties in question must be the same; five, the party ; 
claiming estoppel must have been misled and have changed his 
! 
position; and six, it must appear unjust to one party or permit 
the other to change. Now these elements in AMJUR also aren't | 
met here. The parties in question must be the same. Clearly 
they're different parties in the SBA case and this one. The 
! 
party claiming estoppel must have been misled and have changed 
its position. Here there's been zero reliance by Mr. Orvis | 
i 
upon any statements made in this SBA deposition. In fact, he 
i 
wasn't just misled, he actually bought that judgment and he is ' 
i 
right now continuing to trying to collect on that judgment in | 
federal court and we've been over there in federal court just a 
I 
couple of weeks ago arguing this other case and there's been no
 ( 
- he wasn't misled and Mr. Orvis has never changed his 
position. i 
And the last requirement, it must appear unjust to 
one party to permit the other to change, that clearly hasn't , 
happened here because after this deposition was taken by the i 
SBA, post judgment, Mr. Orvis continued to provide checks to i 
Danelle Johnson and one actually to Jamis Johnson every month i 
i 
for, well, that's what we're fighting about, what those I 
i 
payments are for and this is significant money. It went all 
the way up to $35,000 a month. It's not that he changed his 
position or was unjust, he continued to make these payments > 
and, in fact, we have partnership agreements that we presented ' 
to the court and we have statements by Mr. Orvis indicating a ' 
i 
business relationship between the two that we presented to the ! 
court and there are also depositions taken after the Victor | 
j 
19 
1 , Lawrence judgment was done that indicate Mr, Orvis was being 
2 J deceitful about the accounting provided to Mr. Johnson and the ' 
3 | monies that were owed to the Johnsons. But we can't even get 
4 | to what was said in the deposition or how the court or a jury 
i ' 
5 should characterize that because judicial estoppel simply 
6 i doesn't apply. Interestingly in AMJUR, section 70-
i 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
THE COURT: Wait a minute. What do you mean we can't 
get to it? 
MR. CARTWRIGHT: Well, judicial estoppel doesn't 
apply.. 
THE COURT: Okay. That's fine. You can still 
it. You have to get to it to decide whether it's judicial 
estoppel. 
S& 
MR. CARTWRIGHT: You're right, and I guess what I ' 
mean is that the plaintiffs are making certain , 
I 
16 | characterizations on what he meant by saying no in the context | 
i i 
17 ! of the deposition and I'm saying we don't get rhat far to the 
18 I saying no because it doesn't meet any of the elements of 
19 | judicial estoppel. Let's assume that Mr. Johnson was the most 
20 I dishonest person in the world and he sat there and lied during j 
21 I his deposition, which he didn't and the evidence shows he i 
22 ' didn't, but assume that he did. Even if he did and was the 
t i 
i 
23 biggest liar in the world which he's not, it doesn't matter in 
24 
25 
this case. It would be evidence against him that could be 
presented to the jury but it's not judicial estoppel because 
20 
1 the requirements arenrt met. That's what I mean about not | 
2 I getting that far. 
3 j Now the plaintiffs have indicated that, I believe 
4 their language is that Tracy has been expressly overruled. 
1
 I 
5 i That's simply mistaken. Tracy was not expressly overruled. , 
6 There's two cases they cite where they talk about how Tracy i 
7 j shouldn't apply and I notice they don't even mention, it's 
8 almost pretending like the 2002 and 2001 Supreme Court 
9 decisions don't exist. But what they argue - they're pretty | 
10 much trying to ignore judicial estoppel and go into cases that | 
11 talk about res judicata versus collateral estoppel. What they 
12 J say supports their position, they're talking about the : 
13 ' International Resources v. Cremfield case and there the Utah 
14 Supreme Court said, ''Concerning the doctrine of res judicata it 
15 I is said that both parties the issues must have been the same 
16 j and also judgment is conclusive and then certain issues tried. 
17 This court explains - and then it talks about race adjudicata 
18 versus collateral estoppel, not judicial estoppel, collateral 
19 I estoppel and there they talk about how you can have different 
20 parties in collateral estoppel unlike res judicata where you 
21 need the same parties. 
22 I THE COURT: I understand the difference. 
23 I MR. CARTWRIGHT: But they even say in collateral 
24 I estoppel that operates only as to issues which were actually 
25 j asserted "and tried'7 in that case. There's no allegation here 
21 
1 • that these statements made in a post judgment supp order was 
i 
2 '( tried in the prior case* It simply wasn't and it indicates if 
the material issue was not actually asserted and determined, 
4 ' there is no basis upon which it could be concluded that it had , 
5 ] actually taken a different position on the issues. So even , 
6 I arguing this collateral estoppel, that: doesn't go but when it's ' 
7 I talking about the difference between the two, there's a 
i 
8 | footnote in the case and this is where the plaintiffs say Tracy 
9 : was expressly or explicitly overruled. Here's the footnote, 
10 I "We so state an awareness of a conceitedly, over broad 
11 
12 
statement in our case of Tracy Loan and Trust to the effect 
that one would not be judicially estopped unless the parties 
13 j and the issues are the same in the instant and the prior suit. 
14 j Any misstatement of the rule was corrected and superceded by 
15 our decision in Richard v. Hodson." So this is the first time 
I 
16 j they talk about judicial estoppel in this case. They were 
17 | talking about collateral estoppel before and they refer to 
18 Richard v. Hodson. Going to Richard v. Hodson where they say 
19 I this is where they clarified it, and again, it doesn't talk 
20 j about judicial estoppel. It talks about collateral estoppel 
21 ' versus res judicata. It talks about the difference between the 
22 I two and then it says, "This doctrine known as collateral 
I 
23 estoppel differs from res judicata not only in the fact that 
I 
24 all the parties need not be the same, but also in the fact that 
25 the estoppel applies only to issues actually litigated and not 
1 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
as to those that could be determined." So again, talking about 
2 ' collateral estoppel and issues actually litigated. 
3 I THE COURT: The Supreme Court doesn't know what 
4 judicial estoppel is. 
I i 
5 I MR. CARTWRIGHT: No, I think what I'm saying is-
6 I THE COURT: Wait a minute. Didn't they say in the ' 
footnote judicial estoppel? 
MR. CARTWRIGHT: Yeah. 
THE COURT: And they referred to a case that talks 
about only collateral estoppel? 
MR. CARTWRIGHT: That's correct. 
THE COURT: Then I guess they don't know what they're 
talking about, huh? 
MR. CARTWRIGHT: I can't figure out why they were 
saying that because in International Resources they're talking 
about res judicata versus collateral estoppel. They have a 
footnote that says our Tracy Loan and Trust with judicial 
estoppel as clarified by this other case. I go to the other 
case and I see them talking about collateral estoppel and res 
judicata in talking about elements there. I can't fit those 
cases together and I'm not sure why they talk about that. All 
I'm left with is - and this Hodson case is 1971. All I'm left 
with is two Supreme Court cases in the year 2000 and 2001 that 
don't deal with collateral estoppel but talk about judicial 
25 estoppel and it outlines the specific requirements there. 
23 
Putting aside the issues of law that judicial 
estoppel doesn't apply here, I'd like to point out to the Court 
that judicial estoppel is the only claim asserted before the 
Court in this motion and judicial estoppel based upon really 
one thing and that one thing only is what he said in this , 
deposition transcript. In the reply memorandum we get for the i 
first time new arguments and that new argument talks about a ' 
prior order that the judge entered in this court in regards to 
Victor Lawrence. 
THE COURT: That's me and I said judicial estoppel | 
applied. ; 
MR. CARTWRIGHT: That's correct. \ 
THE COURT: Did somebody appeal that? 
MR. CARTWRIGHT: Yes, he should if that's a- j 
THE COURT: Did someone appeal that? 
i 
MR. CARTWRIGHT: No, because it hasn't been certified • 
i 
as a final order to be appealed* J 
THE COURT: Third party action, wasn't it? Yeah, a * 
i 
third party defendant. I guess that kind of ended the third 
party complaint, didn't it? 
MR. CARTWRIGHT: Your Honor, I'm not aware that i 
that's been certified a final issue or not. 
THE COURT: Why would you have to certify it if it's a 
third party? 
i 
MR. CARTWRIGHT: That could be and here's where this i 
24 , 
I 
argument should not apply. First of all, I haven't had the 
i 
opportunity to respond to this issue because it was presented i 
to the Court for the first time in the reply memorandum and | 
under Rule 56, what they're stuck with and what they elected to 
argue then was judicial estoppel based upon the statements that . 
were made in the deposition only and not this subsequent order ( 
and if they want to bring "his in a subsequent motion, that | 
would allow Mr. Johnson and I the time and the opportunity to 
fully respond to that and to address the issue of whether it's 
a final order or not, but they didn't. They raised that issue 
i 
at the very beginning in their reply memorandum and the Utah | 
Court of Appeals - we filed a Motion to Strike that. 
THE COURT: I know. 
MR. CARTWRIGHT: The Utah Court of Appeals indicated 
that you may grant a Motion to Strike on issues raised for the 
first time in a reply memorandum and we're not saying that 
they've lost their chance forever. We're simply saying, we 
should have the opportunity to submit affidavits and other I 
I 
evidence in response to that, that it's too late now. I 
Number two, I've indicated that it's my understanding 
! 
I 
that it's not a final order, that they're still able to appeal , 
that or even more importantly, Your Honor can, based upon | 
additional information presented here and the evidence that he j 
presented in his affidavit here is much more comprehensive than | 
it was before, would justify not only denying this motion, if 
25 
that were at issue, but changing the court's order previously 
and we're saying that - we haven't made that motion now. We're 
saying it's not-
THE COURT: Assuming a year has gone by and I haven't 
seen any motion to change it and it hasn't been appealed, final 
or not, the chances of my changing that are about slim to none. 
MR. CARTWRIGHT: Okay. Also, Your Honor, there's 
been things that have happened which doesn't make that - while 
it may apply to Victor Lawrence, it shouldn't apply to Jayson 
Orvis and the reason why is the relationships of the parties 
are completely different. The relationship between Victor 
Orvis and Mr. Johnson was that of attorney and client. Here 
this is no attorney. This is partnership, partnership. He was 
not making partnership claims against Victor Lawrence. He was 
making various other claims that the Court dismissed. I'm not 
arguing that those are right or wrongly dismissed. I'm saying 
that the relationships are very different. The claims that 
were made against Victor Lawrence are different than Jayson 
Orvis and that even if they had raised this for the first time 
and we'd had the opportunity to respond, the circumstances are 
different. 
Also, between then and now there's been the 
additional discovery that Mr. Johnson has obtained that talks 
further about the relationships between the parties and that 
includes an assistant of Mr. Orvis that testified in a 
deposition about Mr. Orvis' payments of monies to Mr, Johnson 
and how those payments were false and were basically, it was i 
i 
cheating one to the other and also an assistant of Victor ! 
i 
Lawrence. And we believe that with that additional testimony 
I 
presented to the Court, that Your Honor would find differently j 
if that matter were raised now with Mr. Orvis. But in any | 
event, we shouldn't get that far because judicial estoppel -
 { 
this one isn't even close. These elements don't apply and 
that's it and that's our position. 
I 
THE COURT: All right, thank you. 
I 
MS. TOMSIC: Your Honor, briefly if I could just j 
I 
address a couple of points. 
I 
THE COURT: Okay. ' 
MS. TOMSIC: First of all, Your Honor, relative to | 
the order, obviously it's part of the record in this case and \ 
i 
the reason obviously we cited it, was in direct reputation as j 
i 
to their position as to what the required elements for judicial : 
I 
estoppel which is clearly would be contrary to Your Honor's j 
order and it is basically the law of this case at this point 
given that it was issued almost a year and a half. 
Second, Your Honor, in terms of Mr. Johnson's . 
purported explanation of his testimony before the SBA, it's all l 
well and good for Mr. Cartwright to stand up here and try to 
explain it to the Court but we don't have anything before this 
Court in any way explaining that. If you look at Mr. Johnson's 
27 
affidavit, all be talks about is that his testimony was 
truthful and he quotes it, it says what it says. He denies he 
had any partnership interest. Here he claims he has one. I 
I 
And I think what else is important, Your Honor, is i 
when they're taking the position that somehow the SBA lawyer 
that knew it was Danelle Johnson who had it, it's just not 
true, Your Honor, and I would ask Your Hondr to look at pages 
40 through 42 of Mr. Johnson's deposition before the SBA and 
I've got a copy for Your Honor and a copy for opposing counsel 
if I could. And Your Honor, the SBA - if I may approach? 
THE COURT: Yes. \ 
i 
MS. TOMSIC: - is asking them about Danelle Johnson
 ( 
and where she's getting her income and if you go to I believe i 
I 
it's page 44, he's talking about getting payments from j 
Lexington Law Firm to the SBA and Jamis Johnson takes the • 
position that basically, she's receiving those payments because, 
i 
she's a trustee on these boards, that she had performed some i 
j 
services for them that are undescribed and that she had donated ' 
some computer equipment, furniture. There's absolutely no an i 
i 
assertion in there that says, gee, well, I thought you were 
I 
talking to me about me owning an partnership interest. No, my 
I 
wife is the one who owns it. So not only did he say he didn't 
I 
own a partnership interest contrary to his position here, he , 
tells the SBA that the reason his wife is getting any money is j 
because she was doing services, acting as a trustee and had , 
28 j 
1 contributed some things. So, Your Honor, I just say, his 
2 deposition says what it says. It's unequivocal on its face 
3 : that he is denying any type of a partnership or any type of an 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
LLC interest or a corporation. His position in this case is 
absolutely contrary to that. You can see it in their papers. 
You can see it in their answer to the declaratory judgment and 
you can see it in his third party complaint and counterclaim. 
And Your Honor, I think the thing I want to say about 
Mr. Cartwright's representation of the Utah Supreme Court 
authority, it's true that the Nebeker and Silver Fork cases 
were decided after the International case that we cite to Your 
Honor but I think, Your Honor, in fairness, if you look at 
those decisions, the issue before the Court in neither of those 
decisions was whether or not the party asserting judicial 
estoppel was the same party. That was not the issue on which 
the court made a decision, and I think if you look at the cases 
we cited - and I've got copies if you would like a copy. 
THE COURT: I would, uh-huh (affirmative). I can 
19 find them but I guess I better read them. 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
MS. TOMSIC: If you-
THE COURT: What do you say about this thing in the 
footnote the Supreme Court talks about judicial estoppel being 
clarified in a subsequent case that talks about collateral 
estoppel? 
MS. TOMSIC: Your Honor, I think - let me tell you, I 
29 
can t speak to what's in the minds and heart of the Supreme 
Court. 
THE COURT: Neither can I, not can ones that have 
gone before. 
MS. TOMSIC: But what I can tell you, Your Honor, is 
this is that the Tracy Loan case which is really the prodigy 
that is cited that they rely on in subsequent decisions, the 
Nebeker decision and the Silver Fork decision, is a case 
involving judicial estoppel and at the time of that case there 
also was a law, both with regard to judicial estoppel and 
collateral estoppel that the parties had to be the same as in 
the prior suit and when they're citing to Tracy Collins, while 
they may be looking to a case dealing with collateral estoppel, 
basically the same principles were being applied on collateral 
estoppel and judicial estoppel, that is requiring the parties 
and the subject matters to be the same and the way I read this 
footnote, Your Honor, is saying, look, we were really broad in 
our language that we were using in Tracy Collins, Take a look 
at this Hodson case because what we've done is we've redefined 
those elements and that would apply with equal force to 
judicial estoppel and collateral estoppel and that's how I 
would read it. 
But Your Honor, I do want to say one other thing. I 
want to give you the Nebeker case and this Silver Fork case 
oecause I think what you'll see is like many courts, they grab 
1 a quote out of a case, put it up there, and then they pick the 
2 ' element they're talking about and that's what they decide the 
3 case on. If you look at the Nebeker case, the Court is taking 
4 the position after it cites that, which really I think if you 
5 look at it in terms of the holding of the court is dicta, it 
6 says that the reason they're not applying judicial estoppel is 
7 because the party hadn't changed its position in the original 
8 litigation based on testimony which is obviously contrary in 
9 this case because the SBA did change its position. It couldn't 
10 collect on a $250,000 plus judgment and while they ultimately 
11 ended up selling it for $30,000, it changed its position, Your 
12 Honor, because it couldn't collect on a partnership that Mr. 
13 Johnson is now claiming is worth hundreds, and hundreds, and 
14 hundreds or thousands of dollars in this case. 
15 So, one, the cite to Tracy Collins was a quote that 
16 is dicta in the case if you look at the holding of the case and 
17 in terms of the Silver Fork Pipeline case, again, while they 
18 quote that whole long quote out of Tracy Collins, that case, 
19 the only issue before the court was, can you apply judicial 
20 estoppel where there is not a knowing misrepresentation, that 
21 is where somebody might be mistaken about something and may not 
22 have all the facts and again, neither the Nebeker case nor the 
23 j Silver Fork Corporation case are situations where a party was 
24 arguing, geez, they weren't the same parties, it wasn't the 
25 same subject matter. Those were not the issues before those 
1 cases and unfortunately, the Supreme Court hasn't said anything 
2 ! about this footnote and there is no case where it has said 
3 I again, after the International Resources case that it meant 
i 
4 I something differently. 
5 
6 
And a point I want to make Your Honor is one, I don't : 
party and the judicial system which means that Mr. Cartwright's 
i 
think it's correct that you have to have those requirements 
7 j because the issue again is really the relationship between the 
8 
9 I argument that your prior order shouldn't apply because the 
10 ! relationships between the parties are different, well, Your 
11 | Honor, the bottom line is, all you need to do is look at the 
j I 
12 authorities and they make it clear. This is not equitable | 
13 estoppel. You're not looking at relationships between parties. ' 
14 You're looking at the relationship between the defendant and j 
15 the judiciary and what the defendant has done within that i 
16 i judicial system and what's important here, Your Honor, is you 
17 I take the position that Mr. Johnson, we believe didn't tell the 
18 truth. But assuming he - if you're with me and you read it andi 
19 it's not the truth, what he's saying, Mr. Cartwright is saying, 
20 is litigants can go and perpetrate a fraud on the court and 
21 then turn around and totally change their position to their I 
i 
22 , benefit using the court again and that exactly the reason that I 
23 you have judicial estoppel. It's to keep parties from lying to j 
24 I a court and as many courts have said, what it does is it 
j I 
25 I increased the costs of lying. If you lie in a judicial j 
I 
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i 
proceeding, you can't then turn around and change your story to1 
i I 
get some benefit before another court and that's exactly what , 
i 
we have here. I 
I 
Your Honor, so I'd say again, one, the requirements | 
I 
for judicial estoppel are that you have a litigant, Mr. Johnson j 
in the SBA case, making a statement under oath in a judicial | 
proceeding where the SBA changes its position and then in this 
case, turns around and take a totally inconsistent position and ! 
says he does have a partnership interest, hoping to benefit j 
economically from that and at the same time to have deprived 
the SBA of that money. And under the doctrine of judicial i 
estoppel it's a deliberate false misrepresentation and it's 
being used for their benefit and he's trying to use this Court | 
to either lie to the SBA in that case or lie to the Court in 
this case and under the doctrine of judicial estoppel that is , 
not permitted. | 
! 
Finally I'd say one last thing, Your Honor, and that ; 
is, I think even assuming you were to buy the argument that the ' 
j court didn't mean whatever it said in footnote 4, and again, I i 
just want to state the language because they're talking about 
collateral estoppel in the body of the text and then the i 
footnote, and they say "We so state an awareness of an ' 
I conceitedly over broad statement in our case Tracy Loan, to the I 
i | 
I effect that one would not be 'judicially estopped' unless the ! 
I parties and the issue are the same in the instant and the prior > 
1 j suit. Any misstatement of the rule was corrected and i 
2 I superceded by our decision in Hodson". And again Hodson dealt ' 
3 j with collateral estoppel, but the elements were the same for 
4 collateral estoppel and judicial estoppel prior to the Hodson 
5 decision where it found you don't have to be the same parties 
6 j and as long as it was an issue that was actually addressed, 
7 you're there, 1 
! - i 
8 i And I think one last thing, Your Honor, and that is
 ( 
that fundamentally in this case, if the Court were to overrule ! 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
its prior decision relative to Mr. Spendlove and Mr. Lawrence, ' 
the bottom line is even if you impose that same party of 
privity requirement, given that Mr. Orvis is an assignee of the I 
judgment, under Utah law, he is a privy. You know that as well ; 
as I do, I mean, clearly the Utah Supreme Court has defined 
privy to include that, AMJUR defines a privy as that. So Your
 ( 
Honor, one, that's not the law but even assuming that you 
i 
decided, geez, I'm going to change my opinion and I'm going to I 
18 ! decide that's a requirement, it doesn't really matter for 
19 
20 
purposes of Mr. Orvis. 
And in terms of changing position, I think I've 
21 covered that with the SBA. There was detrimental reliance, 
22 
23 
Your Honor, selling a judgment that now with interest is 
i 
probably close to $350,000 or $400,000 for $30,000 is clearly a' 
24 • detrimental reliance on the truth of his testimony in that SBA 
25 supp hearing. 
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I thank you for your time, Your Honor. Do you have 
any questions? 
THE COURT: I do. What's the date of the case that 
uses the footnote regarding judicial estoppel? 
MS. TOMSIC: The name of the case Your Honor is 
International Resources, and would you like a copy? 
THE COURT: Uh-hah (affirmative). 
MS. TOMSIC: May I approach? 
THE COURT: Yes, of course. That'll answer all the 
questions I have. 
MS. TOMSIC: Let me give you the other two cases, 
Your Honor, if I could. This is the Silver Fork Pipeline case, 
Your Honor, and this is the Nebeker. 
THE COURT: Thank you. I'll take a look at these 
cases. I want to read these to see what they have to say. As 
a practical matter, the reason I wanted to know the date of the 
case, I wondered who wrote it and whether or not it was 
unanimous because I doubt seriously that all five justices 
(inaudible) talk about when you use the words judicial 
estoppel. That would be highly unlikely. 
MR. CARTWRIGHT: May I just respond to one-
THE COURT: No sir, you may not. She gets the first 
23 I and last saying. 
MR. CARTWRIGHT: But Your Honor there's been a 
misstatement of the law that I'd like to correct. I don't want 
35 
to make any arguments but to point out a misstatement that 
i 
was 
1 
2 • said, ' 
3 THE COURT: Go ahead. ' 
A i 
4
 | MR. CARTWRIGHT: In the Salt Lake City v. Silver 
5 j Creek case that you have, paragraph 15, second paragraph, ) 
6 | SPFC's contention is untenable for two reasons; first, SPFC was 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
not a party to Progress. That's means the first case, that 
detrimentally changes its position by reason of Salt Lake's 
inaccurate representation of Utah water law in Progress. Under 
judicial estoppel, a person may not to the prejudice the other 
person, deny any position taken in a prior judicial proceeding 
between the same persons. One of two reasons this case turns 
on is it's different parties. That's all. She indicated to 
the Court that that was not a reason. It simply is. That's 
i 
one of the two reasons for the decision, different parties. 
THE COURT: I'll read these cases and let you know.
 ( 
I'll be interested to know whether or not - well, I suppose one , 
i 
18 j way or the other this issue might get addressed by one of the i 
19 appellate courts but I'll be interested to know whether or not , 
20 ' the appellate courts are of the opinion that a person can make ! 
21 a representation in one court and change it in another whether ' 
! 
22 j you're the same party or whether you're not. I don't see that 
23 I it makes any difference but we will see. Thank you counsel. ' 
24 j I'll ler you know within a day or two. 
25 I (Whereupon the hearing was concluded) -c-
i 
i 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JAYSON ORVIS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JAMIS JOHNSON, 
Defendant. 
JAMIS JOHNSON and 
DaNELL JOHNSON, 
Third Party Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
JAYSON ORVIS, SAM SPENDLOVE, 
DEON STECKLING, VICTOR 
LAWRENCE, and JOHN DOES 1-15 , 
Third Party D e f e n d a n t s . 
Before the Court i s the p l a i n t i f f ' s Motion for Summary 
Judgment. Fol lowing argument of counse l , t h e Court took the matter 
under advisement t o f u r t h e r cons ider the arguments of the part ies , 
part icularly the arguments surrounding t h e i s s u e of judic ia l 
estoppel. After t a k i n g the matter under adv i sement , the Court has 
received correspondence from both the p l a i n t i f f and the defendant, 
with attached case a u t h o r i t y . 
CASE NO. 010907449 
FMBWmiCTCWJIT 
Third Judicial District 
OCT 2 0 200*1 
Deputy Ctorfc 
ORVIS V. JOHNSON PAGE 2 MINUTE ENTRY 
The Court, s i n c e taking th i s matter under advisement and 
receiving the supplemental materials of the p a r t i e s , has revisited 
this matter on a number of occasions. In doing so , the Court has 
read the materials submitted by the p a r t i e s once again, has 
reviewed this Court's pr ior rulings deal ing with the question of 
judicial estoppel, and based upon that review, the arguments of 
counsel, and the persuas ive law presented, the Court i s satisfied 
that the p l a i n t i f f ' s Motion for Summary Judgment must be granted as 
prayed. 
The Court continues to be fu l ly s a t i s f i e d that the doctrine of 
judicial estoppel a p p l i e s in th i s circumstance. Mr. Johnson i s 
judicially estopped from assert ing that he had an interest in a 
partnership where he, in a separate proceeding under oath, 
test i f ied that he had none. There i s no quest ion of mistake. Mr. 
Johnson t e s t i f i ed as he did, so as to avoid c o l l e c t i o n efforts from 
the Small Business Administration. The pr inc ipa l of judicial 
estoppel prohibits Mr. Johnson from in t h i s l a t e r action now 
asserting a d i f ferent p o s i t i o n . 
As the claims a s s e r t e d by Johnson must flow from the existence 
of an ownership in the partnership, a p o s i t i o n that Mr. Johnson 
previously denied in a separate proceeding, h i s claims must fa i l . 
Accordingly, in accordance with the p l a i n t i f f ' s request, the 
Court will enter a dec laratory Judgment indicat ing that Mr. Johnson 
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has no claim or i n t e r e s t in the credit r epa i r business or any of 
the other enterpr ises in question. 
Counsel for the p l a i n t i f f i s to prepare an appropriate Order 
granting the re l ie f requested in the Motion for Summary Judgment, 
and submit the same t o the Court for review and signature. The 
Order should comply with Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, set t ing for th in de t a i l thflf bas is upon which this Court-
grants the p l a i n t i f f ' s Motion. / 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby c e r t i f y t h a t I mailed a t r u e and c o r r e c t copy of the 
foregoing Minute En t ry , t o the following, t h i a p(.0 day of October, 
2004: 
Peggy A. Tomsic 
Attorney for P l a i n t i f f 
50 S. Main, Sui te 1250 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Joe Cartwright 
Attorney for Defendant Jamis Johnson 
299 S. Main S t r e e t , S u i t e 1700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(^ujJ^JMmj&mJ 
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# 
" Deputy Claifc 
Peggy A. Tomsic (3879) 
BERMAN, TOMSIC & SAVAGE 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1250 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Telephone: (801)328-2200 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Third Party 
Defendant, Jayson Orvis 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JAYSON ORVIS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JAMIS JOHNSON, 
Defendant. 
JAMIS JOHNSON. 
Third-Party Plaintiff. 
vs. 
JAYSON ORVIS. SAM SPENDLOVE, 
DEON STECKUNG. VICTOR 
LAWRENCE, and JOHN DOES 1-15. 
-fORVlS'S PROPOSED]-V 
JUDGMENT 
Case No. 010907449 
Honorable Timothy R. Hanson 
Third-Party Defendants. 
Based on the Court's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Minute Entry 
dated October 27, 2004, THE COURT HEREBY ENTERS JUDGMENT as follows: 
1. The Court enters judgment in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant on 
Plaintiffs Declaratory Judgment Complaint and all claims asserted therein. Defendant 
has no right, claim or interest in any business, enterprise or entity, relating to credit 
repair, in which Plaintiff has any ownership interest, 
2. The Court enters judgment in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant on 
Defendants Counterclaim against Plaintiff and all claims asserted therein, and the 
Counterclaim is dismissed with prejudice. 
3. The Court enters judgment in favor of Third Party Defendant Deon 
Steckling and against Defendant on Defendant's Third party Complaint against Deon 
Steckling and all claims asserted therein, and the Third Party Complaint is dismissed 
with prejudice. 
DATED thi of 
Salt Lake County. State of Utah 
2 
November. 2 
BY THE COURT 
*4fcJ 
Monorable Timd1 
/Third Judicial Disf 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
S.CA OC&P^ 
I hereby certify that on the ±J_ day of <Novern5e>, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the JUDGMENT to be mailed, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Jamis M. Johnson 
Johnson & Associates 
352 South Denver Street 
#304 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Blake S. Atkin 
Atkin & Hawkins 
136 South Main Street, #610 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorney for Third Party Defendants 
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By 
F l U f t USTUCT COURT 
• nfrd Judicial District 
NOV 2 3 20M 
0 DtputyCtoifc 
Peggy A. Tomsic (3879) 
BERMAN, TOMSIC & SAVAGE 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1250 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Telephone: (801)328-2200 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Third Party 
Defendant, Jayson Orvis 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JAYSON ORVIS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JAMIS JOHNSON, 
Defendant. 
JAMIS JOHNSON, 
Third-Party Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JAYSON ORVIS, SAM SPENDLOVE, 
DEON STECKLING, VICTOR 
LAWRENCE, and JOHN DOES 1-15, 
•[JQRVIS?6 PttOPOQCD] 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. 010907449 
Honorable Timothy R. Hanson 
Third-Party Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Jayson Orvis is the Plaintiff in this Declaratory Judgment action. Orvis 
provides consulting to law firms or businesses providing credit repair services. These 
services consist of assisting in removing false or erroneous entries from the clients1 
credit reports. Additionally, Orvis owns and licenses software, trademarks and trade 
names, and other intellectual property used in the credit repair business to these law 
firms and businesses, through various entities which he has established. Plaintiff seeks, 
in this action, a judgment declaring that the Defendant has no right, claim or interest 
relative to any business or venture relating to the credit repair business in which Plaintiff 
has any ownership. 
2. Defendant Johnson, the Defendant in this case, asserts that a partnership 
exists between him and Orvis and that he is therefore entitled to partnership proceeds 
from intellectual property lease payments and consulting fees paid to Orvis by various 
credit repair entities, including an entity called The Lexington Law Firm. 
3. In addition to claiming a partnership interest in Orvis's credit repair 
businesses, Johnson filed a Third Party Complaint against three third-party defendants, 
including Deon Steckling. In Johnson's Answer and Third Party Complaint, he alleged 
that Steckling, as well as the other third-party defendants, conspired with On/is to 
exclude Johnson from the partnership interest he allegedly had in Orvis's credit repair 
related businesses. Johnson charged that the third-party defendants had 
2 
misappropriated the funds of the alleged partnership and had been unjustly enriched 
thereby. 
4. Prior to Orvis's filing of the Declaratory Judgment Action, Johnson was 
sued by the Small Business Administration ("SBA), and judgment was entered against 
him in that case on September 29,1997. United States of America v. Jamis Johnson. 
2:95«CV-838J, in the United States District Court for the Central District of Utah. 
5. In post-judgment supplemental proceedings for collection purposes in the 
SBA case. Johnson was deposed by the SBA. In his deposition, Johnson, under oath, 
disavowed any interest, partnership or otherwise, in the credit repair business of On/is. 
There was no question of mistake. Johnson testified as he did so as to avoid collection 
efforts by the SBA, Johnson testified, under oath: 
Q: Do you have any interest in any partnership? 
A: No. 
Q: Any interest in any limited liability companies? 
A: No. 
[Deposition of Jamis Johnson, November 17,1999, Exhibit 6 to Affidavit of Jayson 
Orvis, at 30:16 31:4]. 
A: Lexington Law Firm, Victor Lawrence and another attorney 
have taken over all of that. I've indemnified them, they have 
indemnified me. IVe resigned from any relationship. . . . 
Lexington Law FirmQ was in my name, but since that time and 
with my bar problem, I have completely relinquished any 
3 
interest. They paid me a little, made my payment, and I 
resigned. Now. it's listed as an assumed name by Jamis 
Johnson, they're going to have to go in and change that. But, 
you know, they're operating now without me. 
[Deposition of Jamis Johnson. November 17,1999. Exhibit 5 to Affidavit of Jayson 
On/is, at 23:6-24:10]. 
6. On August 8, 2001, the SBA assigned its judgment against Johnson in the 
SBA case to an entity called All Star Financial. L L C . 
7. On August 11, 2001, All Star Financial, L L C . assigned the judgment 
against Johnson in the SBA case to Orvis. 
8. On March 30. 2004. Plaintiff Jayson Orvis filed a Motion for Summary 
Judgment arguing that the doctrine of judicial estoppel precluded Johnson from 
claiming a partnership interest in any credit repair business of Orvis because of 
Johnson's testimony under oath before the SBA. Third-party defendant Steckling 
joined in Orvis's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
11. On August 9, 2004, the Court held a hearing on Orvis's and Steckling's 
Motion for Summary Judgment. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Based on the foregoing findings of fact, the Court makes the following 
conclusions of law. 
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1. The principle of judicial estoppel prohibits Johnson from asserting a 
different position in this later action from the position to which he testified under oath in 
the SBA case. That is, judicial estoppel will not allow Johnson to contradict his 
testimony before the SBA and claim a partnership interest here. See Salt Lake City v. 
Silver Fork Pipeline Coro,. 913 P,2d 731, 734 (Utah 1995) (the purpose of judicial 
estoppel is "to uphold the sanctity of oaths, thereby safeguarding the integrity of the 
judicial process from conduct such as knowing misrepresentations or fraud on the 
court."). 
2. Judicial estoppel does not require that the parties to the prior and present 
litigation be the same. See International Resources v. Dunfield. 599 P.2d 515, 517, n.4 
(Utah 1979) (noting 'a concededly overbroad statement in [the Court's] case of Tracy 
Loan and Trust Co. v. Qpenshaw Inv. Co.. et aL 102 Utah 509. 132 P.2d 388. to the 
effect that one would not be 'judicially estopped' unless the parties and the issues are 
the same in the instant and the prior suit. Any misstatement of the rule was corrected 
and superseded by our decision in Richards v. Hodson. [485 P.2d 1044 (Utah 1971)]"). 
3. Even if Utah law requires that the parties to the prior and present 
proceedings be the same in order for judicial estoppel to apply, such is not 
determinative in this case because Orvis, having purchased and having been assigned 
the judgment owned by the SBA, is in privity with the SBA. See 47 Am. Jur. 2d 
Judgments § 663 (2004) ("a privy is one who, after the commencement of the action, 
5 
has acquired an interest in the subject matter affected by the judgment through or 
under one of the parties, as by . . . assignment."); Searle Brothers v. Searle. 588 P.2d 
689 (1978) (The legal definition of a person in privity with another, is a person so 
identified in interest with another that he represents the same legal right. This includes 
a mutual or successive relationship to rights in property.). 
Based on the foregoing, the Court grants Plaintiffs Motion for Summary 
Judgment and dismisses Johnson's counterclaim against Plaintiff with prejudice. The 
Court will enter a Declaratory Judgment that Johnson has no right, claim or interest in 
any business, enterprise or entity, relating to credit repair, in which Orvis has any 
ownership interest. The Court also grants Deon Steckling's Motion for Summary 
Judgment and dismisses the Third Party Cpmplaint against him with prejudice. 
DATED this<230f November, 20JD4. 
BY W E COURT: _ ^ 
honorable Timoth 
(Third Judicial District 
Salt Lake County, 
6 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on October 29,2004,1 caused a true and correct copy 
of (JAYSON ORVIS'S PROPOSED] FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW io be mailed, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Jamis M. Johnson 
Johnson & Associates 
352 South Denver Street 
#304 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Blake S. Atkin 
Atkin & Hawkins 
136 South Main Street, #610 
Salt Lake City. Utah 84101 
Attorney for Third Party Defendants 
(r^A/-&**-
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AGREEMENT 
AGREEMENT entered into by and between Jayson Orvis and Jamis 
Johnson. 
RECITALS 
WHEREAS, Orvis and Johnson have developed over the last several-
years enterprises that provide credit repair services to a nationwide 
clientele. Such credit repair services include, but are not limited to a 
range of activities, including telemarketing, internet marketing, 
consulting, law representation, and the enterprises have grown over 
the years and have acquired a variety of tangible and intangible 
assets including, without limitation, for example, equipment, 
computers, software, furniture, knowledge, methods, techniques in 
marketing, lead sources, internet operations; and 
WHEREAS, the parties desire to provide for the unimpaired 
continuation and growth of the business to the mutual benefit of the 
parties; and 
WHEREAS the parties acknowledge that an agreement was put in 
place reciting thai all assets of this enterprise are placed in the name 
of Jayson Orvis so as to protect these assets and provide for 
continued growth and mutual profitability; and 
WHEREAS the parties acknowledge that they have governed and 
operated these enterprises under an outline agreement and under a 
course of performance that they desire to continue; 
NOW THEREFORE, for good consideration, the parties agree as 
follows: 
1. [Governance and compensation/allocation of profits shall continue 
in the percentages as heretofore provided under the operating 
arrangements and as the enterprise continues to grow, however, all 
monies shall be paid to Jayson Orvis or his business entity as may be 
established and Jayson Orvis shall provide Johnson's share or 
allocation to any party directed by Johnson. The intent herein being 
that these enterprises shall continue to grow, expand, multiply as 
directed by the parties under their outline agreement and course of 
performance to their mutual economic benefit 
2. The agreement is to Kept confidential between the parties and the 
parties shall not disdose the arrangement herein to third parties 
>ut mutual agreement 
Jayson 
ORV006 
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September J. X994 
To: Merrill Chandler, John Hollingshead Jam«Johnsoa Jayson Orvis. Steve Paige 
from: Merrill Chandler J o h n Hollir\gshead Jamis Johnsoa Jayson Orvis. Steve Paige 
Re: Gentleman's Agreement 
Whereas. Merrill Chandler has expertise in computers, databases, operations and business management, 
systems development as weB as rents computers and software to businesses, and owns a third of the e quiry in 
N AC A, and 
Whereas John HoMngshead has expertise in business consuming, leasing, financing and funding, and owns a 
ihird of the equity in MACA, and 
Whereas.Jemis Johnson is an attorney and is an expert in the hew. and one hundred percent of the equity of 
Law Offfces of Consumer Affairs P.C. and fifty percent of the profits of Law Offices of Consumer Affairs, and 
Whereas Jsyson Orvis has expertise in writing, marketing, advertising, clarity, and fifty percent of the profits 
of Law Offices of Consumer Affairs, and 
Whereas. StevePaige has expertise m consumer credit, marketing, worry, shell games, cost cutting, and owns 
a third of the equity in N ACA# 
Therefore, in acceptance of the aforementioned contributions we agree to: 
1. Establish a limited liabthry corporation, The Genes* Project* whose purpose a t o create and manage 
profitable entities for the five partners. 
2. Divide equally the equity and profits of The Genesis Proper 
3» Provide vehicles and mechanisms to have ALL profits from N AC A, LOCA and any other related 
company or subsidiary be tunneled into The Geaettk Project 
4. Meet weekly to discuss the items pertinent to the mission of The Genesis Project 
To these ends we will do the following: 
t. Merrill- Act as Executive Director of the North American Consumer Alliance and have responsibility 
over NAC A personnel issues, oversee marketing programs, business operations, member services, 
etc., committing at least 40 hours per week to the task. 
2> John HoQingshead - Act as business consultant to NACA and LOCA commit ing at least 20 hours per 
w e e k to the task. 
3. Jamis Johnson - Protect LOCA/NAC A and all other endeavors legally, perform all legal functions 
except where a majority indicates outside counsel is required, committing at least 20 per week to the 
task. 
4. Jayson Orvis * Business Manager of the Law Offices for Consumer Affairs and have responsibility over 
LOCA personnel issues, marketing programs, oversee business operations, client relations, etc. 
committing at least 40 hours per week to the task. 
5. Steve Paige • Act as a marketing and operations consultant regarding credit and debt issues and 
natters as surface from time to time and will commit 20 hours per waaX to the tas*. 
Exhibit 14 
ASSIGNMENT 
ASSIGNMENT made this ' ^ day of ^A/W^vy . 2001, by Jamis M Johnson to Jayson 
Orvis/Attorneys for People, LLC., a Utah limited liability co&pany, as follows: 
WHEREAS, the name Lexington Law Firm is a duly registered assumed name and/or d.b.a. of 
Jamis M. Johnson with the State of Utah, and constitutes a valid trade name having been used extensively 
in the business of credit repair, and 
WHEREAS, the said trade name is an asset actually owned jointly by Jamis M Johnson and Jayson 
Orvis, and 
WHEREAS, Jamis M. Johnson and Jayson Orvis own intellectual property and tangible and 
intangible assets for the business of credit repair and per prior agreement, this trade name is to be assigned 
by Jamis M. Johnson to Jayson Orvis, and 
WHEREAS, Jayson Orvis has established a limited liability company called Attorneys for People, 
LLC, of which he is the only member, and which he was to hold some of these joint assets and through 
which he administrates some of the credit repair business, and 
WHEREAS, Jamis M. Johnson desires to assign the trade name to Jayson Orvis/Attorneys for 
People and it shall form and is part of the assets jointly owned by Johnson and Orvis and administrated by 
Orvis; 
parties, 
NOW THEREFORE, based upon the foregoing recitals and upon the prior agreement of the 
Jamis M. Johnson does hereby assign to Jayson Orvis/Attorneys for People, LLC., the trade 
name/assumed name ILexington Law Firm. / 
desires. 
Johnson agrees that the name may reside in his name on the files of the State of Utah, if Orvis so 
DATED on the date first above written, 
State of Utah ) 
:ss 
County of Salt Lake ) 
OnthisJ^dayi 
signer of the foregoing ASSI 
., 2001, personally appeared before m^ Jamis M. Johnson, the 
, who duly acknowledged to me that he executed the same. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
KIM A. RENAK 
220 SOUTH 200 EAST STE. 110 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84111 
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES 
SEPTEMBER 26TH 20O4 
STATE OF UTAH 
S ^ n ^ Q . ~&rs*JZ^ 
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Peggy A. Tomsic (3879) 
Angela W. Adams'(9081) 
BERMAN, GAUFIN, TOMSIC & SAVAGE 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1250 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Telephone: (801) 328-2200 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Third Party 
Defendant, Jayson Orvis 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JAYSON ORVIS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JAMIS JOHNSON, 
Defendant. 
JAMIS JOHNSON and 
DaNELL JOHNSON, 
Third-Party Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
JAYSON ORVIS, SAM SPENDLOVE, 
DION SCHNELLING, VICTOR 
LAWRENCE, and JOHN DOES 1-15, 
PLAINTIFF, 
COUNTERDEFENDANT AND 
THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT 
JAYSON ORVIS' SUPPLEMENTAL 
RESPONSES TO DEFENDANT. 
COUNTERCLAIMANT AND 
THIRD-PARTY PLAINTIFF JAMIS 
JOHNSON'S FIRST SET OF 
INTERROGATORIES AND 
REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION 
OF DOCUMENTS 
Case No. 010907449 
Honorable Timothy R. Hanson 
Third-Party Defendants. 
As a licensed attorney, he was responsible for running the legal side of the practice 
entirely. By putting himself in a position to be disciplined by the Utah State Bar, and, 
therefore, incapable of fulfilling his responsibility under their agreement, he breached 
his agreement with Orvis. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 11: Identify all payments from you or the Orvis entities 
to Johnson or to an assignee of Johnson during the relevant time period as alleged in 
Paragraph 24 of the Complaint and the Eighteenth Defense of the Third Party Answer 
by stating the amount, the date, and the reason for each such payment. 
RESPONSE: The following payments were made by Jayson Orvis to Jamis 
Johnson, or Johnson's assignees, voluntarily, and in Orvis' full discretion as to both 
amount and frequency: 
1. 12/16/99 - Payment made to Mitigate, LLC. in the amount of $3950. 
2. 12/17/99 - Payment made to Millgate in the amount of $3000. 
3. 1/18/00 - Payment made to Millgate in the amount of $1500. 
4. 1/18/00 - Payment made to Millgate in the amount of $3500. 
5. 1/21/00 - Payment made to Millgate in the amount of $3750. 
6. 2/2/00 - Payment made to Millgate in the amount of $9250. 
7. 2/17/00 - Payment made to Millgate in the amount of $2500. 
8. 3/13/00 - Payment made to Zion Web Design in the amount of $14,500. 
9. 3/24/00 - Payment made to Zion Web Design in the amount of $2500. 
10. 4/12/00 - Payment made to Zion Web Design in the amount of $13,500. 
11. 5/9/00 - Payment made to Zion Web Design in the amount of $2750. 
12. 5/9/00 - Payment made to Zion Web Design in the amount of $19,500. 
J 
13. 6/5/00 - Payment made to Zion Web Design in the amount of $2000. 
14. 6/5/00 - Payment made to Zion Web Design in the amount of $19,500. 
15. 7/13/00 - Payment made to Zion Web Design in the amount of $10,000. 
16. 7/18/00 - Payment made to Zion Web Design in the amount of $10,500. 
17. 8/4/00 - Payment made to Zion Web Design in the amount of $17,000. 
18. 10/9/00 - Payment made to Zion Web Design in the amount of $24,750. 
19. 10/17/00 - Payment made to Zion Web Design in the amount of $2000. 
20. 11/6/00 - Payment made to Zion Web Design in the amount of $25,229.26. 
21 . 12/11/00 - Payment made to Zion Web Design in the amount of $31,500. 
22. 1/11/01 - Payment made to Zion Web Design in the amount of $30,760. 
23. 2/7/01 - Payment made to Zion Web Design in the amount of $31,500. 
24. 3/1/01 - Payment made to Zion Web Design in the amount of $33,020. 
25. 4/6/01 - Payment made to Zion Web Design in the amount of $30,300. 
26. 5/7/01 - Payment made to Zion Web Design in the amount of $24,058. 
27. 6/7/01 - Payment made to Zion Web Design in the amount of $33,510. 
28. 6/27/01 - Payment made to Zion Web Design in the amount of $500. 
29. 7/3/01 - Payment made to DM Johnson in the amount of $13,000. 
30. 8/1/01 - Payment made to Zion Web Design in the amount of $1000. 
31. 8/8/01 - Payment made to Zion Web Design in the amount of $34,875. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 12: Explain the basis for your contention that Johnson 
is limited to payments in an amount equal to 25% of the profits originating from 
intellectual lease payments resulting from the Lexington Law Firm eClient program and 
from Johnson & Associates. 
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Jam is Johnson 
HAND DELIVERED 
January 22, 199 
Dear Jamis. 
I wanted to put a couple of things in writing so that you're clear on my position. 
I have a lot on my plate right now and I really don't want to spend more of my time 
trying to work out your contingency plan. I would like you to work that out and let me 
know what your plan is when you feel ready. I'm fine with anything that meets the 
following criterium: 
1. those of us with profit share and salary commitments will continue to receive our 
sanne compensation and will continue to receive it in proportion to growth and 
revenue. 
2. that the arrangement be fully disclosed (or disclosable) to the Bar Association 
and other authorities without fear of the appearance of impropriety, 
3. that Victor Lawrence not feel shorted or "ripped off" by the arrangement, and 
4. that all current commitments to team members be honored. 
I'm glad that you've turned away from the idea of a straight buyout, as I was becoming 
increasingly uncomfortable with the figures being discussed. 
But. it reminded me how distracted I was becoming by this transition while I'm in the 
midst of several pivotal Lex projects. 
Another note: if you are in need of financial statements for whatever reason, it looks 
better if you get those through me. I really don't want myself or Trina getting the idea 
that you don't trust me enough to follow our traditional chain of authority. 
Warm regards. 
Jayson Qrvis 
November 0, 1999 
Jayson Orvis 
220 So. 200 East 
Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Ul 84111 
Re: Contract/partnership relations between Johnson and Orvis 
Dear Jayson, 
This lener ;s to outline the substance of our conversations and understanding regarding the management and 
operations of our ventures and the way forward. 
We agree mat you will continue to manage these businesses for our joint benefit. You may have "control" lo 
manage these businesses and 1 will not attempt to exercise managerial control over these endeavors. There will be 
a good faith effort on my part not to be disruptive of the day to day operations of the business and you will use 
reasonable business skill, fidelity, judgment and your best efforts in such management.. You will aid in good faith 
in making all financial, accounting and operations data freely available to me on request if! wunt to review or audit 
any such mailers. We will continue lo communicate about all aspects of the business operations as I request from 
time to time. The goal here is to leave you free to run the operations and let me be "passive". Ultimately the whole 
point b to grow the business and make it profitable for allj You correctly understood, as you sisied in our last 
meeting, that "We don't want to go backwards" in relation to income/benefits established thus far in our businesses. 
I affirm tha. However, we have decided to cease paying cell phones for all people out of these businesses 
including ourselves and our wives. I agree with lhat. 
Jn addition, such ongoing obligations that affect us and the businesses such as Tennessee litigation, attorney's fees, 
trust account management, back IRS tax withholding, Stale Consumer Division/bar issues will continue lo be paid 
attention to and dealt with economically so that all these matters and any others will ultimately be put tc bed. 
With regard to the Lexington/telemarketing portion of the business (as opposed to e-client) and with regard to 
Jade's 10% profit share from that Lexington/telemarketing portion of the business—you have acquired that interest 
yourself by paying Jade from your own resources. I assert no claim to any of Jade's interest. 
With regard fo the arrangements that wc made with the phone system a few months ago wherein you and Sam arc 
paid an extra $500 each ( until 1 believe it was November, December or January) for the guarantee on the phones 
lhat you entered into, we agreed that Sam would put this arrangement into writing. As yet* I have not received a 
written outline of this arrangemenL 1 will ask Sam lo prepare it for both of us to have in our flies. 
Also, as we discussed* it probabry is time for Johnson A Associates to have another board meeting to keep the 
proper corporate formalities. As you suggested I am glad to help gel this together, This meeting should only 
involve sinply a report on the status of J&A and any housekeeping you all feel might be necessary. The prior 
minutes should have caught everything up. J will proceed to arrange a meeting and get minutes prepared in the next 
short while. 
I think this outlines our understanding of the various issues discussed above. If you want to add anything please 
feel free to put it down in writing. I think I h^vf^oVwred mush of it. 
Thanks for your consideration!' ^slhcerely hope that J l this may resulrln business growth, exceptional mutual 
prosperity, an^ptfrtnership txanquilijvberween us I / I 
v^ ^ _^**^^ V \4«HillyyuuiK/ II I 
/ / Jam&fvi. Johnson 
cc: Victor Lawrence. I l l / 
ORV028 
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To: JAYSONORVIS 
From: Jamis ML Johnson 
Date: 1/5/00 
Re: You arc piece of dog shit 
Jayson, 
OK. Here I go. I am going to jump into the void. It ain't easy to 
exercise faith. But I shall. I appreciated our conversation 
yesterday greatly—you don't even know how much. Thank you. 
In spite of the fact that you are indeed a total piece of dog shit 
albeit a genius, I am going to leap anyway. I am coming to believe 
that you deserve the trust- Meantime, in the ongoing attempt to 
.keep.the spirit .of.whatever our_contracl is* try to get me to $45r000 
per month from the growth. That is a worthy goal. And I in the 
meantime will try to be relatively normal—not an easy task for me 
as you may know. I am going to try the faith/trust thing. Thank 
you again Jayson.. 
Regards, 
Jamis, the Faithful One 
ORV019 
To: Jayson 
From: Jamis 
Date: August 29, 2000 
Jayson, 
This memo sets forth a few issues that have come ujp in the last month or so 
that we deed to get resolution on. We last met face to face about four weeks 
ago before your trip to Alaska. 
I. We have discussed Lexington's and affiliated companies' work on a 
move to a new location. You mentioned rhat you have a cubicle there. I 
realize that your office is primarily at your home. I expressed an interest is 
having space there in the new premises as well. 1 am not sure I want a foil 
blown office or just some space set asidc.jor the use of your space. I don't 
really have a lot of energy over this but let's kick it around. I need to 
discuss this with you and with Sam as he plans the space. 
In any event, this move disrupts several key services that are in place here 
and represent considerable cost benefit to inc. Currently, our organization 
pays my rent down in my basement space. I also am currently a part of the 
Lex phone system with some shared receptioning (Kim and Teny do some 
trading off both as telephone operators and in reception.) I use our copier 
and oux faxes as well. I have mentioned to Sam briefly that since our phone 
system has remote capabilities that 1 will need an extension connected here 
at least so the phone receptioning can continue and I still hook into the 
phone system. Obviously the cost to replace these items such as phone 
system, copier leases, long distance, etc., h reduced if we just move my 
offices to the new location—though I am not sure I want to go. Otherwise, 
we need to figure out the cost of this change and I guess take it out as a cost 
2. With regard to the lease, you mentioned to me in passing In our last 
meeting that you and Sam want to receive an extra fee to yourselves for 
personally guaranteeing the lease. This is similar to the fee we negotiated 
that you both received for your securing the telephone system lease. The 
system is now paid for and that payment is finished and we own the system. 
With regard to the lease, I don't have a problem with this lease guarantee 
payment concept necessarily. I want to see what you arc proposing—the 
amount you propose that you two are paid, what is being guaranteed, the 
term of this payment, i.e. when it expires, etc. Again I don't think I have a 
problem with something reasonable. Once we have agreed on the 
ORV020 
arrangement, we need to memorialize it in writing for our records. You and 
I did this on the payment of my rental space and it was painless. Please get 
me the specifics of your proposal in the next few days. Also, I haven't seen 
ihe latest copy of the lease. I guess I can get a copy from Sam. Please get 
me the latest if you can. 
3, You have me rather excited to see the results of the new client-
fricndly-extend-the- payment efforts that Sam and Spencer Bingham have 
been working on. Profit share was down in July as you predicted because of 
the equipment expenditures, the hiring of Spencer, etc. but as we both 
know, even one extra month of client payments (based on increased client 
care and satisfaction) is extremely profitable. I have great hopes for profit 
share at the end of this month but even greater hopes for the fourth quarter of 
the year. 
ril call you on this stuff shortly and if you are in lets get together. 
J amis 
To: Jamis 
From: Jayson 
Date August 30,2000 
Jamis, 
I am struggling a little with this latest series of written 
correspondences. As you surely recall you and I have a marked 
difference of opinion as to the nature of our business relationship. 
Within your correspondences, you present as premises several 
positions with which I disagree. That makes it a little tough for me, 
as I'm forced to respond and realign those assumptions so that it 
doesn't appear that I'm acquiescing to them. As I have recorded my 
opinion of what our relationship is (and isn't) in the past, I will not 
bore you with it again. However, I would prefer that you not 
continue with written correspondence, as you have, so that I can stop 
playing anti-lawyer and go back to the business of business. 
With regards to your issues: 
1. Victor's firms are moving to a new location and I will have no 
space there whatsoever. In the spirit of "keeping the peace," I'll throw 
my weight behind whatever feels necessary and equitable to keep 
you as unaffected as possible by their move. 
2. No personal guarantee was necessary in their new lease, so this 
discussion is probably moot either way. Victor has been actively 
reviewing and negotiating the lease, and since he is the signer, I'm 
pretty confident that he's on top of it. 
3. Again, I feel awkward discussing the particulars of firm 
management with you^As-l have stated in the past, I am pleased to 
continue paying, your company as an adjunct consultant to my 
consulting services_agency. As I have also stated, I take the opinion 
that you have no control whatsoever in the management of any firms 
with which I associate. While the terms of the compensation I pay 
your company are foggy at best I believe that you nave been pleased 
with the amount of compensation afforded. I, too, feel that it has 
been reasonable and fair, faowever, Tm unwilling to hold it out that 
you hold an ownership interest in these firmsj I am sure that that 
would constitute some kind of complicity in defrauding personal 
r> / -Vv :\.;o TV>.- » \^rr • J 
creditors to whom you have represented that you draw no income 
from these organizations and that you hold no controlling interest 
1 am not pleased to have been compelled to say these things, but I'm 
feeling a little backed into a corner by the nature of the last two 
letters that you have sent me. Since I can see only more positioning 
and time-wasting brinksmanship arising as a result of this letter 
campaiga 1 again suggest that we let this be. 
Might I make a suggestion? I would suggest that we just let our 
foggy, little business relationship continue down it's foggy, little 
course. You have no reason to believe that I will stop compensating 
your company for consulting services along die lines already 
established. Attempting to fortify your position can only heat up the 
debate. I am committed to making a bigger pie for as long as is 
feasible, and that has been nothing but good for both of us. 
I'll call you right now, but, bummer that we had to talk about this 
now. 
Warmest regards, 
Jayson 
MEMORANDUM 
RE: Voice mail received by Jamis Johnson from Jayson Orvis approximately 
mid-August 2001, to the phone number 680-3333 
Hey dirt bag, this is Jayson. Hey, uh, Gavin just told me that he talked to you a 
second ago. Profit share is slow this month because we switched accounting systems, 
controllers and all that, so they are dragging it out, it looks like for a couple of days. 
Hey, if you want me to float you some funds between now and then, I don't know if 
you're tight or what, but I'd be happy to just cut you ten grand or something to tide you 
over for a couple of days. Uh, in fact, I think I owe you a little bit from last month still. 
Uh, there were some checks that we had to hold from Lexington that I think I could 
deposit now. So if you want a little bit of interest though, what's today Thursday, I 
would think, uh Wednesday, I would think we'd be done by the end of the week where 
we'd be ready to cut, but, I'm far from sure that, you know, it's really no problem if you 
want me to cut you a few bucks. Uh, if you want that, you can call me at 652-1801 or 
Gavin at 243-3325, and we'll be happy to do it. He's bringing Kim's check over this 
morning, so if you'd call in the next little while, that'd be cool. Talk to you later. 
End of message. 
F:\USERS\CMWUJohnson\vra8.2001 .wpd 
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provide for the continued representation of clients and 
of the credit law practice." Do you see that? 
A. Yes. 
Q. So by t h i s agreement you were des i r ing to 
stop a c t i n g in the c r e d i t law p r a c t i c e ; i s that r i gh t ? 
MR. MARSDEN: I ob jec t t o the form of the 
ques t ion . 
A. With regard t o , I gues s , t h i s body of claims 
that would be c o r r e c t . 
Q. Okay. Let me ask you t h i s . Mr. Johnson, 
t h i s agreement t a l k s about a n a t i o n a l c l i e n t e l e of 
c red i t law p r a c t i c e t h a t you developed under the name 
of Lexington Law Firm. Did you have a c red i t law 
p ra c t i c e o u t s i d e of t h i s c l i e n t e l e t h a t ' s being 
described in t h i s agreement? 
A. T h a t ' s a d i f f i c u l t q u e s t i o n to answer, but 
the answer would be yes . 
Q. And what was tha t? Who were those c l i e n t s or 
what was t h a t p r a c t i c e ou t s ide of t he Lexington Law 
Firm p r a c t i c e ? 
A. I t was -- i t ' s hard t o d e s c r i b e , but if you 
look in t h i s c o n t r a c t we i n d i c a t e t h a t Victor Lawrence 
wil l have no ownership of the t r a d e name Lexington Law 
Firm and t h a t would be reserved t o Jayson Orvis. 
Mr. Orvis and I had an ongoing p a r t n e r s h i p that did a 
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lot of credit repair business and what could also be 
called credit repair law. We had approached other 
counsel. We had concepts to co-counsel with others and 
so the credit law practice, the credit law business 
would still be going forward probably even using the 
name Lexington Law Firm, but with regard to the clients 
Victor Lawrence was really stepping into that 
situation. He had been one of four or five attorneys 
that I hired. So he was more or less continuing on. 
Q* Let me ask you this. Was it not correct then 
when you stated in this agreement that Johnson desires 
to discontinue credit law practice? 
MR. MARSDEN: I object to form. 
Q. Was that not a true statement? Were you 
being truthful when you stated in this agreement that 
Johnson desires to discontinue credit law practice? 
MR. MARSDEN: Objection to the form of the 
question. It's argumentative. Calls for a legal 
conclusion. 
A. I would imagine I was being truthful. 
Q. Now in this agreement you've identified a 
national clientele that had been developed under the 
name of Lexington Law Firm. Were there credit law 
clients that you continued to serve as a lawyer after 
the date of this agreement, that you didn't pass over 
13 
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A, Yes. 
Q. Tell me how that factored into your agreement 
with Victor Lawrence. 
A. Well, we had just talked to the SBA, a 
creditor holding a judgment against me. Victor had 
spoken with them. Jason had been involved in 
discussing it. They had deposed my wife. They had 
sought some documentation, I believe, from Johnson & 
Associates that had been subpoenaed. And we wanted to 
preserve our business and not be a big target for the 
SBA. I don't think we realistically thought I would be 
disbarred at that time and we knew that it would be 
going on for many years to come. 
Q. And just so I can understand, what was your 
concern with regard to the SBA that they would try to 
take over or somehow the credit repair law firm? 
A. The concern was vague and generated mostly by 
Jayson Orvis, so it's hard me to articulate exactly the 
concern, but I was willing to take the steps that we 
had discussed which would be to take Victor, who was 
already running portions of the credit law practice, 
and put him in and Jayson and I would deal with our 
ownership of assets as well in contemporaneous 
agreements. 
Q. Now you've alluded to this before. Victor 
22 
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identify them. 
A. I think I got them from you. 
Q. Tell me what those agreements are. Tell me 
how you would identify them. 
A. There's an agreement where Jayson and I agree 
to hold everything in his name for our mutual benefit. 
Q. First of all, if you would, tell me who the 
parties are to that agreement. 
A. It!s an agreement between Jayson and Jamis. 
Q. Jayson Orvis and Jamis Johnson? 
A. Right. We agreed to hold everything jointly* 
We would hold it in his name, but it's for our mutual 
benefit, all credit repair businesses. 
Q. So that agreement was that: the business --
give me the substance of that again. That Jayson would 
own the business for the mutual benefit of you both? 
MR. MARSDEN: I object. That 
mischaracterizes his testimony. 
Q. I!m not trying to mischaracterize your 
testimony. Give me again what you --
A. That agreement contemplates that all of the 
assets, intellectual property that we own jointly would 
be held in Jayson's name for our mutual benefit and 
that the payment arrangements and profit shares would 
continue and that the businesses would expand and our 
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1 A. Well, I think I just answered that, I think 
2 I said that I may have that information and at this 
3 time I don't know, 
4 Q. Okay, Do you know how Sam Spendlove acquired 
5 the software? 
6 A. I d o n ' t have s p e c i f i c knowledge of how he 
7 acquired i t . 
8 Q. And then you talked about some entities that 
9 Sam Spendlove had an interest in that you claim some 
10 interest in or ownership in. Do you know what entities 
11 Sam Spendlove owns that you claim to have some right to 
12 an interest in? 
13 A. You know, whatever my answer was last week, I 
14 mean last time, but any entities that deal with credit 
15 repair that he shares with Jayson Orvis jointly or 
16 directly or indirectly I would claim interest in. 
17 Q. And on what basis would you claim an interest 
18 in any entity that Sam Spendlove owns? 
19 A. Well, I don't know, that I can list all of the 
20 bases exhaustively and it may call for a legal 
21 conclusion, but I have a partnership agreement with 
22 Jayson Orvis that we share all the credit repair 
23 business that he does. And Sam was one of our 
24 employees and anything that he does with Jayson I would 
25 claim an interest in. 
20 
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wife's company? You don't own any interest in that 
company? 
A. No. 
Q. And did your wife ever perform services for 
Johnson & Associates? 
A. Well, it indicates here that she's on the 
board. 
Q. Other than being a member of the board, did 
your wife ever perform any services for Johnson & 
Associates? 
A. She provided some equipment, furniture, 
computers for the original company. 
Q. And was her -- was the compensation that she 
received in any way tied to services that you were 
performing for Johnson & Associates? 
A. The compensation she received or DM Johnson 
received, I'd assigned to her. So whatever I was 
negotiating would have gone to her. So whatever that 
negotiation resulted in would nonetheless have been to 
Johnson & Associates. 
Q. So there was sqme compensation that Johnson & 
Associates owed to you that ended up being paid to DM? 
A. No, I donft think that's accurate. 
Q. Then explain to me what you're talking about. 
A. From the outset of our partnership I had 
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explained that the beneficial interest of this endeavor 
would be owned by my wife or her entity and that the 
payments should go to my wife or her entity and that's 
what happened. And I have a power of attorney that I 
represented that entity and my wife in a number of 
companies, these and elsewhere. And everything that I 
would negotiate in my name nonetheless would result in 
that remuneration to that entity as our agreement would 
have been. So whenever you have money going out of 
these companies it almost always goes to an entity 
owned or controlled by DaNell Johnson. 
Q. Okay. What services did DaNell Johnson 
perform if any for Johnson & Associates? 
A. I think you asked and answered that. 
MS. ATKINSON: Yeah, that's asked and 
answered« 
Q. Other than being a trustee did you identify 
any other services that she performed? 
A. I did. 
Q. What were those? 
A. I identified the contributions she made at 
the start of the endeavor. In addition, based on my 
power of attorney and my agency relationship with that 
entity and her, what I did often were down to the 
benefit of my services and could be attributed to her. 
69 
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UTAH. NEW YORK ATTORNEY AT LAW 
AND IDAHO BAR 220 South 200 East, Suite 110 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
August 30, 2001 
Daniel L. Bennan VIA FACSIMILE & U.S. MAILS 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1250 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Re: Jayson Orvis v. Jamis M. Johnson 
Dear Dan: 
This confirms the substance of our meeting yesterday, August 29, 2001. Jayson Orvis was 
present and you also were there with an associate. You indicated! at the meeting that your firm 
had filed a complaint for declaratory relief in behalf of Jayson Orvis against me. (I have since 
been served with that complaint.) In that meeting you extended an offer of settlement to resolve 
all matters between Jayson Orvis and myself The substance of that offer as I recorded in my 
notes, is as follows: Jayson Orvis has acquired two judgments against me personally that total 
approximately $700,000. Jayson indicated that these judgments are the SBA judgment and a 
judgment held by an Arizona resident, Pamela Belding. Jayson offers to pay me between $16,000 
and $18,000 per month for a period of two years (provided the businesses don't suflfer economic 
set backs that would prevent those payments) after which time all further payments would stop. 
Also at the end of that payment period, Jayson Orvis would have the two judgments satisfied and 
they would be of no further force and affect against me. My notes do not indicate an expiration 
date for this offer, but we have scheduled to meet again in your offices at 4:00 p.m. next 
Wednesday, September 5, 2001. 
I write this letter so that we may have an accurate record of our interactions to date. If I 
have mis-stated the facts above in any way or have misunderstood the offer as presented, would 
you kindly please correct me. 
JMJ/kr 
Telephone 
(801)5300100 
Fax 
(601)530-0900 
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1 SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH - JANUARY 29, 2003 
2 HONORABLE TIMOTHY R. HANSON, JUDGE PRESIDING 
\ P R O C E E D I N G S 
4 THE COURT: Good morning. Jayson Orvir> v. Jam is 
5 Johnson; Jamir Johnson and Donnelle Johnson v. Jayson OrvLs, 
6 Sam Spendlove, Deon Schilling and Victor Lawience. Appearances 
7 please. 
H MR. KGAN: Your Honor, Sean Egan. I'm tr:om 
9 Bendinger, Crockett on behalf of Jamis Johnson. 
10 MR. ATKIN: Blake Atkin representing Victor Lawrence 
11 and Sam Spendlove, Your Honor* 
12 MS. ADAMS: Angela Adams representing the PlainliLl 
1i Jayson Orvis. 
14 THE COURT: Okay. The things we want to take up 
ll*> today, this first would be the third party defendatiLs Lawronco 
10 and Spendlove's Motion for Summary Judgment and then secondly 
17 we'll talk about some attorney's fees being sought by the 
IB plaintiff on di\ unrelated matter today. All right. Whatever 
19 happened to Schilling? Did he ever get served or make an 
20 appearance? 
21 MS. ADAMS: His name is actually Deon Steckling and 
22 he's a third party defendant. I represent him as well. 
23 THE COURT: Oh, okay. 
C4 MS. TOMSIC: Itfs S-T-E-C-K-L-I-N-G. 
2^ THE COURT: All right. Let's hear from Lawrence and 
1 
Spendlove. 
MR. ATKIN: Thank you, Your Honor. Blake Atkin, I 
represent Mr. Lawrence and Mr. Spendlove. I presume that the 
Court has read our moving papers. 
THE COURT: You presume correctly. 
MR. ATKIN: Great. I'll try not to be to repetitive. 
When I first came into this suit, Your Honor, I thought it 
would be a relatively straight forward matter. I had a copy of 
the May, 1999 agreement whereby Victor Lawrence bought this 
credit repair law practice from Mr. Johnson and that agreement 
specifically required Mr. Lawrence to continue to use the 
consulting services and paralegal services that were provided 
by Mr. Orvis and my client assured me that while he complied 
with that portion of the agreement and substantial funds were 
paid by the law firm to Mr. Orvis and his companies tor those 
services, that there wasn't any flow of money the other way and 
I thought that we would be able to that to the plaintiff's in 
this case and at least end the matter with regard to Lexington 
Law Firm and Mr. Lawrence and Mr. Spendlove. 
Talking to plaintiff's counsel, I was informed it was 
more complicated than that and so I took Mr. Johnson's 
deposition and in his deposition I attempted to lay out that it 
wasn't really more complicated than that, that we had a 
contract whereby Mr. Lawrence had purchased this law practice 
and that Mr. Lawrence had been complying with the contract and 
2 
really shouldn't be involved in this dispute that was existing 
between Mr. Johnson and Mr. Orvis. Mr. Johnson then explained 
to me than in order to understand the agreement between him 
and my client, one had to understand two other agreements that 
had been entered into contemporaneously, he called it, with 
that agreement and so I began asking him about those 
agreements. And the first of those agreements that he 
described is what I've called the backdated agreement, an 
agreement dated April, 1997 but which Mr. Johnson testified was 
actually executed in May of 1999, and quite frankly I was 
shocked about Testimony when he was asked why this backdated 
agreement had been prepared, he explained that the 3BA, the 
Small Business Administration, had a judgment against him and 
he and Mr. Orvis were trying to protect the partnership assets, 
the partnership that he now suffuses is the basis of this 
lawsuit, from the SBA and so they entered into this agreement 
to make it appear that all of those partnership assets belonged 
to Mr. Orvis and not to Mr. Orvis and Mr. Johnson. 
He described an elaborate fraudulent scheme where 
they intentionally used different computers, different 
typewriters, to prepare these different agreements to make it 
look like Lhey had been prepared upon the dates that they bore 
rather than being a part of this scheme. And then he talked 
about the secret agreement that he had with Mr. Orvis in which 
they basically agreed that the backdated agreement didn't 
3 
acL,ur.4tely reflect their relationship, but that they had an 
ongoing partnership relationship with each other and that 
secret agreement by its own terms says that they'ie noL going 
to disclose it to anybody else and I asked him if he had 
disclosed that to anyone else and he said no, that was 
something simply between me and Mr, Orvis. 
Then I wanted to make the record clear what we were 
looking at here and I asked Mr. Johnson, was this backdated 
agreement designed to defraud your creditors or did it 
accurately reflect the facts as they existed in April of 1997? 
And Mr. Johnson gave an answer to that. He said it did not 
reflect the facts as they existed in April of 1997, and he said 
that it had also been created for the purpose of providing a 
continuum. 
Now T didn't understand at first what he meant by-
providing this continuum so I continued to question him about 
that and he explained the continuum in this way, explained that 
in April of 1997 what had actually existed was a group oi" 
people working together to provide these credit repair and 
Jegal services chat included him and Mr. Orvis, and a Mr. Page 
and a Mr. Hollingshead and a Mr. Chandler and of that group, 
only Mr. Johnson was a lawyer, the rest of them were not 
lawyers, and so they entered into this backdated agreement. 
But Mr. Johnson in addition to having the SBA chase him as a 
creditor, Mr. Johnson had some problems with the Utah State 
4 
1 Ba r. 
2 THE COURT: I know about those. 
3 MR. ATKIN: And so he was concerned about having Lo-
4 THE COURT: Unless there's more than one. I know 
5 about the one that he got disbarred for. 
(3 MR. ATKIN: Right. And so he was looking for someone 
7 to take over the credit repair law firm and so with the law 
8 practice being so combined with these non-lawyers, there were 
9 issues about illegal practice of law or illegal, inappropriate 
10 fees with non-lawyers, and so another purpose of this backdated 
11 agreement was to make it appear that the Lexington law firm 
\2 that Victor Lawrence would be buying was a separate entity and 
13 not part of this partnership arrangement with these non-
14 lawyers. And so that was what he was trying to accomplish Ln 
lb that regard. 
16 So, his testimony, specifically, in a sussinct way he 
17 was asked, "So the reason this was backdated to April of 1997 
lo wets in connection with your concerns with the SBA?" 
19 Answer: "That's not accurate actually." 
20 "Okay, why was it backdated to April, 1997?" 
21 "One reason was the SBA." 
,?2 "Okay." 
23 "The other reason was that it would difficult to have 
21 an agreement where I conveyed to Victor Lawrence the Lexinqton 
2b Law Firm and we have all sorts of agreements out there where 
Jayson and I and John Hollingshead and Steve Page and Men iLI 
Chandler are all running this operation together so we wanted 
3 something that would be viewed as a continuum," 
4 So that's what he meant by this continuum. He wanted 
5 to create an appearance that Lexington Law Firm had been a 
0 separate entity since at least 1994 so that he could not only 
7 prevent the bar thuL was already concerned about him from 
b learning that he might have been involved with the illegal 
9 practice of law or illegal splitting of fees with non-lawyers, 
in but it would also be difficult to try to attract a lawyer to 
LI take over that law practice if it had this unsavory past. So 
LI- this backdated agreement was not only designed to defraud his 
13 creditor, it was also designed to defraud the Utah State Bar 
J 4 aiM I'm not sure if Victor Lawrence was a specific target o! 
15 that fraud or if he was just a dupe of that fraud, but in any 
lb event, Mr. Lawrence entered into this May 1999 agreement 
17 understanding that he was buying a law practice that was 
18 separate from this other partnership entity that was being run 
19 by Jayson Orvis. 
20 THE COURT: Did he have any knowledge of these two 
21 agreements, this backdated agreement or this secret agreement? 
22 MR. ATKIN: Not the backdated agreement, Your Honor. 
23 Mr. Johnson's testimony was that that was between him and Mr. 
24 Orvis and he had not disclosed it to anyone. 
THE COURT: How about the other one? 
MR. ATKIN: Mr. Lawrence was - I'm not sure it he was 
specifically aware of the backdated agreement, but he was aware 
ol: the continuum idea he was being told and the agreement Mr. 
Lawrence entered into, the May 1999 agreement, describes 
Lexington Law Firm as a separate entity and then Mr. Lawrence 
also entered into an agreement with Mr. Orvis to contract lor 
these management services, paralegal services that was, fox aJl 
Intensive purposes a mirror image of the backdated April 19, 
*97 agreement. And so he was certainly aware of the continuum 
concept that they had created and the representation of the 
relationship between those parties. 
Now, Mr. Johnson comes into this Court and wants to 
repudiate the April 1997 agreement and say "No, it doesn't 
accurately reflect the facts as they existed. You know, I have 
an ongoing partnership with Mr. Orvis that has continued since 
1994 and Mr. Lawrence, you know, you're not entitled to rely 
upon that agreement that made the Lexington Law Firm separate 
fiom the Orvis entities, so now, you know, you have to deaJ 
wil.li the tact that I'm claiming to be a partner with Jayson 
Orvis, this is a partnership that included the Lexington Law 
Firm back through the past. 
Mr. Lawrence is entitled to receive what was 
represented to him in this May 1999 agreement that he enteied 
into. He's entitled to rely upon this continuum that had been 
ciuated by Mr. Johnson in the 1997 agreement. He's entitled to 
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that not onJy to avoid having to continue with this litigation 
and receive a summary judgment in this case but he's also 
entitled to that because of the problems that it might create 
tor him with the Utah State Bar is he's now saddled with at 
least two non-lawyers who claim to be his partners, Mr. Orvis 
who is not a lawyer and Mr. Johnson who is no longer a lawyer. 
And there are a number of legal theories that support Mr. 
Lawrence's request that this Court grant him judgmunt and a J low 
him to continue on practicing law and serving his clients as he 
contracted to do in this May 1999 agreement. 
The first legal theory that we've asserted is fraud. 
It's an old concept in the law but we believe still a valid 
concept in the law in this state and that is the law, when the 
law finds people who have entered into illegal contracts, it. 
will leave those people where it finds them, that the Court 
won't allow someone to come into court and try to change their 
position from the position that they've taken in an illegal 
contract. The backdated, 1997 agreement, was an illegal 
contract witli regard both to the SBA, with regard to the Utah 
State Bar and with regard zo Mr. Lawrence. If the Court were 
to allow Mr. Johnson to repudiate that backdated agreement by 
reference to the secret agreement that he didn't disclose lo 
anybody or even by saying, my claims are based on an agreement 
that started in 1994 and not affected by that '97 agreement, 
then the SBA becomes a subject of his fraud and the Utah :Jtalo 
Bar would be and Mr. Lawrence would be -
THE COURT: It sounds like the SBA has already been 
defrauded. 
MR. ATKIN: They have been, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Has the U.S. Attorney heard about ail 
this? 
MR. ATKIN: The lawyer from the SBA, I've talked with 
him about it. 
THE COURT: Somebody ought to be looking into it. If 
there's any substance to it, it's serious business. 
MR. ATKIN: It is very serious business, Your Honor, 
and that brings me to the next theory that we would rely on Lo 
prevent Mr. Johnson from being able to recover ftom this case, 
fiorn my clients and that is estoppel and this is even more 
serious than the fraud argument, Your Honor, and that is, I'd 
like first of all to talk about judicial estoppel. As the 
Court has some genuine concerns about what Mr. Johnson is 
trying to do in this case, judicial estoppel as our Supreme 
Court has said, prevents a party from seeking judicial relief 
by offering statements inconsistent with its own sworn 
statements in a prior judicial proceeding. Then the Court went 
on to explain the purpose of judicial estoppel. The purpose of 
judicial estoppel is to uphold the sanctity of oaths, thereby 
safeguarding the integrity of the judicial process from conduct 
such as knowiiKj misrepresentations or fraud on the court. 
1 Now, in supplemental proceedings in that SBA action 
2 where the SBA was attempting to collect from Mr. Johnson, he 
3 was asked this question, "Do you have any interest in any 
4 partnerships," Answer, "No." He went on to elaborate. He 
5 said, "You know, often I'll have a joint endeavor with somebody 
6 but I don't have a partnership or set up a partnership or an 
7 LLC, you know. If I get a deal I say, Hey, do you want to do 
8 this deal together? We'11 go up to Summit County and buy a 
9 lot." Question, "So a joint venture." Answer, "Yeah, you can 
10 call it that but I don't have any ongoing partnerships." 
11 Now, that supplemental proceeding was taken on 
12 November the 18 ', 1999. Mr. Johnson, according to the court 
13 reporter's certificate that Jamis M. Johnson was by me before 
14 examination duly sworn to testify to the truth, the whole truth 
15 and nothing but the truth in said cause. That was November 18, 
16 1999. 
17 Now in this case, in response to our Summary Judgment 
18 Motion, he comes into Court saying I'm making my claims based 
19 on a partnership that existed in the beginning of 1994 and so 
20 we'd ask, where was this partnership when he was under oath to 
21 tell the SBA the truth? Where was this partnership on November 
22 18, 1999 when he swore under oath that he had no ongoing 
23 partnerships? I hope I don't live long enough to see the day 
24 when someone can, under oath, make an answer to that kind of a 
25 question and say I don't have any ongoing partnerships and then 
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come into this Court and on the basis of what would have to be 
perjured testimony, try to establish that he does have. 
THE COURT: Well, one of them (inaudible) perjured, 
that's for sure. 
MR. ATKIN: Yeah. So on the basis of whether you 
call it judicial estoppel or whether you call it equitable 
estoppel or whether you just term it the Court's inherent 
discretion to not allow people to assert claims that are 
diametrically opposed to testimony they gave under oath to toll 
the truth, the Court should grant us summary judgment. 
I'd be happy to answer any questions. 
THE COURT: No. 
MR. ATKIN: Thank you Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Explain to me how Mr. Spendlove all 1 Its 
into this. 
MR. ATKIN: Mr. Spendlove is an employee of Lexington 
Law Firm. He also has businesses in which he provides similar 
services to Lexington Law Firm, consulting services. 
THE COURT: Similar to Mr. Orvis? 
MR. ATKIN: Similar to Mr. Orvis's services. 
THE COURT: Okay. And the claim is he's involved in 
this conspiracy as well as I understand it? 
MR. ATKIN: There is that claim but again, Your 
Honor, all of those claims go back to a conspiracy to divert 
assets from <i partnership that Mr. Johnson claims he's a part 
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1 of which he disavowed in the backdated agreement in which he 
2 disavowed in his sworn testimony to the SBA and that's the 
3 basis under which we think summary judgment should be also be 
4 granted for Mr. Spendlove. 
5 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. 
6 MR. ATKIN: Thank you. 
7 THE COURT: Mr. Egan? 
8 MR. EGAN: Thank you, Judge. We appreciate the Court; 
9 making time for us. I think at the outset, I know the Court 
10 has read the papers and I am content, Your Honor, to rely on 
11 the briefing lo identify disputed facts and point out the 
12 pertinent controlling authority which I think makes summary 
13 judgment inappropriate. But I did want to raise a couple ot: 
14 points particularly in response to some of the remarks Mr. 
15 Atkin has made. The Johnson's claims in this case are based on 
16 an oral agreement, a long standing course of conduct and a 
17 number of agreements, not simply those that Mr. Atkin has 
18 identified and I think it's important with respect to the 
19 remarks made about the SBA to try to differentiate and unravel 
20 as best we can, the nature of the Johnson interests. The 
21 checks that Jayson Orvis wrote were actually written to 
22 Donnelle Johnson or to entities controlled by Donnelle Johnson. 
23 Jamis Johnson has had a long standing relationship with his 
24 wife whereby he acts as a power of attorney for her and so 
25 there has been some imprecision perhaps created in part by our 
own pleadings and certainly by the pleadings and remarks of 
others, confuting Jamis Johnson with Donnelle Johnson with 
respect to who owns what. But for purpose of this case and 
what we're trying to assert here, it's an interest that's owned 
beneficially by Donnelle Johnson although it's true that Jamis 
Johnson has been involved in representing that interest and 
interacting in. that interest and so there may be some 
imprecision with that. 
THE COURT: Wait a minute. Are these Donnelle 
Johnson's claims or Jamis Johnson's claims in this third party 
complaint? 
MR. EGAN: I think they're both but with respect to 
the existence of an interest in the Orvis entities, it is 
Donnelle Johnson who has received money and has received checks 
from Jayson Orvis in recognition of the interest and I think 
that's an important distinction to make. 
THE COURT: How does she become a third party? I 
assume Donnelle Johnson is -
MR. EGAN: Because I think, Your Honor, and 1 
apologize, I don't mean to duck your question, I'm a late comer 
to the case, but I think the case came about because there was 
a declaratory judgment filed by Jayson Orvis to say that Jamis 
had no partnership interest with Jayson Orvis and we have 
responded by saying Donnelle and Jamis have interests that 
spread across, but with respect as to who actually had the 
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1 partnership interest with Jayson Orvis, it was Donnelle but 
2 Donnelle is represented and has given power of attorney to 
3 Jamis and I think that is an important point to bear in mind. 
4 THE COURT: That doesn't solve the question, how does 
5 she become a third party plaintiff if she's not a defendant to 
6 start with? 
7 MR. EGAN: Well, I think because she's instituting a 
8 separate action by way of the counterclaim. I mean, I see your 
9 point, Your Honor, and I'm not sure how to remedy it at this 
10 stage. 
11 THE COURT: She's an improper party. It's as simple 
12 as that. If she wasn't named as a defendant, she can't assert 
13 a third party complaint and she cannot assert a counterclaim. 
14 If she becomes a defendant, then she can but no one has sued 
15 tier, have they? 
16 MR. EGAN: No, I don't believe anyone has sued her. 
17 THE COURT: Then she ought not to be in this lawsuit. 
18 MR. EGAN: Well, that may be the subject of an 
19 appropriate pleading either for me to amend and get her in 
20 properly or on the part of Jayson Orvis and Spendlove, Victor 
21 Lawrence's interests to get her out but we're here now and a 
22 number of important points have been raised so I think we ought 
23 to proceed. 
24 THE COURT: Just because everybody has done it the 
2b wrong way, doesn't mean that I'm going to just go along with 
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1 it. 
2 MR. EGAN: No, and I wasn't suggesting that you 
3 should, Your Honor. I think you've made an important 
4 observation that's passed us all. 
b THE COURT: That's one of the first things that 
6 iumpeu out to me. 1 don't know how anybody could have missed 
7 that, but, that all aside, proceed. 
8 MR. EGAN: It's important, Your Honor, to make clear 
9 that as I said a moment ago, the Johnsons are not attempting -
10 or the Johnsons are pursuing an interest based on far more that 
11 the agreements that Mr. Atkin has identified. The Johnsons are 
1/! not attempting to recover from Victor Lawrence or Sam Spendlove 
13 or the Lexington Law Firm based on any of these agreements. 
14 They're not claiming that Victor Lawrence or Sam Spendlove are 
15 partners with them. What the Johnsons are claiming is thai 
16 Victor Lawrence and Sam Spendlove are part of a scheme to 
1 7 deprive the Johnsons of their beneficial interest in the 
16 partnership arrangement they have with Jayson Oivis and thai 
19 there's been conduct that Mr. Spendlove and Mr. Lawrence have 
20 been involved in or have abetted in some fashion which we're 
?1 still trying to work out a way through the discovery process to 
J?- assist Mr. Or vis in his efforts to deprive Mr. Johnson of his 
:"! :> interests. 
?\ THE COURT: I thought Mr. Johnson told the bBA under 
,'b oath that he didn't have a partnership interest? 
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1 MR. EGAN: No. What he said - he doesn't but this 
2 yets back to the distinction between Donnelle Johnson and Jamis 
3 Johnson. 
4 Now, with respect to the SBA testimony, Judge, 1 
5 think that obviously the quoted testimony is there. I could 
6 not come before the Court and tell you that I have a full 
7 understanding of what is proper asset shielding and improper 
8 asset hiding. I know that Mr. Johnson was attempting to manage 
9 his attairs with the SBA to his advantage, whether in that 
10 testimony he cuts it too close, is too cute or is attirmatively 
11 misleading the SBA, I quite frankly believe is an issue for the 
12 jury to decide after all of the evidence is in about what was 
13 said to the SBA and what they're doing with Jamis Johnson and 
14 what they were doing with Donnelle Johnson. I think it's 
lb interesting to note and it's of great concern to us, that at 
16 some point during Mi. Johnson's involvement with the SBA he was 
17 represented by Victor Lawrence. At some point during her 
18 involvement with the SBA, Donnelle Johnson was represented by 
19 Victor Lawrence. 
20 THE COURT: Did Victor Lawrence tell them to lie to 
21 the examiner under oath in the SBA supp order? 
22 MR. EGAN: No, I don't think he did that. 
23 THE COURT: I'm sure he didn't. 
24 MR. EGAN: I'm sure that's true, Judge. 
2b THE COURT: Then why do you tell me alL that? 
16 
1 MR. EGAN: I'm telling you that because I think that 
2 it's far more complicated than Mr. Atkin is making it appear 
3 and that's— 
4 THE COURT: I understand your claim. You say you7 re 
5 not basing anything on any of these agreements and so 
6 therefore, you've got some type of an oral deal here based on 
7 course of conduct that's a big conspiracy that takes your 
•8 client's interest that is not the subject of a writing, 
9 basically, isn't that it? 
10 MR. EGAN: Well, there are additional writings but 
11 the bottom line is the course of conduct and the oral 
12 understandings of the parties entered into over the course of 
13 many years, that's true. The reason I'm raising these points, 
14 and the additional point that the SBA sold their judgments to 
15 Jayson Orvis or an Orvis controlled entity, is to suggest to 
16 you that it's not nearly as clean or not nearly as black and 
17 white as Mr. Atkin has presented to you and I think that what 
18 went on in front of the SBA to the extent that it's pertinent 
19 to these claims, is a matter for the jury to decide that you're 
20 being asked to come in and make credibility determinations and 
21 make factual determinations with a record that is not, in my 
22 judgment, complete about what the SBA was told. One of the 
23 things I can tell you, Your Honor, it's my understanding the 
?A SBA had full access to Mr. Johnson's finances, full access to 
25 his documentation and nothing was held back but we're isolating 
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on this testimony as a sign and literally prooE that there was 
some elaborate scheme to defraud the SBA. I don't think that 
the evidence will support that and that's what I'm suggesting 
about not rushing to judgirent about what Mr. Johnson was saying 
to the SBA and not allowing it to serve as the basis foL a 
summary judgment here, 
I think Mr. Atkin did not - Mr. Atkin summarized the 
testimony. He only read a little bit of it. He only included 
a little bit more in his briefing papers, but I think the 
inference - they don't say what Mr. Atkin says they do. He has 
summarized it. He may be able to convince a jury of that, but 
1 think that for summary judgment purposes under Rule 56, Mr. 
Johnson and Mrs. Johnson are entitled to favorable inferences 
about what than testimony meant, what the significance of it 
is. 
THE COURT: Well, have they come forward with 
affidavits to explain what their testimony is in this cas^, to 
explain why they made what appears to be a false representation 
- Mr. Johnson? 
MR. EGAN: They have not come forward with testimony/ 
Your Honor, because I don't think the way the issue was fr-imcd, 
J don't think the way the issue was framed, allows or makes 
that necessary and also the testimony itself doesn't support 
that. You've reached the conclusion that Mr. Atkin wants you 
to reach in your question to me which is, this is traud and I'm 
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suggesting to you that — 
THE COURT: Well, you know, I don't even care if it's 
fraud. Just u flat lie is bad enough for me, particularly from 
someone who used to be a lawyer. 
MR. EGAN: Well, again, Your Honor, the factual 
loundation for that remark has not been laid out by anybody. 
I'm attempting to provide some information and lay out some 
foundation for the Court but if Mr. Spendlove and Mr- Lawrence 
are mis-perceiving the claims, suddenly this issue of what was 
said to the SBA becomes the tail that wags the dog and I'm 
suggesting to the Court that that's not accurate. 
THE COURT: Well, tell me what you're basing your 
claim on. Tell me about all this course of conduct and all 
these other documents that supports this claim. 
MR. EGAN: The course of conduct is ail understanding 
between Jayson Orvis and Jamis Johnson that Jayson Orvis would 
pay money to Donnelle Johnson based upon a preexisting 
established relationship between Jamis Johnson and his wite and 
checks were cut routinely for several months. But as the 
business grew — 
THE COURT: Okay. Let me ask you before you move on, 
who was doing this work that Mr. Orvis was paying for, Mr. 
Johnson or Mrs. Johnson? 
MR. EGAN: I think it was more in the form oi: - at 
first, Mr. Johnson was doing work as part of the partnership, 
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as part of the arrangement. As time progressed, Mr. Johnson 
became more ot a passive investor because of his own issues and 
so it WdSn'L consideration necessarily for work done, it was 
payment for an interest in the business entities that Jayson 
Urvis -
THE: COURT: Did he assign this partnership interest 
that was created by his relationship with Mr. Orvis to his wife 
and then he became her attorney in fact — 
MR. EGAN: I don't think that's quite what happened, 
Your Honor. I think what happened is that any entity that Mr. 
Johnson was involved in long before his involvement or his 
disciplinary problems with the Bar, long before the SBA, Mr. 
Johnson routinely, when he would set up or get involved in a 
business interest, would have his wife be the beneficial owner 
of the interest. 
MR. JOHNSON: She sat on the boards as well, iiedn. 
MR. EGAN: Yeah and Mr. Johnson is reminding me that 
Mrs. Johnson sat on the Board of the various entities, not 
simple these credit repair entities. I know, for example, that 
Mr. Jolmson had, or Mrs. Johnson was on the Board of a hospital 
that Mr. Johnson was involved in Louisiana — 
THE COURT: The whole thing smells. 
MR. EGAN: Well, no one is coming into this courtroom 
completely clean, Judge. 
THE COURT: No, they're not. 
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MR. EGAN: I have no problem conceding that. 
THE COURT: There's the degree ot odor but it's not. 
looking too good foi Mr. Johnson. 
MR. EGAN: Well, I understand what you're saying, 
Your Honor, but I'm also urging the Court to place Mr. 
Johnson's position in the context of Rule 56 and who gets to 
decide whether it stinks and if so, from whose side of the 
fence the odor is emanating most from. That's, 1 think, very 
important. I share Your Honor's concerns. I understand them 
but I'm also suggesting that in businesses of this sort as in 
many other commercial transactions, there's a lot of stutl. 
that's going on and the best way to approach this is to allow 
the litigation process to run its course so that we can tind 
out what happened, so that a jury can decide whose telling the 
truth here and whose not, so that there can be a full 
explication of the facts and not simply some cherry picked 
testimony that looks bad right now and, Your Honor, I'm not 
trying to run away from it. It says so right there. It's \ 
troublesome bit of testimony. But what is its significance? 
What did Jamis Johnson mean? What was going on in other 
portions of those SBA proceedings? Why is Jaysoa Orvis buying 
the judgments and then calling Mr. Johnson up to the Berman 
otfice and being presented with them as a threat to resign any 
interest in a partnership? Why did he do that? We're not the 
only people that have mud on our shoes. 
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THE COURT: I don't know about Mr. OrvLs. I'm 
concerned about Mr. Spendlove and Mr. Lawrence. 
MR. EGAN: And I understand that, Your Honor, but 
what I'm suggesting to you is, what is troubling the Court is 
best resolved by allowing the case to proceed forward and then 
by truncating it or preempting it based on a summary judgment 
motion for which I'm not sure they even having standing to 
raise as to some of these agreements. That's all I'm 
suggesting to Your Honor. I'm not trying to suggest to you 
that this is a rose. It's not a rose, but there is more going 
on here and there are explanations that a lot of people have to 
give and not simply Mr. Johnson and there will be a time and 
place for that and I'm suggesting respectfully, Your Honor, 
that the time and the place for that is at a trial and not. in a 
summary proceeding. 
The bottom line of the case, Your Honor, is there's 
an effort on the part of Jayson Orvis with the assistance of 
Victor Lawrence and Sam Spendlove to deprive Mr. and Mrs. 
Johnson of their interests in the Jayson Orvis entities. 
THE COURT: Tell me exactly what Mr. Lawrence did 
upon which you base your claim, this conspiracy he had with Mr. 
Orvis and Mr. Spendlove to beat whoever owned this, Mr. Johnson 
or Mrs. Johnson, out of their interest, assuming they had one? 
MR. EGAN: Let me answer this two ways. First, if we 
refer to the brief and the specific facts, facts 23, 24 and 2'J 
sets out the detail of the claims against Mr. Spendlove and Mr. 
Lawrence. But generally speaking, Your Honor, we believe that 
Mr. Spendlove was advising Mr. Orvis and assisting Mr. Orvis 
with the strategy of in part, purchasing SBA judgments to use 
the SBA judgments against Jamis Johnson to obtain leverage over 
Mr. Johnson to renounce any interest that he or his wile had in 
the Jayson Orvis entities and there was a meeting prior to the 
tiling of suit at Mr. Berman's office where Mr. Johnson was 
presented with all this and was basically told to renounce your 
interests or we're going to sue you, we're going to chase you 
down. That's the primary claim that we have against Mr. 
Lawrence. There hasn't been discovery taken of Mr. Lawrence. 
We got dropped several boxes right on the eve of having them 
respond to the motion and I would suggest that more time would 
be useful to develop further theories. 
I know that these are serious allegations being made 
against Mr. Spendlove and Mr. Lawrence. I'm trying very hard 
not to come here waving my arms about it because I understand 
that reputations are important but I also want to proceed with 
caution and say let me take some discovery. Let me depose Mr. 
Lawrence. Let me depose Mr. Spendlove. 
THE COURT: Where is your Rule 56F request? 
MR. EGAN: Because the motion is predicated as a 
motion based on law and it's not really a question of tact 
necessarily. 
2 3 
1 THE COURT: You don't need to take anybody's 
2 deposition to respond to this motion. 
3 MR. EGAN: That's right, but I'm also-
4. THE COURT: Then why are you telling me we need to 
b discover more facts? 
p MR- EGAN: Because you've asked me some additional 
7 questions about what else is going on. 1 think what I've tried 
b to do is point out the conduct of Mr. Spendlove and Mr. 
9 Lawrence as identified in the brief and you've said what did 
10 they do? It's there. That's where it is and then more 
11 generally our approach is to explore his relationship with 
12 Jayson Orvis as it relates to getting the Johnson's interests 
13 extinguished. 
14 THE COURT: All right. 
15 MR. EGAN: Thank you, Judge, 
16 THE COURT: All right, thank you, 
17 Mr. Atkin? 
18 MR. ATKIN: Your Honor, today is the first Lime tluiL 
ly I've heard any attempt to articulate that Donnelle Johnson's 
20 interests somehow is different from that of Mr. Johnson and 
21 with regard to the explanation that has been attempted tor the 
22 testimony that was given to the SBA, not only do T point out in 
23 our reply brief, that if there was an explanation, it's in 
24 response to a summary judgment motion that they need to give 
25 that explanation, not by counsel making statements that aren't 
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1 under oath but through admissible evidence, explaining what 
that testimony meant if it meant something different. Ii there 
3 was going to be this argument that Donnelle Johnson was the 
4 owner of the partnership interest, that should have been set 
5 out but that wasn't set out and, in fact, the testimony ol Mr. 
b Johnson in his deposition, precludes that kind of an argument. 
7 Had that been made, we would have pointed the Court to this 
y testimony which is in fact in our reply memorandum but was put 
9 in for a different reason, but the Court will see the obvious 
JO relevance of it. 
11 And the question was asked, "And was this agreement 
\2 in May of 1999 between you and Victor Lawrence, was that part 
13 ot your contingent plans for your preparations in the event 
.14 that you were disbarred?" 
I1.) Answer, "That may have been part of it. There were 
lb other considerations." 
17 Question, "What were the other considerations?" 
18 And then he gives this answer, "Jayson Orvis and I, 
1 V» we had this credit repair business and we wanted to protect it 
1!0 irom creditors as well." 
;:'l No mention of Donnelle Johnson or her being involved 
1!!! in it. But his testimony in recent deposition, setting out 
I! 5 that these agreements were entered into for the purpose ot 
1'4 defrauding the SBA. They wanted to protect this business trom 
2!3 creditors as well. "You wanted to protect the credit repair 
;!b 
I business from creditors?'' Answer, "Yes. We wanted to piuserve 
J our business and not be a big target for the SBA." And so, not 
i only has there been no attempt to try to explain that testimony 
^ to the SBA in a way that would take it outside the realm of 
1) fraud, but the evidence that he has given makes it clear that 
b there was that testimony for the purpose of defrauding tho SBA 
7 and judicial estoppel. 
8 THE COURT: Let me cut to the chase here. Evon 
9 assuming that I was convinced that your theory that fraudulent 
10 contracts can't be relied upon by Johnson or Johnsons or 
11 wnoever owns Lhe interest, or that estoppel does not apply for 
12 statements made under oath that are contrary to what Liu; 
15 assertions are here, if the allegation is that the Johnsons 
14 claims are based upon a long standing course ot conduct and 
ll_> oral agreements that don't have anything to do with these 
lh written agreements, then how do I grant a summary judgment? 
17 MR. ATKIN: On the basis of judicial estoppel, Your 
18 Honor. 
19 THE COURT: But judicial estoppel only implies to Lhe 
20 basis of the contract, that he didn't have a partnership 
111 agreement. I suppose - I understand what you're sayinq. 
Z'J. MR- ATKIN: If he didn't have a partnership 
;:3 agreement, if he's precluded from relying on a claim that he 
:i'i had a partnership with Jayson Orvis, then-
.; > THE COURT: Well, what if Mrs. Johnson owned this 
2 b 
interest? 
MR. ATKIN: Well, Your Honor, again, there's no 
evidence of that and Mr. Johnson's testimony in his deposition 
is exactly to the contrary. "Jayson Orvis and I, we had this 
credit repair business and we wanted to protect it trom 
creditors as well." Throughout all the briefing, there's been 
no suggestion that it was Donnelle Johnson's interest. The 
argument has been that it was Jamis Johnson's interest and to 
bring that kind of thing up at this point without evidence, 
just by unsworn statements of counsel, doesn't comply with Rule 
56* We're entitled to not be ambushed by that kind oi thing 
without evidence. 
THE COURT: Okay. Anything else? 
MR. ATKIN: Only Your Honor, I'd like to comment, 1 
sat patiently while there were suggestions made that there was 
some kind of odor, some kind of improper conduct by the other 
parties in this lawsuit. There is no evidence of any improper 
conduct by Mr. Lawrence of Mr. Spendlove and I just wanted to 
aidke that clear on the record. 
THE COURT: Well, there's a suggestion that at least 
Mr. Spendlove - there's been some question on Mr. Spendlove but 
nobody has said anything about Mr. Lawrence but the question, 
when I asked about what did Mr. Spendlove do to engage in this 
conspiracy, there was that he encouraged Mr. Orvis to buy these 
things with SBA and then use that against Mr. Johnson to divest 
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him and I guess now his wife from the interest thai t.hcy had in 
this properly. What about that? Is there any support for that 
in the record? 
MR. ATKIN: Again, that needs to be based on evidence 
and not just unsworn statements by counsel. Your Honor, I'm 
not sure that there would be anything improper in a person 
buying a judgment and then using that to negotiate the 
settlement of a civil lawsuit. I'm unaware of any law that 
would suggest that that's illegal or improper. 
THE COURT: Has Mr. Spendlove's deposition been 
taken? 
MR. ATKIN: It has not. 
THE COURT 
MR. ATKIN 
THE COURT 
MR. ATKIN 
Has Mr. Lawrence's deposition been taken? 
It has not. 
Has Mr. Orvis's deposition been taken? 
It has not, Your Honor. There's been 
ample time to do that and, in fact, we produced documents way-
back in October that would have shown them that we haven't 
received any monies from Mr. Orvis but the money has been going 
Lhe other direction and they simply haven't come over and 
looked at those documents even after we got them ready for 
them. 
THE COURT: Okay, Anything else? 
MR. ATKIN: That's all, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Thank you. I'll think about the matter. 
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1 I'll take the matter under advisement- I may revisit the 
2 briefs. It's been a couple of week since I looked at them and 
3 made my notes. 
4 Let's turn briefly to the issue about fees on Lhis 
5 matter. I suppose this is directed to Ms. Adams. 
6 Ms. Adams, I believe there was an order that 1 issued 
7 granting a protective order regarding certain conduct oi a John 
8 Bogart, Mr. Johnson's attorney in a deposition that somebody 
9 else was being deposed. I indicated tees would be appropriate 
10 and asked for an attorney fee affidavit. I got your affidavit 
11 and I realize there was no objection to it and perhaps that 
12 should have been enough but my concern is that the amount of 
13 the fees requested were somewhere around $9,000 and I'm having 
14 trouble understanding how we get $9,000 worth of fees for 
15 having to file a Motion for Protective Order and having to 
16 retake a deposition. 
17 MS. ADAMS: I was under the impression from the 
IB order, maybe this was a mistaken impression that I'll have to 
19 remedy in a new affidavit, but I was under the impression that 
20 the order granted attorney's fees on the taking of the 
21 deposition, the preparing of the motion and the preparing for 
22 the first deposition. 
23 THE COURT: I'm sure it did. I've got it right here 
24 and we can see what the minute entry says. 
25 MS. ADAMS: I brought with me so that you could take 
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1 a look at them if you wanted. 
I THE :OURT: I don't need it. Let me just read with 1 
3 suid here. I know it was lather broad because 1 was rat hot 
4 upset with - \\--s, here is the minute entry of November h. 
5 Preparation tor Mr. Vigil's deposition, attendance at 
6 deposition and preparation for the motions. And that's what 
/ \ou've included in your affidavit? 
S MiJ. ADAMS: Yes. If you'd like to see I bi ought I he 
9 statements that were sent to Mr. Orvis. I didn't provide them 
10 wiin my affidavit because they're obviously attorney/client and 
II work product issues but I highlighted them for you so you could 
12 I O O K and see wnere the expenses went. 
13 THE COURT: Weil, but just give me a repnesentatio n 
14 here today as an officer of this Court that you've already done 
15 your aftidavit, but I just want to be clear that all this time 
16 was necessary. 
1"? MS. ADAMS: All this time was necessary. The bulk ol 
18 the beginning, you'll see in the affidavit I'm sure you've got 
1^ a copy of that, the hours that were spent in prepaialion lor 
. 0 the deposition, the bulk of the timer at that time 1 had no 
.1 knowledge oi Low Mr. Vigil was involved in this situation at 
IV ail, but as it turns out he was an employee who knew both the 
Zs ueiendcmt and the plaintilf and the third party detendants 
24 quite well, both personally and professionally and was involved 
. •» in the business during the process, during trie time period, 
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during the relevant time period while all of this was gojng on 
so J^ysvn and I, Mr. Orvis and I spent the first two listings -
the iirst two listings on there are meetings between he and I 
where he was just listing to me all of the meeting he had with 
Mr. Vigil that he could recall and all the interactions with he 
and Mr. Vigil and Mr. Johnson and the then the bulk of the rest 
of that time in the preparation was me going through, re-
reading the transcripts of the recording of our conversations 
and then calling him and asking him further followup questions 
on all of that and all of it was necessary to prepare for the 
deposition. I, in fact, only spent about, I believe an hour 
and a half, two hours, questioning Mr. Vigil, but I believe 
I've got another day or two full of questions to ask him when 
we reconvene that deposition. He's pretty well involved as far 
as I can tell in a lot of what went on between - in the 
interactions between these parties and in working with 
Lexington Law Firm for a brief period of time and so he's got 
quite a bit of information that needs to be looked at very 
seriously. The time of the deposition obviously was necessary 
and then there's two listing on there after that where 1 was 
preparing the motion and that's simply a case of going back 
through. I re-read the deposition two or three times I believe 
to make sure that we had all of the pertinent, important, pieces 
of the record in that motion and then also doing the research 
tor that, the legal research on the cases and things iii\<\ then 
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putting that together and then the last couple ot entries on 
that are just going through and revising that and making sure 
that it was as streamlined as possible for the Court to take 
care ot and then obviously there's a reply memo. 
I've also got in here, highlighted on these sheets, 
the time that Peggy Tomsic who is a partner in my firm, spent 
on this and there' s actually about $1,500 worth of charges that-
were not included on my affidavit because I hadn't specifically 
ctsked for attorney's fees for both she and I, so 1 didn't 
include that information in my affidavit. 
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. I think that explains 
my concerns. I'll allow the attorney's fees and the request 
for attorney's fees and the costs in the amount of $9,297.10. 
1 don't know - have you submitted an order on that? 
MS. ADAMS: I have not. 
THE COURT: No, you haven't. Well, you may do so. 
MS. ADAMS: Okay. Thank you. 
THE COURT: All right. Well, the only final thing 
I'm concerned about is Donnelle Johnson. This Motion tor 
Summary Judgment goes to her and I don't think she's a parly. 
There may have been no motion but I'm going to take care or 
this on my own motion. Unless somebody can tell me a reason 
why a person who is not a party to a lawsuit can file a third 
party claim, or for that matter a counterclaim, if a 
counterclaim has been filed on behalf of Donnelle Johnson, I'm 
31 
1 going to strike her from this lawsuit. Can anybody do that? 
2 MR. ATKIN: I think that's correct, Your Honor. 
3 MR. EGAN: Your Honor, rather than strike, hor tioni 
4 the lav/suit, I would request an opportunity to correct the 
5 pleadings so that she can become properly joined in the suit. 
6 I understand the Court's point. It's obviously escaped our 
7 notice but ratner than strike her, I'd rather keep her in and I 
8 will set to work on getting her into the case properly through 
9 the proper channel. 
10 THE COURT: Well, but in the meantime, what do I do 
11 about this motion? 
12 MR, EGAN: Well, you can hold it in abeyance or you 
3 3 can deny it because I think there is basis to deny it 
14 regardless of whether she's properly — 
15 THE COURT: I don't think I ought to be entering 
16 orders against people that I don't think are proper parlies to 
17 a lawsuit. There's a way to bring her in - well, I don't, know 
13 if there is or not. I mean, I haven't even given hei an ounce 
19 of thought but I do know that the rules do not allow a third 
20 patty complaint by some intervener that just cruises in from 
21 the side without leave of the Court and all of a sudden she 
22 just appears here and if she needs to be here, fine. Rut as 
23 tar as this motion is concerned, I'm going to decide it as far 
24 as Mr. Johnson. I don't think it make any difference in the 
25 outcome but I'm not going to have one of the appellate courts 
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shaking their neads saying what the hell is Hanson dcingV Ho's 
hearing motions against parties and granting motions or denying 
motions regarding parties that shouldn't even be in tho lawsuit 
and he knows it. Donnelle Johnson is out of this lawsuit. L>he 
'nas been improperly included in the .Lawsuit. She has no claims 
t hat are piop^rly asserted in this lawsuit and as f.ir as tnese 
pending motions are concerned, she's a non-party. 
I'd like an order in that regard, Mr. Atkin. 
MR. ATKIN: I will, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Just indicate that the Court on it:; own 
motion is striking Donnelle Johnson from these pleadings 
oecause she has been improperly named and has improperly 
cisserted in claims herein and that's not a bar to her 
attempting to get into this lawsuit as a proper party through 
legitimate means, but at this point in time, she's out, she's a 
non-paity. 
I'll let you know in a written decision on my 
decision for your Motion for Summary Judgment. Thank you. 
(Whereupon the hearing was concluded) 
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1 SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH - AUGUST 9, 2004 
2 I JUDGE TIMOTHY R. HANSON PRESIDING 
3 I P R O C E E D I N G S 
4 J THE COURT: Good afternoon. 
"5 MS. TOMSIC: Good afternoon, Your Honor. 
6 THE COURT: Jayson Orvis v. Jamis Johnson, 010907449. 
7 Appearances please. 
8 I MS. TOMSIC: Peggy Tomsic representing the plaintiff, 
9 Jayson Orvis. Today Your Honor, I have with me Heather Keoyo 
10 who has just joined our firm but has not as yet been admitted 
11 to the bar, who's helping me. Mr. Orvis, the plaintiff and his 
12 wife, Pam Orvis, are also present in the courtroom. 
13 : THE COURT: Thank you. 
14 MR. CARTWRIGHT: Joe Cartwright here representing Mr. 
15 Johnson, Your Honor. 
16 THE COURT: Thank you. This is on for Plaintiff's 
17 I Motion for Summary Judgment. I've reviewed the pleadings that 
18 you've filed counsel, so if you'd like to proceed Ms. Tomsic, 
19 you may. 
20 MS. TOMSIC: Your Honor, as you know this action is a 
21 declaratory judgment action that was brought by the plaintiff, 
I 
22 Jayson Orvis, seeking a declaration from this Court that the 
23 defendant, Jamis Johnson holds no interest, title, or right to 
24 the credit repair businesses of Mr. Orvis and seeking the costs 
25 involved in that case. Mr. Johnson has filed a counterclaim 
1 j asserting various claims against Mr. Orvis and other third 
2 parties, two or whom you've already granted summary judgment 
3 I on, all of which, regardless of the label are predicated on the 
4 I assumption that Mr- Johnson has a partnership with Mr. Orvis 
5 relative to these credit repair businesses. 
6 Previously Your Honor, just in terms of history, two 
7 of the defendants, Mr, Lawrence and a Mr. Spendlove moved the 
8 court for summary judgment and the Court had granted that 
I 
9 Motion for Summary Judgment basically on two grounds, one of 
10 which was judicial estoppel. Mr. Orvis has moved this Court 
11 for summary judgment on one ground, Your Honor, and that is 
12 judicial estoppel, that is that as a matter of law, Mr. 
13 Johnson, Jamis Johnson, the defendant and counterclaim 
14 plaintiff and third party plaintiff in this action, cannot 
15 assert that he has a partnership interest or any right or title 
16 to the credit repair businesses of Mr, Orvis or the proceeds or 
17 profits from those businesses. 
18 I Your Honor, as you know, judicial estoppel is a 
19 doctrine that was created in the late 1800s and has been 
20 adopted by those courts who have considered it including the 
21 Supreme Court of the United States and obviously was applied by 
22 this Court in granting the summary judgments for Mr. Lawrence 
23 and Mr. Spendlove. Judicial estoppel is a doctrine that the 
24 ! courts have created which is an equitable doctrine; that it is 
25 ] a doctrine that is applied by a court as in matter of law where 
1 you have a party coming into court and asserting a position or 
2 making a claim that is inconsistent with a position or claim 
3 that they have asserted in a prior case. And in this case, 
4 Your Honor, we have a situation where Mr* Johnson was sued by 
i 
5 the Small Business Administration, SBA, back in 1997 and they j 
6 j got a judgment against him for money owed. The SBA 
7 subsequently engaged in supp hearings to determine whether Mr. 
8 Johnson had any assets including any interest in any 
9 partnerships, any limited liability companies, any businesses 
10 on which the SBA could execute to collect on its judgment. 
11 In the course of those supp hearings, the SBA in 
12 1999, took the deposition of Mr. Johnson. Mr. Johnson was 
13 sworn to tell the truth in that deposition as all deponents are 
14 and given an opportunity to correct the deposition prior to the 
15 time it becomes final. In this case, while Mr. Johnson 
16 testified to tell the truth and purported to tell the truth, he 
17 never corrected that deposition and never made any changes and 
18 in fact has never made any assertions before this Court that in 
19 anyway that his testimony before the SBA was somehow mistaken 
20 or wrong, and in fact, has stood by that testimony. 
21 We have submitted the testimony that Mr. Johnson gave 
22 in the SBA proceeding and that testimony, Your Honor, flatly 
23 contradicts Mr. Johnson's position in this case both by way of 
24 a defense and in its counterclaim and third party claims that 
25 he has a partnership issue in these credit repair businesses. 
1 j And Your Honor, what I'd like to do is I'd just like 
2 to read from the pages that I have attached to Mr. Orvis' 
3 I affidavit. They are attached as Exhibits 5 and 6, if I could, 
4 and I'm beginning on page 23 on line 3 and again, this is the | 
i 
5 supp hearing that is being conducted by the SBA to determine , 
6 whether Mr. Johnson holds any interest in anything that they 
7 I can execute on and this is Mr. Johnson's testimony beginning at 
8 line 3 on page 23 and he states, testifies under oath, "But I 
9 have resigned with any involvement in Lexington Law Firms 
10 because of the pending bar problem." Question, "Aren't we 
11 talking about Johnson and Associates, not Lexington Law Firms?" 
12 Answer, "No. I resigned from anything. I have practiced law 
13 under Jamis M. Johnson and Jamis M. Johnson and Associates. 
14 Johnson and Associates is a not-for-profit corporation and 
15 you've been told this. Nobody has shares of stock. I resigned 
16 from that. Lexington Law Firm, Victor Lawrence and another 
17 attorney have taken over all of that. I've indemnified them. 
18 They have indemnified me. I've resigned from any relationship. 
19 Lexington Law Firm was just an operating entity that was doing 
20 credit repair." Question, "Now Lexington Law Firm is not an 
21 entity, it's an assumed name registered to you?" Question by 
22 Mr. Hugey. Answer, "Actually, I think what happened, and I'll 
23 | have to recall this but I assigned, a couple of years ago there 
was a corporation being set up but that was assigned, the name 24 
25 was assigned to - it was going to be assigned into a 
1 corporation. I don't know if we've ever registered the fact 
2 I that it was assigned." And then he goes on to talk about a 
3 I suit by the state of Tennessee and this is the next page, page 
4 24. Beginning on line 4 he says, "But since that time" that's 
5 I the time of the Tennessee suit and his problems with the bar, 
6 "and with my bar problem, I have completely relinquished any 
i 
7 interest. They paid me a little bit, made my payment and I | 
8 resigned. Now if it's listed as an assumed name by Jamis 
9 Johnson, they're going to have to go in and change that but, 
10 you know, they're operating now without me." So he testified 
11 to that in terms of Lexington Law Firm which was the credit 
12 repair business that was being run by Mr. Johnson and then by 
13 Mr. Lawrence and it was a credit repair business that was 
14 utilizing intellectual property and equipment of Mr. Orvis, 
15 part of the intellectual property and equipment that's at issue 
16 here but Mr. Johnson didn't stop his testimony there, Your 
17 Honor. The attorney for the SBA really wanted to find out 
18 geez, okay, we're talking about Lexington Law Firm and we're 
19 talking about Johnson Associates, you're saying you've resigned 
20 any interest, you don't have anything at all, well, I'm going 
21 to be real categorical about this and beginning on page 30 at 
22 line 16 the lawyer says, question, "Do you have any interest in 
23 any partnerships?" On line 18 Mr. Johnson testifies under 
24 oath, "No." Now he does go on to say in that he says, V"I mean, 
25 [ you know, often I'll have a joint venture with somebody but I 
1 1 don't have a partnership or set up a partnership or an LLC. 
2 I You know, if I get a deal I say, hey, do you want to do this 
3 deal together? We'll go up to Summit County and buy a lot." 
4 Question, "So a joint venture." "Yeah, you could call it that 
5 but I don't have any outgoing partnerships." I believe that's 
6 I a typo. I believe it's ongoing, Your Honor, partnerships. 
7 Question, "Any interests in any limited liability companies?" 
8 I Answer, "No." And then he goes on on line 11 on page 31 and 
9 1 says, "I have no interest in LLCs or corporations." 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
i 
24 
25 
Clearly Your Honor, the supp hearing was to determine 
what if any interests he held in anything. The questions were 
specifically put to him under oath as to whether he had any 
interest in Lexington Law firm, Johnson and Associates, any 
partnership, any LLC, any corporation and he categorically said 
no. 
In this proceeding Your Honor, Mr. Johnson has done 
an entire about face and his answer, all you have to do is look 
at his answer to the declaratory judgment in this action and 
his counterclaim and third party claim and he says "I, Jamis 
Johnson, am a partner with Jayson Orvis. I have a partnership 
interest in these credit repair business." That is the 
foundation of his defense. That is the foundation of every 
I 
23 single claim he has made against Mr. Orvis, the plaintiff in 
this case and every third party defendant including the two 
third party defendants who were let out of this case on summary 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
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13 
14 
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23 
24 
25 
judgment. 
Your Honor, so I would say as a matter of law, under 
the doctrine of judicial estoppel, Mr. Johnson is estopped from 
claiming he owns a partnership and Mr. Orvis, as a matter of 
law, is entitled to a declaratory judgment that Mr. Johnson 
does not have an ownership interest. 
And I want to address a couple of issues that were 
raised by Mr. Johnson in his opposition because I think that 
they're ones that I'd like to address in my opening and then if 
there are further issues, I'd like to deal with that in my 
rebuttal. 
Mr. Johnson takes the position that the doctrine of 
judicial estoppel does not apply here even though this Court 
applied it relative to Mr. Lawrence and Mr. Spendlove because 
he says that under Utah law, you have to have been a party or 
privy with a party in this prior action and it had to involve 
the same subject matter and he cites to a Utah Supreme Court 
case that quotes from a 1942 decision, the Tracy Loan case by 
the Utah Supreme Court and says that's the state of the law. 
Well, Your Honor, the problem with that position is 
that the Utah Supreme Court subsequent to that Tracy decision 
stated that in fact to the extent there was that type of broad 
language in the Tracy case, that it had been revisited and 
reconstructed in a later decision by the Supreme Court, the 
Hodge decision which he said has clarified what that is and in 
1 
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the Hodge decision, Your Honor, they were talking about 
collateral estoppel and on collateral estoppel there had been 
prior case law just like there had been on judicial estoppel, 
that you had to be same parties in the same suit or privy on 
the same subject matter and the Court made it clear that that | 
is not correct. What you have to demonstrate is that in fact i 
i • 
you have someone in a prior proceeding who takes a position and) 
if they're doing, it under oath before a tribunal or in a case, ; 
and that position is contrary to a position they're not 
asserting before a court, that you do not have to be the same | 
i 
parties, that what you have to show is they are contrary 
positions and in this case, the defendant got a benefit out of 
i 
it. Well, clearly in this case Your Honor, Mr. Johnson got a j 
benefit out of it because the SBA didn't collect on anything I 
because be claimed he didn't own anything including this I 
partnership interest. ' 
i 
And so Your Honor, I would say there is not a Supreme i 
Court case after the Supreme Court basically overruled the 
l 
Tracy decision on the grounds of having to have identities of 
parties and subject matter. Where this Court, being the 
Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, or even a district court has 
held that in order to utilize judicial estoppel, you have to be 
23 ; the same parties in the same action. And that's important, 
24 
25 
Your Honor, because as you stated in your opinion explaining j 
why you had granted summary judgment to Mr. Lawrence and Mr. 
I 
8 
1 Spendlove, the purpose for judicial estoppel is to make sure » 
2 that the courts are not being utilized to commit fraud and that 
3 they are not allowing people to lie in one tribunal and use it ' 
4 I to their benefit in another tribunal and, Your Honor, I would I 
I 
5 say that the issue that this Court decided relative to Mr. 
6 I Lawrence and Mr, Spendlove on the issue of judicial estoppel is . 
7 identical as that raised by Mr. Orvis. 
8 The courts are clear that when you're talking about 
9 judicial estoppel versus equitable estoppel, the relationship 
10 i you're looking at is the relationship between a party of the 
11 tribunal. The question is, are you misusing the justice 
12 system? And that's the relationship you're looking at and on 
13 the summary judgment motion against Mr. Johnson by Mr. 
14 Spendlove and Mr. Lawrence, this Court stated and I'm quoting 
15 Your Honor from page 4 of your opinion in that case that was 
16 entered, I believe, more than a year ago in February 2003, you 
17 stated, "Mr. Johnson is also estopped from asserting any claims 
18 in this action which are based on the partnership he denied 
19 under oath when questioned by the SBA." "Estoppel is a bar or 
20 impediment which precludes allegations denial of a certain fact 
21 or state of facts in consequence of a previous allegation or 
22 denial or conduct or admission. It operates to put a party 
23 I entitled to its benefits in the same position as if the thing 
24 represented were true." And you're quoting Black's Law 
25 I Dictionary. And then you go on to say, judicial estoppel 
1 I "prevents a party from seeking judicial relief by offering 
2 
3 i 
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statements inconsistent with its own sworn statements in a 
prior judicial proceeding." 
You then go on to state on page 5, "Mr. Johnson seeks 
judicial relief in this matter by offering statements that are 
inconsistent with his own sworn statements in the proceedings 
brought against him by the SBA. In a sworn deposition, Mr. 
Johnson told the SBA that he had no interest in and had no 
right to receive payments from Lexington Law Firm. He went on 
to aver that he had no partnership interest nor interest in a 
limited liability company. Because each of the claims asserted 
against Lawrence and Spendlove are expressly negated in Mr. 
Johnson's prior testimony where he was attempting to avoid 
payment to the SBA, the claims must be dismissed." And again, 
those claims, Your Honor, were all predicated on an assumption 
that Mr. Johnson owned a partnership interest or had a 
partnership with Mr. Orvis. 
So I would say Your Honor, one, you have visited this j 
issue with regard to other defendants. You clearly have laid 
out what judicial estoppel is and what the purpose behind it is 
and why it would apply in this situation. 
Your Honor, the arguments that the Defendant Johnson 
asserts here are exactly the arguments that he asserted in 
opposition to Mr. Spendlove and Mr. Lawrence's motion and which 
were rejected by the court in finding summary judgment based at 
10 
1 I least in part on the judicial estoppel doctrine. 
2 | Finally Your Honor, the argument that Mr- Johnson i 
3 raises again which he raised in the last hearing on the other I 
4 I summary judgment motion, is that, well, geez, you know, my wife j 
5 j and I both have this interest in the partnership and it's 
6 really her interest in the partnership. Well, Your Honor, we 
7 attach as Exhibit A to our reply an order from this court that 
8 was signed and was basically reflected your ruling at the oral 
9 argument in connection with the last Motion for Summary 
10 Judgment, that his wife, Danelle Johnson is not a proper party 
11 before this Court and you ordered that any reference to her in 
12 any pleadings, be stricken and the reason this had arisen is 
13 because the Memorandum in Opposition, just as the Memorandum in 
14 Opposition to our motion was styled, Jamis and Danelle 
15 Johnson's opposition and your point was, she's not a proper 
16 ! party in this case. She's not a party. She cannot be 
17 asserting claims and that is not before the court. Well, that 
18 was back in February 2003, Your Honor, and here we are again 
19 with the same point. 
20 And I might point out, Your Honor, even if she were a 
21 party to this action, it would make no difference and that is 
22 because to the extent she's claiming any interest and I believe 
23 that Jamis has described it as a "beneficial interest" it all 
24 derives and is part and parcel of his claim that he is a 
25 | partner and has a partnership interest with Mr. Orvis in credit 
11 
1 repair and that he has given the benefit of that, that is in j 
2 I profit sharing to his wife. So even if she were before this I 
3 I court which she's not, it would make no difference because 
4 I judicial estoppel, estops Mr. Johnson from making that claim I 
5 and he can't give a benefit to his wife that he's estopped from! 
6 j claiming. | 
7 Finally Your Honor, I would just say, this is an 
8 issue that is firmly established in the law. The record is 
9 uncontroverted in this record that Mr. Johnson made those 
10 statements under oath before the SBA. They are inconsistent 
11 with the position he has taken here and as a matter of law, the 
12 Court should grant our Motion for Summary Judgment, both on our 
13 declaratory judgments and on his counterclaim and third party 
14 claims predicated on him having an ownership interest. We 
15 would ask that our motion be granted. 
16 THE COURT: Thank you. 
17 Mr. Cartwright? 
18 MR. CARTWRIGHT: Good afternoon, Your Honor. I'm 
19 somewhat new to this case and I want to first address a 
20 misunderstanding I had when I first got involved in the case 
21 because I think that may be a misunderstanding that is taking 
22 j place here in the way this motion is being presented. What had 
23 [ happened here as explained in Mr. Johnson's affidavit was there 
24 were initially five guys who created a partnership in doing 
25 I credit repair, the credit repair business, where they dispute 
12 
1 I certain things on people's credit and challenge them. After a 
i 
2 I period of time three of those partners dropped out and there | 
3 I were just two guys left, Mr. Orvis and Mr. Johnson. They were | 
t 
4 the two remaining partners. Now this credit repair partnership! 
5 that existed between the two of them - and here's where my 
I I 
6 misunderstanding was - was not called Lexington Law Firm. This 
7 partnership had many different organizations that it was 
8 managing, some LLCs, this law firm. It hired attorneys to 
9 manage the law firm including Lexington Law Firm but the 
10 partnership existed outside and separately of Lexington Law 
11 Firm. So later on Mr. Johnson, there was a judgment obtained 
12 against him by the SBA and after that judgment there was a 
13 deposition and he was asked about his interest in Lexington Law 
14 I Firm and at that time Mr. Johnson truthfully stated that he had 
15 disclaimed all interest in Lexington Law Firm. Now even though 
16 he didn't have that interest in Lexington Law Firm, there still 
17 remained this partnership between Mr. Johnson and Mr. Orvis and 
18 Mr. Orvis isn't an attorney but this was the marketing arm that 
19 was generating clients for Lexington Law Firm, contract between 
20 I the law firm and Mr. Orvis, where all this money was being 
21 poured into the partnership and therefore, in accordance with 
22 the partnership agreement between Mr. Johnson and Mr. Orvis, he 
23 was receiving a cut of that. So I just want to clarify that 
24 . issue right now. It isn't - Mr. Johnson still isn't claiming I 
25 I own Lexington Law Firm. He's saying I have a partnership with 
13 
1 J Mr. Orvis. 
2 J THE COURT: That's swell but why did he tell the SBA 
3 | he didn't have any interest in any partnerships? 
4 , MR. CARTWRIGHT: Let me look at the broader context 
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of this statement. Mr. Johnson earlier in this deposition had 
talked about - and in his other deposition with the SBA and in 
his wife Danelle's deposition with the SBA, explained that 
there was a lot of money coming to Danelle Johnson. Danelle 
was pretty much a figurehead. Jamis was the one with the 
involvement and was doing the work and so they had talked about 
that in this deposition and in previous ones. Now we get to J 
the specific question where they asked about partnerships and 
that was done in the context of the laundry list of things do 
you own or not own. Do you own stocks? No. Bonds? No. It's 
a big list and it gets down to partnerships. No. Now in Mr. 
Johnson's mind set as explained in his affidavit, he thought 
that had to do with real estate or other partnerships not 
having to do with this one that he'd already talked about 
extensively with the SBA and that his wife had talked about 
extensively with the SBA. 
THE COURT: So being a lawyer, he, of course, said to 
the question, are you just talking about the Lexington Law Firm 
or what partnerships are you talking about? 
MR. CARTWRIGHT: I don't think that he was being that 
tap dancing around the issue at that time. 
14 
1 I THE COURT: Of course he didn't because he said no. 
2 MR. CARTWRIGHT: He said no in the context of his 
3 mind that they'd already talked about these other issues and 
4 , that that question meant other than the partnership that 
5 Danelle's already talked about, that you've already talked 
6 about, that the SBA knew that money was coming to Danelle and 
7 1 so in his mind it wasn't even a tap dance- It was thinking in 
8 the context of the entire deposition, other partnership 
9 I interests other than the one with Mr. Orvis. So in his mind, 
10 he answered that question truthfully. It wasn't referring to 
11 that and it wasn't any legal lawyer tap dancing around the 
12 issue asking about definition. He was just answering a 
13 question to the best of his knowledge with his understanding, 
14 as he explains in his affidavit, that the SBA was well aware of 
15 the relationship of the partnership and the money going to 
16 Danelle Johnson and Jamis' involvement in the partnership. 
17 t Now that's what he's testified in his affidavit. It 
18 doesn't have to do with Lexington Law Firm. He doesn't assert 
19 an ownership in that. He asserts a continuing partnership 
20 I relationship. He says no there but the reason he says no, his 
21 intent is that he's already talked about that and that was 
22 related to real estate holdings or other types of partnerships 
23 J that he was involved in. 
24 | Now, having said that, we shouldn't even get as far 
25 I as his answers in this prior proceeding because the law I agree 
1 I is clear that judicial estoppel does not apply in this case. I 
2 think counsel has clearly, is clearly mistaken as to what the 
3 law of judicial estoppel is in the state of Utah. She 
4 indicated that there was no more recent law in the United 
5 I States Supreme Court than this Hodge case in 1971 and that 
6 ignores two separate cases that are far newer. One is in 2001 
7 I and one is in the year 2000 and following these cases, we don't | 
8 even get to what's in this deposition. In Nebeker which we 
9 I cited in our Memorandum in Opposition, the Utah Supreme Court ' 
l i 
10 out l ines what j u d i c i a l estoppel i s . "Under jud ic i a l es toppel a ! 
i 
11 I person may not, to the prejudice of another person, deny any ' 
! 
12 I position taken in a prior judicial proceeding %between the same 
13 persons or their privies involving the same subject matter and 
14 if such prior position was successfully maintained.'" So the 
15 Utah Supreme Court is setting forth three requirements; number 
16 one, between the same persons or their privies; number two, 
17 involving the same subject matter; and number three, if such 
18 prior position was successfully maintained. Those elements are 
19 clearly not satisfied here. Number one, it isn't the same 
20 persons or privies. In that case it was the SBA. In this case 
21 it's Mr. Orvis. Number two, involving the same subject matter. 
22 In the SBA case they were litigating issues over the contract 
23 liability under the SBA loan. After a judgment was entered, 
24 this isn't litigating a claim, he made a statement that can be 
25 construed several different ways in a post judgment, 
16 
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1 I supplemental proceeding. And number three, I don't see how 
2 this can be met under any reasoning, if such prior position was 
3 ! successfully maintained. There was no position taken in there 
4 | that was asserted or litigated or decided by anyone. He lost 
5 | that case. He made a statement in a post judgment deposition. 
6 There wasn't any successfully maintaining this. Interestingly, , 
7 in the plaintiff's memorandum, they say that this element is | 
i 
8 met successfully maintained because the SBA hasn't received a ! 
9 I cent from Johnson on the judgment and that that constitutes ] 
10 meeting this element. Well, the fact of the matter is, they 
11 didn't tell the Court that Mr. Orvis bought that judgment from 
12 the SBA. The SBA got I believe $30,000. That's a lot more 
13 than not receiving a cent on this and it certainly doesn't 
14 satisfy if such a prior position was successfully maintained. 
15 Simply put, under judicial estoppel, it doesn't meet any of the 
16 I requirements set forth by the Utah Supreme Court. 
17 The Utah Supreme Court, this is 2001 in Nebeker 
18 Trucking versus the Utah State Tax Commission and that's not 
19 the only case that talks about it. The Nebeker Court actually 
20 [ - it cites I believe to a 2000 case, Salt Lake City versus 
Silver Fork Pipeline Corporation and in that they talk about 
the requirements that you have to have for judicial estoppel to 
apply. In this, SFPC claimed that Salt Lake City was 
judicially estopped and the Utah Supreme Court again said, 
SFPC's contention is untenable for two reasons. First, SFPC 
17 
1 was not a party to Progress, that's another party, that • 
2 detrimentally changed its position by reason of Salt Lake's i 
3 inaccurate representation of Utah's water law in progress. . 
4 Then they cite the law. Under judicial estoppel, a person may i 
5 not, to the prejudice of another person, deny any position 
6 taken in a prior judicial proceeding, one - and these are my 
7 ones - between the same persons or their privies; that doesn't 
8 I apply in this case; (2) involving the same subject matter; SBA 
9 subject matter and this one is different; and (3) if such prior 
10 position was successfully maintained. The exact same elements 
11 and they're citing an earlier case involving the same parties 
12 I and they also cite Tracy Loan and Trust Company versus 
13 ] Openshaw. Again, there's two Supreme Court cases, 2000 and 
14 2001 which directly say here's the elements to judicial 
15 estoppel and in this case they say because these elements 
16 weren't met, judicial estoppel does not apply. 
17 Now, this 2000 case also cites to AMJUR, talking 
18 ( about what the judicial estoppel is. Now AMJUR, if you go to 
19 section 70, it lists the requirements. Number one, the 
20 i inconsistent position first asserted must have been 
21 j successfully maintained; two, a judgment must have been 
22 rendered; three, the positions must be clearly inconsistent; 
23 I four, the parties in question must be the same; five, the party 
24 I claiming estoppel must have been misled and have changed his 
25 I position; and six, it must appear unjust to one party or permit 
18 
1 the other to change. Now these elements in AMJUR also aren't 
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met here. The parties in question must be the same. Clearly 
they're different parties in the SBA case and this one. The 
party claiming estoppel must have been misled and have changed ! 
its position. Here there's been zero reliance by Mr. Orvis | 
upon any statements made in this SBA deposition. In fact, he ' 
wasn't just misled, he actually bought that judgment and he is I 
I 
right now continuing to trying to collect on that judgment in i 
federal court and we've been over there in federal court just a 
couple of weeks ago arguing this other case and there's been no 
- he wasn't misled and Mr. Orvis has never changed his 
position. 
And the last requirement, it must appear unjust to 
one party to permit the other to change, that clearly hasn't 
happened here because after this deposition was taken by the 
SBA, post judgment, Mr. Orvis continued to provide checks to 
Danelle Johnson and one actually to Jamis Johnson every month 
for, well, that's what we're fighting about, what those 
payments are for and this is significant money. It went all 
the way up to $35,000 a month. It's not that he changed his 
position or was unjust, he continued to make these payments 
and, in fact, we have partnership agreements that we presented 
to the court and we have statements by Mr. Orvis indicating a 
business relationship between the two that we presented to the 
court and there are also depositions taken after the Victor 
19 
1 j Lawrence judgment was done that indicate Mr. Orvis was being 
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deceitful about the accounting provided to Mr. Johnson and the | 
monies that were owed to the Johnsons* But we can't even get 
to what was said in the deposition or how the court or a jury 
should characterize that because judicial estoppel simply 
I 
doesn't apply. Interestingly in AMJUR, section 70-
THE COURT: Wait a minute. What do you mean we can't 
get to it? 
MR, CARTWRIGHT: Well, judicial estoppel doesn't 
apply.. 
THE COURT: Okay. That's fine. You can still -geiCtS 
it. You have to get to it to decide whether it's judicial ^  
estoppel. 
MR. CARTWRIGHT: You're right, and I guess what I 
mean is that the plaintiffs are making certain 
16 | characterizations on what he meant by saying no in the context | 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
of the deposition and I'm saying we don't get that far to the 
saying no because it doesn't meet any of the elements of 
judicial estoppel. Let's assume that Mr. Johnson was the most 
dishonest person in the world and he sat there and lied during 
his deposition, which he didn't and the evidence shows he 
didn't, but assume that he did. Even if he did and was the 
23 : biggest liar in the world which he's not, it doesn't matter in 
24 
25 
this case. It would be evidence against him that could be 
presented to the jury but it's not judicial estoppel because j 
20 
1 the requirements arenft met- That's what I mean about not
 ( 
2 getting that far. 
3 1 Now the plaintiffs have indicated that, I believe 
4 their language is that Tracy has been expressly overruled. 
5 I That's simply mistaken. Tracy was not expressly overruled. 
6 There's two cases they cite where they talk about how Tracy 
7 shouldn't apply and I notice they don't even mention, it's 
8 almost pretending like the 2002 and 2001 Supreme Court 
9 decisions don't exist. But what they argue - they're pretty 
10 much trying to ignore judicial estoppel and go into cases that 
11 talk about res judicata versus collateral estoppel. What they 
12 say supports their position, they're talking about the 
13 International Resources v. Cremfield case and there the Utah 
14 Supreme Court said, "Concerning the doctrine of res judicata it 
15 is said that both parties the issues must have been the same 
16 and also judgment is conclusive and then certain issues tried. 
17 This court explains - and then it talks about race adjudicata 
18 versus collateral estoppel, not judicial estoppel, collateral 
19 I estoppel and there they talk about how you can have different 
20 parties in collateral estoppel unlike res judicata where you 
21 need the same parties. 
22 I THE COURT: I understand the difference. 
23 I MR. CARTWRIGHT: But they even say in collateral 
24 I estoppel that operates only as to issues which were actually 
25 I asserted "and tried" in that case. There's no allegation here 
1 ] that these statements made in a post judgment supp order was | 
I . i 
2 tried in the prior case. It simply wasn't and it indicates if j 
3 I the material issue was not actually asserted and determined, j 
4 ' there is no basis upon which it could be concluded that it had j 
5 I actually taken a different position on the issues. So even , 
6 arguing this collateral estoppel, that doesn't go but when it's 
7 I talking about the difference between the two, there's a i 
I i 
8 footnote in the case and this is where the plaintiffs say Tracy | 
9 was expressly or explicitly overruled. Here's the footnote, 
10 "We so state an awareness of a conceitedly, over broad 
11 statement in our case of Tracy Loan and Trust to the effect 
12 that one would not be judicially estopped unless the parties . 
13 j and the issues are the same in the instant and the prior suit. ! 
14 Any misstatement of the rule was corrected and superceded by 
15 our decision in Richard v. Hodson." So this is the first time 
16 they talk about judicial estoppel in this case. They were 
I 
17 | talking about collateral estoppel before and they refer to 
18 j Richard v. Hodson. Going to Richard v. Hodson where they say 
19 this is where they clarified it, and again, it doesn't talk 
20 j about judicial estoppel. It talks about collateral estoppel 
21 versus res judicata. It talks about the difference between the 
22 two and then it says, "This doctrine known as collateral 
23 estoppel differs from res judicata not only in the fact that 
24 all the parties need not be the same, but also in the fact that 
25 the estoppel applies only to issues actually litigated and not 
22 
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as to those that could be determined." So again, talking about 
collateral estoppel and issues actually litigated. 
3 I THE COURT: The Supreme Court doesn't know what 
judicial estoppel is. 
MR. CARTWRIGHT: No, I think what I'm saying is-
l 
THE COURT: Wait a minute. Didn't they say in the ' 
footnote judicial estoppel? I 
MR. CARTWRIGHT: Yeah. 
THE COURT: And they referred to a case that talks 
about only collateral.estoppel? i 
i 
MR. CARTWRIGHT: That's correct. I 
THE COURT: Then I guess they don't know what they're 
talking about, huh? 
MR. CARTWRIGHT: I can't figure out why they were 
saying that because in International Resources they're talking 
about res judicata versus collateral estoppel. They have a 
footnote that says our Tracy Loan and Trust with judicial 
estoppel as clarified by this other case. I go to the other 
case and I see them talking about collateral estoppel and res 
judicata in talking about elements there. I can't fit those 
cases together and I'm not sure why they talk about that. All 
I'm left with is - and this Hodson case is 1971. All I'm left 
with is two Supreme Court cases in the year 2000 and 2001 that 
don't deal with collateral estoppel but talk about judicial 
25 I estoppel and it outlines the specific requirements there. 
23 
I I 
1 I Putting aside the issues of law that judicial 
2 estoppel doesn't apply here, I'd like to point out to the Court ' 
3 that judicial estoppel is the only claim asserted before the 
4 Court in this motion and judicial estoppel based upon really 
5 I one thing and that one thing only is what he said in this 
6 I deposition transcript. In the reply memorandum we get for the 
7 first time new arguments and that new argument talks about a 
8 prior order that the judge entered in this court in regards to 
9 Victor Lawrence. 
10 THE COURT: That's me and I said judicial estoppel 
11 applied. 
12 MR. CARTWRIGHT: That's correct. 
13 THE COURT: Did somebody appeal that? 
14 MR. CARTWRIGHT: Yes, he should if that's a-
15 THE COURT: Did someone appeal that? 
16 J MR. CARTWRIGHT: No, because it hasn't been certified 
17 as a final order to be appealed. 
18 THE COURT: Third party action, wasn't it? Yeah, a 
19 third party defendant. I guess that kind of ended the third 
20 I party complaint, didn't it? 
21 MR. CARTWRIGHT: Your Honor, I'm not aware that 
22 that's been certified a final issue or not. 
23 ' THE COURT: Why would you have to certify it if it's a 
24 third party? 
25 I MR. CARTWRIGHT: That could be and here's where this 
24 
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argument should not apply. First of all, I haven't had the '. 
i 
opportunity to respond to this issue because it was presented i 
to the Court for the first time in the reply memorandum and j 
under Rule 56, what they're stuck with and what they elected to I 
I 
argue then was judicial estoppel based upon the statements that i 
were made in the deposition only and not this subsequent order 
and if they want to bring this in a subsequent motion, that 
would allow Mr. Johnson and I the time and the opportunity to 
fully respond to that and to address the issue of whether it's 
a final order or not, but they didn't. They raised that issue 
at the very beginning in their reply memorandum and the Utah 
Court of Appeals - we filed a Motion to Strike that* 
THE COURT: I know. 
MR. CARTWRIGHT: The Utah Court of Appeals indicated 
that you may grant a Motion to Strike on issues raised for the 
first time in a reply memorandum and we're not saying that 
they've lost their chance forever. We're simply saying, we 
should have the opportunity to submit affidavits and other 
evidence in response to that, that it's too late now. 
Number two, I've indicated that it's my understanding 
that it's not a final order, that they're still able to appeal 
that or even more importantly, Your Honor can, based upon 
additional information presented here and the evidence that he 
presented in his affidavit here is much more comprehensive than 
25 it was before, would justify not only denying this motion, if 
25 
that were at issue, but changing the court's order previously 
and we're saying that - we haven't made that motion now. We're 
saying it's not— 
THE COURT: Assuming a year has gone by and I haven't 
seen any motion to change it and it hasn't been appealed, final 
or not, the chances of my changing that are about slim to none. 
MR. CARTWRIGHT: Okay. Also, Your Honor, there's 
been things that have happened which doesn't make that - while 
it may apply to Victor Lawrence, it shouldn't apply to Jayson 
Orvis and the reason why is the relationships of the parties 
are completely different. The relationship between Victor 
Orvis and Mr. Johnson was that of attorney and client. Here 
this is ho attorney. This is partnership, partnership. He was 
not making partnership claims against Victor Lawrence. He was 
making various other claims that the Court dismissed. I'm not 
arguing that those are right or wrongly dismissed. I'm saying 
that the relationships are very different. The claims that 
were made against Victor Lawrence are different than Jayson 
Orvis and that even if they had raised this for the first time 
and we'd had the opportunity to respond, the circumstances are 
different. 
Also, between then and now there's been the 
additional discovery that Mr. Johnson has obtained that talks 
further about the relationships between the parties and that 
includes an assistant of Mr. Orvis that testified in a 
26 
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deposition about Mr. Orvis' payments of monies to Mr. Johnson 
and how those payments were false and were basically/ it was 
cheating one to the other and also an assistant of Victor 
Lawrence. And we believe that with that additional testimony 
presented to the Court, that Your Honor would find differently 
if that matter were raised now with Mr. Orvis. But in any 
event, we shouldn't get that far because judicial estoppel -
this one isn't even close. These elements don't apply and 
that's it and that's our position. 
10 ; THE COURT: All right, thank you. 
MS. TOMSIC: Your Honor, briefly if I could just 
address a couple of points. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MS. TOMSIC: First of all, Your Honor, relative to 
the order, obviously it's part of the record in this case and 
the reason obviously we cited it, was in direct reputation as 
to their position as to what the required elements for judicial : 
I 
estoppel which is clearly would be contrary to Your Honor's | 
order and it is basically the law of this case at this point 
21 
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Second, Your Honor, in terms of Mr. Johnson's 
purported explanation of his testimony before the SBA, it' s all 
well and good for Mr. Cartwright to stand up here and try to 
explain it to the Court but we don't have anything before this 
Court in any way explaining that. If you look at Mr. Johnson's 
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affidavit, all be talks about is that his testimony was 
truthful and he quotes it, it says what it says. He denies he 
had any partnership interest. Here he claims he has one. 
And I think what else is important, Your Honor, is 
when they're taking the position that somehow the SBA lawyer 
that knew it was Danelle Johnson who had it, it's just not 
true, Your Honor, and I would ask Your Honor to look at pages 
40 through 42 of Mr. Johnson's deposition before the SBA and 
I've got a copy for Your Honor and a copy for opposing counsel 
if I could. And Your Honor, the SBA - if I may approach? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MS. TOMSIC: - is asking them about Danelle Johnson 
and where she's getting her income and if you go to I believe 
it's page 44, he's talking about getting payments from 
Lexington Law Firm to the SBA and Jamis Johnson takes the 
position that basically, she's receiving those payments because 
17 she's a trustee on these boards, that she had performed some 
services for them that are undescribed and that she had donated 
some computer equipment, furniture. There's absolutely no an 
assertion in there that says, gee, well, I thought you were 
talking to me about me owning an partnership interest. No, my 
wife is the one who owns it. So not only did he say he didn't 
23 , own a partnership interest contrary to his position here, he 
tells the SBA that the reason his wife is getting any money is 
because she was doing services, acting as a trustee and had 
28 
1 contributed some things. So, Your Honor, I just say, his 
2 deposition says what it says. It's unequivocal on its face 
3 : that he is denying any type of a partnership or any type of an 
4 LLC interest or a corporation. His position in this case is 
5 absolutely contrary to that. You can see it in their papers. 
6 You can see it in their answer to the declaratory judgment and 
7 you can see it in his third party complaint and counterclaim. 
8 J And Your Honor, I think the thing I want to say about 
9 Mr. Cartwright's representation of the Utah Supreme Court 
10 authority, it's true that the Nebeker and Silver Fork cases 
11 were decided after the International case that we cite to Your 
12 Honor but I think, Your Honor, in fairness, if you look at 
13 those decisions, the issue before the Court in neither of those 
14 decisions was whether or not the party asserting judicial 
15 estoppel was the same party. That was not the issue on which 
16 I the court made a decision, and I think if you look at the cases 
1*7 we cited - and I've got copies if you would like a copy. 
18 THE COURT: I would, uh-huh (affirmative). I can 
19 find them but I guess I better read them. 
20 MS, TOMSIC: If you-
21 THE COURT: What do you say about this thing in the 
22 footnote the Supreme Court talks about judicial estoppel being 
23 clarified in a subsequent case that talks about collateral 
24 estoppel? 
25 I MS. TOMSIC: Your Honor, I think - let me tell you, I 
29 
1 can't speak to what's in the minds and heart of the Supreme I 
2 ' Court. i 
3 THE COURT: Neither can I, not can ones that have 
4 I gone before. 
i 
5 MS. TOMSIC: But what I can tell you, Your Honor, is 
6 this is that the Tracy Loan case which is really the prodigy 
1 that is cited that they rely on in subsequent decisions, the 
8 Nebeker decision and the Silver Fork decision, is a case 
9 involving judicial estoppel and at the time of that case there 
10 also was a law, both with regard to judicial estoppel and 
11 collateral estoppel that the parties had to be the same as in 
12 the prior suit and when they're citing to Tracy Collins, while 
13 they may be looking to a case dealing with collateral estoppel, 
14 basically the same principles were being applied on collateral 
15 estoppel and judicial estoppel, that is requiring the parties 
16 and the subject matters to be the same and the way I read this 
17 footnote, Your Honor, is saying, look, we were really broad in 
18 i our language that we were using in Tracy Collins. Take a look 
19 at this Hodson case because what we've done is we've redefined 
20 those elements and that would apply with equal force to j 
21 judicial estoppel and .collateral estoppel and that's how I 
22 would read it. 
23 But Your Honor, I do want to say one other thing. I 
24 want to give you the Nebeker case and this Silver Fork case 
25 because I think what you'll see is like many courts, they grab 
I 
1 I a quote out of a case, put it up there, and then they pick the 
2 element they're talking about and that's what they decide the 
3 case on. If you look at the Nebeker case, the Court is taking 
4 the position after it cites that, which really I think if you 
5 look at it in terms of the holding of the court is dicta, it 
6 says that the reason they're not applying judicial estoppel is 
7 because the party hadn't changed its position in the original 
8 litigation based on testimony which is obviously contrary in 
9 this case because the SBA did change its position. It couldn't 
10 collect on a $250,000 plus judgment and while they ultimately 
11 ended up selling it for $30,000, it changed its position, Your 
12 Honor, because it couldn't collect on a partnership that Mr, 
13 Johnson is now claiming is worth hundreds, and hundreds, and 
14 hundreds or thousands of dollars in this case. 
15 So, one, the cite to Tracy Collins was a quote that 
16 is dicta in the case if you look at the holding of the case and 
17 in terms of the Silver Fork Pipeline case, again, while they 
18 quote that whole long quote out of Tracy Collins, that case, 
19 the only issue before the court was, can you apply judicial 
20 estoppel where there is not a knowing misrepresentation, that 
21 is where somebody might be mistaken about something and may not 
22 have all the facts and again, neither the Nebeker case nor the 
23 Silver Fork Corporation case are situations where a party was 
24 arguing, geez, they weren't the same parties, it wasn't the 
25 same subject matter. Those were not the issues before those 
I I 
1 cases and unfortunately, the Supreme Court hasn't said anything 
2 I about this footnote and there is no case where it has said 
3 again, after the International Resources case that it meant 
4 something differently. 
5 And a point I want to make Your Honor is one, I don't 
6 I think it's correct that you have to have those requirements 
7 because the issue again is really the relationship between the 
8 I party and the judicial system which means that Mr. Cartwright's 
9 argument that your prior order shouldn't apply because the 
10 relationships between the parties are different, well, Your 
11 Honor, the bottom line is, all you need to do is look at the 
12 authorities and they make it clear. This is not equitable 
13 estoppel. You're not looking at relationships between parties. 
14 You're looking at the relationship between the defendant and 
15 the judiciary and what the defendant has done within that 
16 judicial system and what's important here, Your Honor, is you 
17 take the position that Mr. Johnson, we believe didn't tell the 
18 truth. But assuming he - if you're with me and you read it and 
19 it's not the truth, what he's saying, Mr. Cartwright is saying, 
20 is litigants can go and perpetrate a fraud on the court and 
21 then turn around and totally change their position to their 
22 , benefit using the court again and that exactly the reason that 
23 you have judicial estoppel. It's to keep parties from lying to 
24 a court and as many courts have said, what it does is it 
25 I increased the costs of lying. If you lie in a judicial 
23 
24 
25 
1 I proceeding, you can't then turn around and change your story to 
2 I get some benefit before another court and that's exactly what 
3 I we have here. 
4 Your Honor, so I'd say again, one, the requirements 
5 for judicial estoppel are that you have a litigant, Mr. Johnson 
6 in the SBA case, making a statement under oath in a judicial 
7 proceeding where the SBA changes its position and then in this 
8 case, turns around and take a totally inconsistent position and 
9 says he does have a partnership interest, hoping to benefit 
10 economically from that and at the same time to have deprived 
11 the SBA of that money* And under the doctrine of judicial 
12 estoppel it's a deliberate false misrepresentation and it's 
13 being used for their benefit and he's trying to use this Court 
14 to either lie to the SBA in that case or lie to the Court in 
15 this case and under the doctrine of judicial estoppel that is 
16 not permitted. 
17 Finally I'd say one last thing, Your Honor, and that 
18 is, I think even assuming you were to buy the argument that the 
19 court didn't mean whatever it said in footnote 4, and again, I 
20 just want to state the language because they're talking about 
21 collateral estoppel in the body of the text and then the 
22 [ footnote, and they say "We so state an awareness of an 
conceitedly over broad statement in our case Tracy Loan, to the 
effect that one would not be ^judicially estopped' unless the 
parties and the issue are the same in the instant and the prior > 
i 
I 
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suit* Any misstatement of the rule was corrected and 
superceded by our decision in Hodson". And again Hodson dealt 
with collateral estoppel, but the elements were the same for 
collateral estoppel and judicial estoppel prior to the Hodson 
decision where it found you don't have to be the same parties 
and as long as it was an issue that was actually addressed, 
you're there. 
And I think one last thing, Your Honor, and that is 
that fundamentally in this case, if the Court were to overrule 
its prior decision relative to Mr. Spendlove and Mr. Lawrence, 
the bottom line is even if you impose that same party of 
privity requirement, given that Mr. Orvis is an assignee of the 
judgment, under Utah law, he is a privy. You know that as well 
as I do, I mean, clearly the Utah Supreme Court has defined 
privy to include that, AMJUR defines a privy as that. So Your 
Honor, one, that's not the law but even assuming that you 
decided, geez, I'm going to change my opinion and I'm going to 
decide that's a requirement, it doesn't really matter for 
purposes of Mr. Orvis. 
And in terms of changing position, I think I've 
covered that with the SBA. There was detrimental reliance, 
Your Honor, selling a judgment that now with interest is 
probably close to $350,000 or $400,000 for $30,000 is clearly a 
detrimental reliance on the truth of his testimony in that SBA 
supp hearing. 
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I thank you for your time, Your Honor. Do you have 
any questions? 
THE COURT: I do. What's the date of the case that 
uses the footnote regarding judicial estoppel? 
MS. TOMSIC: The name of the case Your Honor is 
International Resources, and would you like a copy? 
THE COURT: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
MS. TOMSIC: May I approach? 
THE COURT: Yes, of course. That'll answer all the 
questions I have. 
MS. TOMSIC: Let me give you the other two cases, 
Your Honor, if I could. This is the Silver Fork Pipeline case, 
Your Honor, and this is the Nebeker. 
THE COURT: Thank you. I'll take a look at these 
cases. I want to read these to see what they have to say. As 
a practical matter, the reason I wanted to know the date of the 
case, I wondered who wrote it and whether or not it was 
unanimous because I doubt seriously that all five justices 
(inaudible) talk about when you use the words judicial 
estoppel. That would be highly unlikely. 
MR. CARTWRIGHT: May I just respond to one-
THE COURT: No sir, you may not. She gets the first 
and last saying. 
MR. CARTWRIGHT: But Your Honor there's been a 
misstatement of the law that I'd like to correct. I don't want 
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1 to make any arguments but to point out a misstatement that was 
2 « said* 
3 THE COURT: Go ahead. 
4 MR. CARTWRIGHT: In the Salt Lake City v. Silver 
5 Creek case that you have, paragraph 15, second paragraph, | 
I 
6 SPFC's contention is untenable for two reasons; first, SPFC was j 
7 not a party to Progress. That's means the first case, that [ 
i 
8 detrimentally changes its position by reason of Salt Lake's 
9 inaccurate representation of Utah water law in Progress. Under 
10 judicial estoppel, a person may not to the prejudice the other j 
11 person, deny any position taken in a prior judicial proceeding 
12 between the same persons. One of two reasons this case turns 
13 on is it's different parties. That's all. She indicated to 
14 the Court that that was not a reason. It simply is. That's 
15 one of the two reasons for the decision, different parties. 
16 THE COURT: I'll read these cases and let you know. 
17 I'll be interested to know whether or not - well, I suppose one 
18 way or the other this issue might get addressed by one of the 
19 appellate courts but I'll be interested to know whether or not 
20 the appellate courts are of the opinion that a person can make 
21 a representation in one court and change it in another whether 
22 you're the same party or whether you're not. I don't see that 
23 it makes any difference but we will see. Thank you counsel. 
24 I'll let you know within a day or two. 
25 j (Whereupon the hearing was concluded) -c-
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GREENWOOD, Associate Presiding Judge: 
H1 Jamis M. Johnson appeals the trial court's grant of summary 
judgment in favor of Jayson Orvis. Johnson maintains that the 
court misapplied the judicial estoppel doctrine and that genuine 
issues of material fact preclude summary judgment. We affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
1|2 In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, "we view the facts 
and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most 
favorable to the nonmoving party." 3D Constr. & Dev., L.L.C. v. 
Old Standard Life Ins. Co., 2005 UT App 307,Hi n.2, 117 P.3d 1082 
(quotations and citation omitted). We present the facts 
accordingly. 
1|3 In September 2005, the Small Business Administration (SBA) 
filed an action against Johnson in federal district court in an 
unrelated matter. A $260,000 judgment was entered against 
Johnson. Subsequently, the SBA took Johnson's deposition during 
post-judgment proceedings in an attempt to satisfy its judgment 
by identifying Johnson's assets. At that time, Johnson was a 
licensed attorney in Utah and had practiced law for a number of 
years.1 During his deposition, Johnson testified under oath that 
he had no interest in any partnerships or limited liability 
companies. In particular, he responded "no" to the questions, 
"Do you have any interest in any partnership?" and "Any interest 
in any limited liability companies?" Johnson also testified that 
he had no other assets upon which the SBA could execute. As a 
result, the SBA was unable to collect its judgment, and it 
thereafter assigned the judgment to All Star Financial, which in 
turn assigned it to Orvis on August 11, 2001. 
H4 Johnson claims to have had a partnership with Orvis in 
several credit repair businesses. In July 2001, Johnson 
suspected Orvis of embezzlement and fraud and demanded an 
accounting from Orvis. On August 28, 2001, Orvis filed an action 
for declaratory judgment proclaiming that he did not have a 
partnership with Johnson and further that Johnson had no right, 
claim, or interest in any of Orvis's businesses. Johnson 
counterclaimed for an accounting on the basis of his purported 
partnerships with Orvis. Johnson also filed a third-party 
complaint against three other parties on the same basis. Two of 
the third parties filed a motion for summary judgment, which the 
trial court granted, ruling that Johnson was judicially estopped 
from asserting that he was a partner in Orvis's businesses. 
Johnson did not appeal that judgment. 
H5 Orvis filed a motion for summary judgment on the ground that 
Johnson was judicially estopped from claiming partnership 
interests with Orvis. Deon Steckling, the remaining third party, 
joined Orvis in the motion. In November 2 004, the trial court, 
citing Johnson's deposition testimony in the post-judgment SBA 
proceedings, granted summary judgment to Orvis under the doctrine 
of judicial estoppel. The trial court entered a declaratory 
judgment that Johnson had no right, claim, or interest in any of 
Orvis's businesses. The trial court also dismissed with 
prejudice Johnson's third-party complaint against Steckling. 
Johnson appeals.2 
1Johnson was later disbarred in unrelated proceedings. 
2In his appellate briefs, Johnson does not seek reversal of 
the summary judgment in favor of Steckling. Orvis's brief states 
that Orvis is also filing on behalf of Steckling, if necessary. 
For the sake of clarity, we affirm Steckling's summary judgment 
against Johnson. 
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ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1(6- On appeal, Johnson contends that the trial court erred when 
it imposed the doctrine of judicial estoppel and granted summary 
judgment to Orvis, declaring that Johnson had no interest in any 
"business, enterprise or entity, relating to credit repair, in 
which Orvis has any ownership interest." "Summary judgment is 
appropriate only upon a showing 'that there is no genuine issue 
as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to 
a judgment as a matter of law.1" Waddoups v. Amalgamated Sugar 
Co., 2002 UT 69,121, 54 P.3d 1054 (quoting Utah R. Civ. P. 
56(c)). We review a grant of summary judgment for correctness, 
with no deference to the trial court.3 See id. 
1|7 Johnson also contends that the trial court demonstrated bias 
toward him. We review an allegation of judicial bias for 
correctness as a question of law. See State v. Tueller, 2001 UT 
App 317,17, 37 P.3d 1180. 
ANALYSIS 
I. Summary Judgment Based on Judicial Estoppel 
18 Johnson argues that the trial court erroneously applied the 
judicial estoppel doctrine in its grant of summary judgment to 
Orvis. He also argues that genuine issues of material fact 
preclude summary judgment. 
30rvis notes that other appellate courts have applied an 
abuse of discretion standard of review to cases of judicial 
estoppel, even when presented in the context of a summary 
judgment. See, e.g., Stallings v. Hussman Corp., 447 F.3d 1041, 
1046-47 (8th Cir. 2006); Alternative Sys. Concepts, Inc. v. 
Synopsys, Inc., 374 F.3d 23, 30-32 (1st Cir. 2004); De Leon v. 
Comcar Indus., Inc., 321 F.3d 1289, 1291 (11th Cir. 2003); 
Hamilton v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.. 270 F.3d 778, 782 (9th 
Cir. 2001); Ahrens v. Perot Sys. Corp., 205 F.3d 831, 833 (5th 
Cir. 2000). The rationale for applying this standard is that 
"•judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine invoked by a court 
at its discretion.'" Alternative Svs., 374 F.3d at 30-31 
(quoting New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 750 (2001) 
(internal quotations and citation omitted)). Utah's appellate 
courts have not addressed that issue of standard of review and we 
find no need to consider its application in this case. Such 
consideration may, however, be appropriate in a different case. 
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%9 "[J]udicial estoppel is the doctrine which 'prevents a party 
from seeking judicial relief by offering statements inconsistent 
with its own sworn statement in a prior judicial proceeding.'" 
Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough v. Dawson, 923 P.2d 1366, 1371 
(Utah 1996) (quoting Salt Lake City v. Silver Fork Pipeline 
Corp., 913 P.2d 731, 734 (Utah 1995)). '"The purpose of judicial 
estoppel is to uphold the sanctity of oaths, thereby safeguarding 
the integrity of the judicial process from conduct such as 
knowing misrepresentations or fraud on the court.'" Id. (quoting 
Silver Fork, 913 P.2d at 734). 
1(10 First, Johnson maintains that his sworn statement from the 
post-judgment SBA proceedings presents a genuine issue of 
material fact. He contends that the trial court failed to 
consider the actual meaning of his testimony when it interpreted 
only a truncated version of his response. Even though he 
answered "no" to the question about whether he had interest in a 
partnership, he continued his response as follows: 
Often I'll have a joint endeavor with 
somebody, but I don't have a partnership or 
set up a partnership or an L.L.C. You know, 
if I get a deal I say, [h]ey, do you want to 
do this deal together? We'll go up to Summit 
County and buy a lot. 
fll Johnson asserts that he did not think the question referred 
to his partnerships with Orvis, but instead referred specifically 
to real estate partnerships. However, Johnson failed to present 
any specific facts in the record that support this view. 
Because, as the nonmoving party, Johnson must submit more than 
conclusory or speculative assertions, we fail to see how his 
deposition statements can be interpreted as anything but a denial 
of interest in any type of partnership. See Waddoups v. 
Amalgamated Sugar Co., 2002 UT 69,131, 54 P.3d 1054 ("The 
nonmoving party must submit more than just conclusory assertions 
that an issue of material fact exists to establish a genuine 
issue."). 
^12 Further, the trial court considered the fact that Johnson 
was a licensed attorney at the time of the deposition and thus 
understood that the purpose of the deposition was to determine if 
he had assets that could be used to satisfy the SBA judgment 
against him. On review of these facts and the actual deposition 
transcript, there is no lack of clarity in Johnson's deposition 
testimony. 
%13 Second, Johnson contends that the trial court misapplied the 
judicial estoppel doctrine by not considering all of its 
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essential elements. He further maintains that genuine issues of 
material fact within each element preclude summary judgment under 
the judicial estoppel doctrine. 
1l4 In Tracy Loan & Trust Co. v. Openshaw Investment Co. , 102 
Utah 509, 132 P.2d 388 (1942), the supreme court identified four 
elements a party seeking to invoke the judicial estoppel doctrine 
must show: (1) the prior and subsequent judicial proceedings 
involve the same parties or their privies; (2) the prior and 
subsequent judicial proceedings involve the same subject matter; 
(3) the party opposing judicial estoppel seeks to deny a position 
he or she took in the prior judicial proceeding; and (4) the 
party seeking judicial estoppel in the subsequent judicial 
20041122-CA 5 
proceeding must have "relied on the former testimony."4 Id. at 
390. 
115 More recently, this court identified a fifth requirement for 
a party seeking to invoke the judicial estoppel doctrine--the 
party against whom judicial estoppel is sought must have 
exhibited bad faith. See 3D Constr. & Dev,, L.L.C. v. Old 
Standard Life Ins. Co., 2005 UT App 307,iJl2, 117 P.3d 1082 
(explaining that the purpose of the judicial estoppel doctrine is 
not advanced when imposed "in instances where the party's prior 
40ther jurisdictions have determined that mutuality of 
parties and reliance are not essential elements of the judicial 
estoppel doctrine. See Burnes v. Pemco Aeroplex, Inc., 2 91 F.3d 
1282, 1286 (11th Cir. 2002) ("The doctrine of judicial estoppel 
protects the integrity of the judicial system, not the litigants; 
therefore, numerous courts have concluded, and we agree, that 
'while privity and/or detrimental reliance are often present in 
judicial estoppel cases, they are not required.'" (quoting Ryan 
Operations G.P. v. Santiam-Midwest Lumber Co., 81 F.3d 355, 362 
(3d Cir. 1996))); see also Patriot Cinemas, Inc. v. General 
Cinema Corp., 834 F.2d 208, 214 (1st Cir. 1987); Edwards v. Aetna 
Life Ins. Co., 690 F.2d 595, 598 (6th Cir. 1982). 
For reasons explained in our analysis, we need not analyze 
each element of the judicial estoppel doctrine in this matter; 
however, if we did, we would not depart from the controlling 
precedent in Tracy Loan & Trust Co. v. Openshaw Investment Co. , 
102 Utah 509, 132 P.2d 388 (1942) . In Utah, challenges to the 
reliance element have been raised only in dissents. See Wiese v. 
Wiese, 699 P.2d 700, 705 (Utah 1985) (Durham, J., dissenting) 
(stating that because "judicial estoppel has a strong and 
independent public policy justification," the party asserting the 
judicial estoppel doctrine should not have to show either 
prejudice or reliance.); Royal Res, v. Gibralter Fin. Corp. , 603 
P.2d 793, 798 n.7 (Utah 1979) (Maughan, J., dissenting) 
("[E]lements such as reliance and injury or prejudice to the 
individual, which are generally essential to the operation of an 
equitable estoppel do not enter into a judicial estoppel or at 
least not to the same extent." (citing 31 C.J.S. Estoppel 
§ 117(b))). Orvis cites International Resources v. Dunfield, 599 
P.2d 515 (Utah 1979), as modifying the Tracy Loan criteria for 
judicial estoppel. That case, however, involved res judicata and 
collateral estoppel, not judicial estoppel. See id. at 516. 
This court is obligated to follow binding precedent by the Utah 
Supreme Court. Therefore, we assume that mutuality and reliance 
continue to be necessary elements of judicial estoppel in Utah. 
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position was based on mere mistake or inadvertence."5 (citing New 
Hampshire v. Maine. 532 U.S. 742, 753 (2001))). Put differently, 
the purpose of the judicial estoppel doctrine "is not served 
. .^  . where there is no evidence that the party against whom 
judicial estoppel is sought knowingly misrepresented any facts in 
the prior proceeding and where the party seeking to invoke 
judicial estoppel had equal or better access to the relevant 
facts." Salt Lake City v. Silver Fork Pipeline Corp. , 913 P.2d 
731, 734 (Utah 1995) (emphasis added); see also Jones, Waldo, 
Holbrook & McDonough v. Dawson, 923 P.2d 1366, 1371 (Utah 1996) 
(holding that if the party making a statement in a prior 
proceeding did not have access to relevant facts, then he could 
not have knowingly misrepresented the facts).6 
Ul6 As the moving party, Orvis had the burden of presenting 
evidence to demonstrate that no genuine issues of material fact 
existed and that he was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
See Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c) . Orvis presented sufficient evidence 
that no partnership interest existed because Johnson, in sworn 
testimony in a prior judicial proceeding, declared that he had no 
such interest. "[0]nee the moving party challenges an element of 
the nonmoving party's case on the basis that no genuine issue of 
material fact exists, the burden then shifts to the*nonmoving 
party to present evidence that is sufficient to establish a 
5The "prior position" in 3D Constr was a mere failure to 
check a box on a bankruptcy form. See 3D Constr. & Dev. , L.L.C. 
v. Old Standard Life Ins. Co., 2005 UT App. 307,14, 117 P.3d 
1082. 
6In contrast to Utah caselaw, in New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 
U.S. 742 (2001), the U.S. Supreme Court elected not to establish 
a strict formula for determining when to apply judicial estoppel. 
See id. at 750-51; see also Lowery v. Stovall, 92 F.3d 219, 223 
(4th Cir. 1996); Patriot Cinemas, Inc. v. General Cinema Corp. , 
834 F.2d 208, 212 (1st Cir. 1987); Allen v. Zurich Ins. Co., 667 
F.2d 1162, 1166 (4th Cir. 1982) . Nonetheless, in New Hampshire 
v. Maine, the Court enumerated several considerations adopted 
from other courts. See 532 U.S. at 750-51. The Court noted that 
courts typically consider whether (1) the party's earlier 
position is inconsistent with its later position, (2) the court 
accepted the party's earlier inconsistent position "so that 
judicial acceptance of an inconsistent position in a later 
proceeding would create the perception that either the first or 
second court was misled," and (3) "the party seeking to assert an 
inconsistent position would derive an unfair advantage or impose 
an unfair detriment on the opposing party if not estopped." Id. 
at 751 (quotations and citations omitted). 
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genuine issue of material fact." Waddoups v. Amalgamated Sugar 
Co. , 2002 UT 69,^131, 54 P.3d 1054.7 
Hl7 In response to Orvis's motion for summary judgment, Johnson 
asserted that three elements of judicial estoppel were disputed. 
Those elements were (1) whether Orvis and Johnson or their 
privies were parties in both actions, (2) whether both 
proceedings involved the same subject matter, and (3) whether 
Johnson was successful in the prior proceeding. Johnson did not 
argue that reliance and bad faith were necessary elements upon 
which there were disputed material facts. Orvis argues that 
Johnson waived those arguments by not raising them before the 
trial court. See Brookside Mobile Home Park v. Peebles , 2002 UT 
48,1(14, 48 P. 3d 968 (fl[I]n order to preserve an issue for appeal 
the issue must be presented to the trial court in such a way that 
the trial court has an opportunity to rule on that issue." 
(quotations and citation omitted)). Johnson, however, argues the 
trial court committed manifest error by failing to sua sponte 
analyze those two elements. We disagree. The trial court 
rightfully assumed, in reliance on Johnson's filings, that 
Johnson claimed that only those elements he actually discussed 
7Our colleague's concurring opinion maintains that in this 
case, as in Shaw Resources Limited, L.L.C. v. Pruitt, Gushee & 
Bachtell, P.C.i 2006 UT App 313, we have applied the standard for 
summary judgment described in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 
317 (1986), which has not been adopted by the Utah Supreme Court. 
See Harline v. Barker, 912 P.2d 433, 445 n.13 (Utah 1996) ("This 
court has not previously adopted the reasoning of the majority 
opinion in Celotex, which is not binding on us as a matter of 
law, and declines to do so today."). According to the concurring 
opinion, in this case and in Shaw, we have, in effect, adopted 
Celotex as the applicable test for summary judgment cases. We do 
not agree. To the contrary, the supreme court decision, Waddoups 
v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 2002 UT 69, 54 P.3d 1054, to which we 
refer above, cites rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
and another Utah Supreme Court case, Grand County v. Rogers, 2 002 
UT 25, 44 P.3d 734, as well as an Idaho Supreme Court case, as 
authority. See Waddoups, 2002 UT 69 at 1131. Consequently, we 
apply Utah governing law and specifically rule 56's requirement 
that the nonmoving party "must set forth specific facts showing 
that there is a genuine issue for trial." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e). 
Neither this case nor Shaw relies on Celotex. 
20041122-CA 8 
were relevant to the case and presented disputed material issues 
of fact. Accordingly, we do not address either bad faith or 
reliance.8 
Kl8 Furthermore, Johnson failed to identify issues of material 
fact regarding the three elements he raised before the trial 
court. Pursuant to the first element, both Orvis and Johnson 
were parties or privies thereof in both the SBA proceeding and 
the present litigation. Orvis and the SBA were privies because 
Orvis purchased the SBA judgment against Johnson prior to the 
commencement of the present litigation. See Tracy Loan & Trust 
Co. v. Openshaw Inv. Co., 102 Utah 509, 132 P.2d 388, 390 (1942) 
("[A] person may not, to the prejudice of another person [,] deny 
any position taken in a prior judicial proceeding between the 
same persons or their privies.").9 In contrast, Johnson argues 
that there was no valid assignment because Orvis purchased the 
judgment with "monies misappropriated from the partnership" and 
"in violation of partner and lawyer fiduciary duties." He 
contends that genuine issues of material fact exist regarding 
misappropriation and violation of fiduciary duties. He asserts 
that if there was privity, it was between the partnership as 
assignee and the SBA. Yet, even viewed in the light most 
favorable to Johnson, All Star Financial assigned the judgment 
solely to Orvis, an undisputed fact evidenced by the assignment 
attached to Johnson's affidavit. Furthermore, Johnson failed to 
argue or present any evidence of misappropriation or violation of 
fiduciary duties by Orvis. 
Kl9 The second element, consistent subject matter in the prior 
and present litigation, has also been satisfied. According to 
Tracy Loan, a person may not take a position in prior litigation 
8We do note, however, that the trial court stated in its 
minute entry that "there is no question of mistake. Mr. Johnson 
testified as he did, so as to avoid collection efforts from the 
[SBA]." Thus, there was no question of mistake or inadvertence 
in the SBA case. Similarly, it is undisputed that the SBA never 
collected on its judgment because Johnson testified that he had 
no available assets. 
9A person in privity with another is one who is "so 
identified in interest with another that he represents the same 
legal right," and "as applied to judgments or decrees of court, 
privity means one whose interest has been legally represented at 
the time." Searle Bros, v. Searle, 588 P.2d 689, 691 (Utah 1978) 
(quotations and citation omitted). Also included as being in 
privity is "a mutual or successive relationship to rights in 
property." Id. 
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and later deny it in subsequent litigation if the two proceedings 
involve the same subject matter. See id. Here, although the 
underlying action in the SBA proceedings dealt with contract and 
foreclosure, it was similar to the present litigation because 
both involved Johnson's alleged partnership interest with Orvis. 
As the trial court observed, the subject matter of the post-
judgment proceedings by the SBA was to determine Johnson's 
assets, including ascertaining whether he had any partnership or 
limited liability company assets. 
1(2 0 Furthermore, as previously discussed, Johnson's affidavit 
does not create material issues of fact beyond mere speculation. 
Nothing in Johnson's affidavit supports his assertion that his 
response in the SBA deposition to the question about partnerships 
was based on his belief that it referred only to partnerships in 
real estate. An affidavit is deficient if it "reveal [s] no 
evidentiary facts, but merely reflect [s] the affiant's 
unsubstantiated opinions and conclusions." Treloggan v. 
Treloggan, 699 P.2d 747, 748 (Utah 1985). Moreover, the SBA 
deposition questions do not mention real estate, indicating that 
Johnson's response to the question about whether he had any 
partnerships was an unqualified "no." 
1(21 Likewise, the record sufficiently supports the next element 
that Johnson's position in the prior litigation was successfully 
maintained. Johnson's denial that he was involved in any 
partnerships was successfully maintained because the SBA did not 
collect on its judgment against Johnson. See Tracy Loan, 132 
P.2d at 3 90. We therefore hold that the trial court did not err 
in granting Orvis's motion for summary judgment against Johnson. 
II. Judicial Bias 
1122 Johnson contends that the trial court's grant of Orvis's 
motion for summary judgment was based on bias against him. 
Johnson states that the trial judge was biased because he 
presided over a previous bar proceeding that resulted in 
Johnson's disbarment. In addition, he argues that the trial 
court had "preconceived notions" about Johnson and "preconceived 
certainty" about the "meaning of a few short words" from 
Johnson's deposition. 
1J2 3 Because Johnson failed to properly preserve the issue of 
judicial bias by filing a motion to disqualify the judge and 
raises it for the first time on appeal, he must demonstrate that 
the trial court committed plain or manifest error. See State v. 
Tueller, 2001 UT App 317,^9, 37 P.3d 1180. "To be considered 
plain or manifest . . ., an error must be both harmful and 
obvious." State v. Menzies, 845 P.2d 220, 225 (Utah 1992). The 
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alleged bias must "have some basis in fact and be grounded on 
more than mere conjecture and speculation." In re M.L.. 965 P.2d 
551, 556 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (quotations and citation omitted). 
We have carefully examined the record and find no evidence of 
judicial bias against Johnson. 
CONCLUSION 
f24 In sum, Johnson failed to present genuine issues of material 
fact that a partnership existed between him and Orvis. We 
conclude that Johnson is precluded under the judicial estoppel 
doctrine from asserting the existence of a partnership. 
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's grant of summary 
judgment in favor of Orvis and the court's entry of a declaratory 
judgment that Johnson does not have a right, claim, or interest 
in any of Orvisfs businesses. We also reject Johnson's claim of 
judicial bias. 
Pamela T. Greenwood, 
Associate Presiding Judge 
H25 I CONCUR: 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
BENCH, Presiding Judge (concurring): 
[^26 In my recent dissent in Shaw Resources Limited, L.L.C. v. 
Pruitt, Gushee & Bachtell, P.C., 2006 UT App 313,1161-68, I 
pointed out that "[t]he traditional rule is that summary judgment 
is available only where the moving party can affirmatively 
demonstrate that there is no genuine issue as to any material 
issues of fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law." Id. at 162 (quotations and citation 
omitted). Because of Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 
(1986), the burden in federal courts has been shifted to the 
nonmoving party, aligning "the movant's production burden for 
summary judgment to the burden of proof that party would bear at 
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trial." Shaw Res. Ltd., L.L.C., 2006 UT App 313 at ^63 (Bench, 
P.J., dissenting). In Shaw, I argued that Utah has never 
deliberately adopted the Celotex approach, and that the 
traditional rule for summary judgment should continue to be the 
controlling law in Utah. See generally id. at \\64-68. In the 
present case, the main opinion again uses the burden-shifting 
Celotex standard. I reiterate my concern that the Celotex 
standard should not be considered the controlling authority in 
Utah. 
\ll Nevertheless, the doctrine of stare decisis establishes that 
M,the first decision by a court on a particular question of law 
governs later decisions by the same court.'" State v. Menzies, 
889 P.2d 393, 399 (Utah 1994) (quoting State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 
1256, 1269 (Utah 1993)). The majority opinion in Shaw utilized 
the burden-shifting Celotex standard for summary judgment, even 
in the face of my concerns. For the first time, in Shaw, Utah 
knowingly adopted the burden-shifting standard. Until such time 
as that approach is changed by the Utah Supreme Court, I am 
constrained to follow Shaw. I therefore concur, albeit 
reluctantly. 
Russell W. Bench, 
Presiding Judge 
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